Growing Schism in the Jihadi movement
Harold's List
New York Times
By BERNARD HAYKEL
WHEN Iraq's most notorious terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared a "full-scale war" on Iraq's Shiites on Sept. 14, he appeared to be speaking for all or most jihadis. But Mr. Zarqawi's war on Shiites is deeply unpopular in some quarters of his own movement. In fact, growing splits among jihadis are beginning to undermine the theological and legal justifications for suicide bombing. And as that emerging schism takes its toll on the jihadi movement, it could well present an opportunity for Western governments to combat jihadism itself.
The simple fact is that many jihadis believe the war in Iraq is not going well. Too many Muslims are being killed. Images of that slaughter, conveyed by satellite television and the Internet throughout the Muslim world, are eroding global support for the jihadi cause. There are strong indications from jihadi Web sites and online journals, confirmed by conversations I have had while doing research among Salafis, or scriptural literalists, that the suicide attacks are turning many Muslims against the jihadis altogether.
The movement's leadership is sensitive to Muslim public opinion. Mr. Zarqawi's mentor, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, has denounced the campaign against Shiites as un-Islamic. Other prominent radical Islamists have advanced similar criticisms. And in a letter made public last week, Al Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, cautioned Mr. Zarqawi against particularly gruesome executions and attacks on Iraqi civilians for fear of their negative impact on the global jihadi cause.
To be sure, the alternatives these critics recommend are no less violent. Rather, many of the movement's dissidents suggest that jihadis diminish their efforts in Iraq and revert to spectacular attacks in the West, like those that took place on Sept. 11. These, such thinkers maintain, are singularly popular among Muslims and the only effective means of doing long-term damage to the West.
Still, Western governments should encourage the debate among jihadis because, if the promise of absolute salvation through suicide attacks is thrown into question by some within the jihadi movement, potential recruits may come to doubt the wisdom of engaging in such tactics.
The prevailing jihadi theoretical argument consists in saying that there is religious sanction for the killing of Muslim civilians, and that neither the innocent victims nor the bombers are doomed to suffer in hell. Jihadi claims about the certainty of salvation are the most important tools in their recruitment efforts. But they are also so fractious and unstable as to comprise the movement's Achilles' heel. In order to sustain these claims, theorists quote examples from the Prophet Muhammad's time that permit the targeting of Muslim civilians in war. They then draw tendentious analogies between these cases and today's political situation. For example, jihadis falsely claim that Iraqi civilians are being held as human shields by the occupying forces.
Furthermore, in Iraq, the jihadis bank on the fact that their attacks primarily kill Shiites. The fighters presume that their Sunni brethren, who consider Shiites to be heretics, will either approve or turn a blind eye. This policy is clearly failing, except among the radical Salafis in Saudi Arabia whose hatred for Shiites exceeds even that for the United States.
Not only are some jihadis queasy about targeting Shiites, but particularly following the London bombings, some jihadis have questioned the targeting of civilians more generally. One major jihadi ideologue, Abu Baseer al-Tartusi, has issued a fatwa arguing that all suicide bombing that targets Muslims, or innocent non-Muslims, is unlawful.
Abu Baseer, a Syrian who lives in Britain, no doubt fears that in Britain's changing legal climate, he might be extradited to his homeland, where he would face certain imprisonment and torture. Some jihadis have excoriated him on Internet message boards for placing self-preservation above religious conviction. But the important point is that real chinks are widening in the jihadi ideological armor, whether by the real consequences of suicide attacks or because the religious justifications that have underpinned them are becoming untenable.
Arguments can be built on Abu Baseer's position that suicide attacks inevitably involve the killing of innocent civilians, including Muslims living in the West, and that these are difficult to justify in Islamic law. Rather than expelling him from his asylum in Britain, concerned authorities ought to allow Abu Baseer to remain in Britain and make his case, which amounts to one of the first principled arguments by a jihadi thinker against suicide bombings since 9/11. Any would-be suicide bomber will have to weigh these arguments.
The West needs to understand that reasoned debates take place within jihadi circles and that such reasoning can change minds. Indeed, Al Qaeda's most recent statements, like that of Mr. Zawahiri, betray an anxiety about these splits within the movement and seek to reassert the legitimacy of suicide attacks both in Iraq and in the West.
THE West should refrain from interfering in this evolving debate. Western governments should not shut down jihadi Web sites or expel the movement's dissenters, many of whom reside in the West or write from prisons in the Middle East. Rather, they should allow this process to take its course. By employing extreme tactics, the jihadis have laid bare the contradictions within their own movement. Their internal debates about suicide tactics are a sign of weakness - and of the fraying of the consensus Al Qaeda so carefully built over the last decade.
Bernard Haykel, an associate professor of Islamic Studies at New York University and a 2005 Carnegie Scholar, is the author of "Revival and Reform in Islam."
New York Times
By BERNARD HAYKEL
WHEN Iraq's most notorious terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, declared a "full-scale war" on Iraq's Shiites on Sept. 14, he appeared to be speaking for all or most jihadis. But Mr. Zarqawi's war on Shiites is deeply unpopular in some quarters of his own movement. In fact, growing splits among jihadis are beginning to undermine the theological and legal justifications for suicide bombing. And as that emerging schism takes its toll on the jihadi movement, it could well present an opportunity for Western governments to combat jihadism itself.
The simple fact is that many jihadis believe the war in Iraq is not going well. Too many Muslims are being killed. Images of that slaughter, conveyed by satellite television and the Internet throughout the Muslim world, are eroding global support for the jihadi cause. There are strong indications from jihadi Web sites and online journals, confirmed by conversations I have had while doing research among Salafis, or scriptural literalists, that the suicide attacks are turning many Muslims against the jihadis altogether.
The movement's leadership is sensitive to Muslim public opinion. Mr. Zarqawi's mentor, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, has denounced the campaign against Shiites as un-Islamic. Other prominent radical Islamists have advanced similar criticisms. And in a letter made public last week, Al Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, cautioned Mr. Zarqawi against particularly gruesome executions and attacks on Iraqi civilians for fear of their negative impact on the global jihadi cause.
To be sure, the alternatives these critics recommend are no less violent. Rather, many of the movement's dissidents suggest that jihadis diminish their efforts in Iraq and revert to spectacular attacks in the West, like those that took place on Sept. 11. These, such thinkers maintain, are singularly popular among Muslims and the only effective means of doing long-term damage to the West.
Still, Western governments should encourage the debate among jihadis because, if the promise of absolute salvation through suicide attacks is thrown into question by some within the jihadi movement, potential recruits may come to doubt the wisdom of engaging in such tactics.
The prevailing jihadi theoretical argument consists in saying that there is religious sanction for the killing of Muslim civilians, and that neither the innocent victims nor the bombers are doomed to suffer in hell. Jihadi claims about the certainty of salvation are the most important tools in their recruitment efforts. But they are also so fractious and unstable as to comprise the movement's Achilles' heel. In order to sustain these claims, theorists quote examples from the Prophet Muhammad's time that permit the targeting of Muslim civilians in war. They then draw tendentious analogies between these cases and today's political situation. For example, jihadis falsely claim that Iraqi civilians are being held as human shields by the occupying forces.
Furthermore, in Iraq, the jihadis bank on the fact that their attacks primarily kill Shiites. The fighters presume that their Sunni brethren, who consider Shiites to be heretics, will either approve or turn a blind eye. This policy is clearly failing, except among the radical Salafis in Saudi Arabia whose hatred for Shiites exceeds even that for the United States.
Not only are some jihadis queasy about targeting Shiites, but particularly following the London bombings, some jihadis have questioned the targeting of civilians more generally. One major jihadi ideologue, Abu Baseer al-Tartusi, has issued a fatwa arguing that all suicide bombing that targets Muslims, or innocent non-Muslims, is unlawful.
Abu Baseer, a Syrian who lives in Britain, no doubt fears that in Britain's changing legal climate, he might be extradited to his homeland, where he would face certain imprisonment and torture. Some jihadis have excoriated him on Internet message boards for placing self-preservation above religious conviction. But the important point is that real chinks are widening in the jihadi ideological armor, whether by the real consequences of suicide attacks or because the religious justifications that have underpinned them are becoming untenable.
Arguments can be built on Abu Baseer's position that suicide attacks inevitably involve the killing of innocent civilians, including Muslims living in the West, and that these are difficult to justify in Islamic law. Rather than expelling him from his asylum in Britain, concerned authorities ought to allow Abu Baseer to remain in Britain and make his case, which amounts to one of the first principled arguments by a jihadi thinker against suicide bombings since 9/11. Any would-be suicide bomber will have to weigh these arguments.
The West needs to understand that reasoned debates take place within jihadi circles and that such reasoning can change minds. Indeed, Al Qaeda's most recent statements, like that of Mr. Zawahiri, betray an anxiety about these splits within the movement and seek to reassert the legitimacy of suicide attacks both in Iraq and in the West.
THE West should refrain from interfering in this evolving debate. Western governments should not shut down jihadi Web sites or expel the movement's dissenters, many of whom reside in the West or write from prisons in the Middle East. Rather, they should allow this process to take its course. By employing extreme tactics, the jihadis have laid bare the contradictions within their own movement. Their internal debates about suicide tactics are a sign of weakness - and of the fraying of the consensus Al Qaeda so carefully built over the last decade.
Bernard Haykel, an associate professor of Islamic Studies at New York University and a 2005 Carnegie Scholar, is the author of "Revival and Reform in Islam."
posted by Marko at 10/11/2005 11:38:00 AM
<< Home