Russia politics: Starting the succession race
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has promoted two of his most trusted allies to senior government posts, in a rare reshuffle. This signals the start of the succession race and thus that Mr Putin intends to step down in 2008 at the end of his current term. It does not, however, mean that the new first deputy prime minister, the relatively liberal Dmitry Medvedev, can yet be considered the succession favourite—he has much to prove and there is plenty of time for other candidates to emerge. Moreover, the recent changes could give statists greater influence in the Kremlin in the run-up to 2008.
In contrast to the presidency of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, Mr Putin has made relatively few government changes during his time in power. His decision on November 14th to promote two allies, Mr Medvedev and the defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, to new senior government posts is therefore especially noteworthy. Mr Medvedev moves from the Kremlin, where he is the presidential administration’s chief of staff, to be first deputy prime minister in the government. Mr Ivanov retains the defence portfolio but now has the title deputy prime minister. Prior to the reshuffle there was only one deputy prime minister, Aleksandr Zhukov. He remains in post but is now behind Messrs Ivanov and Medvedev in the pecking order.
The president explained that the appointments were intended to “improve co-ordination” within the machinery of government. This does not seem disingenuous: policies are often hatched in the presidential administration but must be executed by the government, and the latter’s effectiveness in this regard is open to question. Thus, with Mr Putin eager to see the reforms that will constitute his legacy implemented, it is not surprising that he should appoint to senior government positions two people who will have the clout to overcome bureaucratic inertia and turf battles.
Start the race
The promotion of Messrs Medvedev and Ivanov has significance beyond the president’s desire to see his programme implemented, however. Each now has an opportunity to prove his credentials for the presidency in 2008. By making the appointments, Mr Putin has fired the starting gun on the succession. This increases the likelihood that he will step down at the end of his current term, rather than seeking to stay in office via a constitutional amendment, or to shift power to the cabinet and then become prime minister.
Nevertheless, the succession race is at a very early stage. The post of prime minister is considered to be the main launch pad for a presidential bid, but incumbent Mikhail Fradkov—who is not a serious contender for the presidency—remains in place. It is probable that the contest will remain at a preliminary stage until Mr Putin appoints a credible presidential candidate to the premiership.
Primarily, this is because Putin cannot yet afford to anoint a chosen successor, as this would weaken his own authority. There are no indications that Mr Putin is ready yet to relinquish effective power to a successor. By promoting Messrs Medvedev and Ivanov, Mr Putin has ensured that the two men will compete for the presidency—by seeking to please Mr Putin by pushing his policies through government—yet it does not preclude new candidates from emerging if one or both of the two front-runners does not make the grade.
Don’t bet yet
The fact that Mr Medvedev has been appointed to the senior position implies that he is ahead of Mr Ivanov in the race for the presidency. For those hoping for a pro-reform administration after Mr Putin steps down, this is encouraging because Mr Medvedev is aligned with the “St Petersburg liberals” faction in the Kremlin while Mr Ivanov, a former KGB officer, is considered to be closer to the statist “siloviki”.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the race is a lengthy one and that it has only just begun. It is much too soon yet to consider Mr Medvedev the favourite, for several reasons.
First, Mr Medvedev needs to prove himself in the new role and must outdo Mr Ivanov, who is also clearly a contender. Until Mr Putin appoints a prime minister with presidential ambitions, there is little certainty as to the path of the succession and it is quite possible that Mr Ivanov—or another—could be promoted into that post over Mr Medvedev.
Second, it is quite possible that another candidate will emerge. In the last two years of Mr Yeltsin’s term, a number of heirs apparent—Sergei Kiriyenko, Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stepashin—were appointed premier and touted as the next president, only to fall by the wayside. Mr Putin’s style is less cavalier than Mr Yeltsin’s, but neither is he limited to the two-man shortlist he has in effect drawn up.
Third, as noted above, Mr Putin cannot afford to give the impression that the succession is settled or close to being so. This would leave him a lame-duck president.
Fourth, Mr Medvedev—who is, in effect, being auditioned for the presidency—is now in a much more vulnerable position than previously. In many ways the presidential administration is a more powerful institution than the government and the latter tends to be viewed as more culpable for policy failures; although he will carry a measure of personal authority into his new post there is a risk that Mr Medvedev’s silovik rivals within the presidential administration will now have greater scope to undermine him. The Yukos affair revealed a great rivalry between Mr Medvedev and one of his deputies, the silovik Igor Sechin. Although Mr Sechin has not been promoted to Kremlin chief of staff, he could well have more influence in the Kremlin under Sergei Sobyanin, the new head of the presidential administration, who was previously the governor of Tyumen oblast.
Statist drift
In the immediate term, the personnel changes hold out some promise of better policy implementation, but not of a more liberal policy direction. The strengthening of the siloviki within the Kremlin is crucial here, for the presidential administration is near certain to remain the principal institution for devising policies. Moreover, the top of the government now looks less liberal than before: previously the only deputy prime minister was the liberal reformist Aleksandr Zhukov; in effect, he has been demoted and now stands below Mr Medvedev, whose liberal credentials are much weaker, and the statist Mr Ivanov.
This trend may prove to be a more reliable indicator of where Russia will go after 2008 than Messrs Medvedev and Ivanov’s starting positions in what may turn out to be a multi-candidate succession race. In the current climate it is difficult to envisage that Mr Putin will select an out-and-out liberal to be his successor. Most likely, he will chose the candidate he considers to be the best bet for continuity with the current policy course, which is notably more cautious than during Mr Putin’s first term. Equally likely, Mr Putin will delay this decision for as long as possible—meaning that the race for the presidency will not be decided before 2007.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
In contrast to the presidency of his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, Mr Putin has made relatively few government changes during his time in power. His decision on November 14th to promote two allies, Mr Medvedev and the defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, to new senior government posts is therefore especially noteworthy. Mr Medvedev moves from the Kremlin, where he is the presidential administration’s chief of staff, to be first deputy prime minister in the government. Mr Ivanov retains the defence portfolio but now has the title deputy prime minister. Prior to the reshuffle there was only one deputy prime minister, Aleksandr Zhukov. He remains in post but is now behind Messrs Ivanov and Medvedev in the pecking order.
The president explained that the appointments were intended to “improve co-ordination” within the machinery of government. This does not seem disingenuous: policies are often hatched in the presidential administration but must be executed by the government, and the latter’s effectiveness in this regard is open to question. Thus, with Mr Putin eager to see the reforms that will constitute his legacy implemented, it is not surprising that he should appoint to senior government positions two people who will have the clout to overcome bureaucratic inertia and turf battles.
Start the race
The promotion of Messrs Medvedev and Ivanov has significance beyond the president’s desire to see his programme implemented, however. Each now has an opportunity to prove his credentials for the presidency in 2008. By making the appointments, Mr Putin has fired the starting gun on the succession. This increases the likelihood that he will step down at the end of his current term, rather than seeking to stay in office via a constitutional amendment, or to shift power to the cabinet and then become prime minister.
Nevertheless, the succession race is at a very early stage. The post of prime minister is considered to be the main launch pad for a presidential bid, but incumbent Mikhail Fradkov—who is not a serious contender for the presidency—remains in place. It is probable that the contest will remain at a preliminary stage until Mr Putin appoints a credible presidential candidate to the premiership.
Primarily, this is because Putin cannot yet afford to anoint a chosen successor, as this would weaken his own authority. There are no indications that Mr Putin is ready yet to relinquish effective power to a successor. By promoting Messrs Medvedev and Ivanov, Mr Putin has ensured that the two men will compete for the presidency—by seeking to please Mr Putin by pushing his policies through government—yet it does not preclude new candidates from emerging if one or both of the two front-runners does not make the grade.
Don’t bet yet
The fact that Mr Medvedev has been appointed to the senior position implies that he is ahead of Mr Ivanov in the race for the presidency. For those hoping for a pro-reform administration after Mr Putin steps down, this is encouraging because Mr Medvedev is aligned with the “St Petersburg liberals” faction in the Kremlin while Mr Ivanov, a former KGB officer, is considered to be closer to the statist “siloviki”.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the race is a lengthy one and that it has only just begun. It is much too soon yet to consider Mr Medvedev the favourite, for several reasons.
First, Mr Medvedev needs to prove himself in the new role and must outdo Mr Ivanov, who is also clearly a contender. Until Mr Putin appoints a prime minister with presidential ambitions, there is little certainty as to the path of the succession and it is quite possible that Mr Ivanov—or another—could be promoted into that post over Mr Medvedev.
Second, it is quite possible that another candidate will emerge. In the last two years of Mr Yeltsin’s term, a number of heirs apparent—Sergei Kiriyenko, Yevgeny Primakov and Sergei Stepashin—were appointed premier and touted as the next president, only to fall by the wayside. Mr Putin’s style is less cavalier than Mr Yeltsin’s, but neither is he limited to the two-man shortlist he has in effect drawn up.
Third, as noted above, Mr Putin cannot afford to give the impression that the succession is settled or close to being so. This would leave him a lame-duck president.
Fourth, Mr Medvedev—who is, in effect, being auditioned for the presidency—is now in a much more vulnerable position than previously. In many ways the presidential administration is a more powerful institution than the government and the latter tends to be viewed as more culpable for policy failures; although he will carry a measure of personal authority into his new post there is a risk that Mr Medvedev’s silovik rivals within the presidential administration will now have greater scope to undermine him. The Yukos affair revealed a great rivalry between Mr Medvedev and one of his deputies, the silovik Igor Sechin. Although Mr Sechin has not been promoted to Kremlin chief of staff, he could well have more influence in the Kremlin under Sergei Sobyanin, the new head of the presidential administration, who was previously the governor of Tyumen oblast.
Statist drift
In the immediate term, the personnel changes hold out some promise of better policy implementation, but not of a more liberal policy direction. The strengthening of the siloviki within the Kremlin is crucial here, for the presidential administration is near certain to remain the principal institution for devising policies. Moreover, the top of the government now looks less liberal than before: previously the only deputy prime minister was the liberal reformist Aleksandr Zhukov; in effect, he has been demoted and now stands below Mr Medvedev, whose liberal credentials are much weaker, and the statist Mr Ivanov.
This trend may prove to be a more reliable indicator of where Russia will go after 2008 than Messrs Medvedev and Ivanov’s starting positions in what may turn out to be a multi-candidate succession race. In the current climate it is difficult to envisage that Mr Putin will select an out-and-out liberal to be his successor. Most likely, he will chose the candidate he considers to be the best bet for continuity with the current policy course, which is notably more cautious than during Mr Putin’s first term. Equally likely, Mr Putin will delay this decision for as long as possible—meaning that the race for the presidency will not be decided before 2007.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
posted by Marko at 11/18/2005 08:04:00 AM
<< Home