Syria politics: Unco-operative
The Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, has opted for defiance and a closing of the ranks of his regime as his means for dealing with the UN Security Council resolution demanding full co-operation from Damascus in the investigation into the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister. The likely consequence is that Syria will be found in breach of that resolution.
Mr Assad laid out his position in a long televised speech at Damascus University on November 10th. The dominant theme was that of Syria being the victim of an international assault aimed at undermining its role as a strategic challenger to the regional dominance of Israel. The tone, was in many parts of the speech, querulous. He reiterated his claim that the first of the recent series of UN resolutions—No 1559 of September 2004—“had no relation to the extension” of the term of Lebanon’s president, Emile Lahoud, but was rather the result of a previous US-French plan to eject Syria from Lebanon. He also claimed that “what is happening now has no relation whatsoever to the assassination of al-Hariri—if they were really concerned with the blood of al-Hariri, they would have formed a commission of inquiry into [the death of] Yasser Arafat”, the Palestinian leader, who Mr Assad claimed to have been poisoned in the Palestinian Territories before dying in a French hospital one year ago.
Mr Assad went on to dismiss the report presented to the Security Council by the UN investigator, Detlev Mehlis, which concluded that there was “converging evidence” of the involvement of Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services in the assassination. Mr Assad, somewhat bizarrely, maintained: “The only positive element that I see in this report is that established our innocence.”
“Playing the game”
UN Security Council resolution 1636 formally endorsed the findings of the Mehlis commission, and extended its mandate until December 15th (with the option of further extensions). The key articles in the resolution relate to the requirements on Syria to co-operate fully in the coming phase of the investigation. It stated that: “Syria must detain those Syrian officials or individuals whom the commission considers as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organising or perpetrating” of the assassination, and make them fully available to the commission. The resolution also stated that the commission shall have the same rights vis-à-vis Syria as it was accorded in Lebanon in the original resolution (No 1595), passed in April, and that Syria must co-operate fully and unconditionally on that basis. The commission has been given the authority to “determine the location and the modalities for interview of Syrian officials and individuals it deems relevant to the inquiry”.
Mr Mehlis returned to his operating base in Beirut in early November. He submitted, through UN channels, a list of six Syrian officials that he wished to interview, specifying that he wished the meetings to take place in Beirut. Mr Assad devoted a section of his speech to addressing this question of co-operation. He sought to establish that Syria was prepared to “play the game” as required by the UN, but that it also wished to address legitimate concerns with regard to the rights of its citizens. He said that Mr Mehlis had refused an invitation to co-ordinate with Syria’s own commission of inquiry into the Hariri assassination, and that he had rejected numerous suggestions from Damascus about how to stage the interviews. These included setting up a location under the UN flag in Syrian territory, or conducting the interviews at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo. “It is not possible to have an investigation without a judicial basis,” he said. “This is unacceptable under any title, whether it be a UN resolution or anything else.”
Following Mr Assad’s speech, Syria’s ambassador to the UN, Faysal Mekdad, sought to amplify the message that Damascus is being reasonable in the face of the intransigence of Mr Mehlis. He said that Syria was quote prepared to allow the six men on the list to be interviewed in a third country--as long as that was not Lebanon. Mr Mehlis has meanwhile left Beirut, without explanation.
It is evident that Syria’s sensitivity about the interviews taking place in Lebanon relates to the possibility that the Lebanese judicial authorities may seek to arrest the men. Were the interviews to take place in another country, there would be no judicial basis for them to be arrested.
The identities of the six men have not been disclosed. The only Syrian officials directly mentioned the final version of the Mehlis report were Rustom Ghazaleh, the former head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, his deputy, Jameh Jameh, and Assef Shawkat, the overall head of Syrian military intelligence. In an earlier version there was also mention of Maher Assad, the president’s younger brother and commander of the 4th Corps of the Republican Guard, which is responsible for military security in Damascus, Bahjat Suleiman, the former head of the internal division of General Intelligence (a forthright opponent of any Syrian disengagement from Lebanon, Mr Suleiman was replaced after the June 2005 Baath part congress), and Hassan Khalil.
Unless Mr Assad makes a dramatic climbdown, Syria will soon have to face the consequences of being found in breach of Resolution 1636, which has binding force as it was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
Mr Assad laid out his position in a long televised speech at Damascus University on November 10th. The dominant theme was that of Syria being the victim of an international assault aimed at undermining its role as a strategic challenger to the regional dominance of Israel. The tone, was in many parts of the speech, querulous. He reiterated his claim that the first of the recent series of UN resolutions—No 1559 of September 2004—“had no relation to the extension” of the term of Lebanon’s president, Emile Lahoud, but was rather the result of a previous US-French plan to eject Syria from Lebanon. He also claimed that “what is happening now has no relation whatsoever to the assassination of al-Hariri—if they were really concerned with the blood of al-Hariri, they would have formed a commission of inquiry into [the death of] Yasser Arafat”, the Palestinian leader, who Mr Assad claimed to have been poisoned in the Palestinian Territories before dying in a French hospital one year ago.
Mr Assad went on to dismiss the report presented to the Security Council by the UN investigator, Detlev Mehlis, which concluded that there was “converging evidence” of the involvement of Lebanese and Syrian intelligence services in the assassination. Mr Assad, somewhat bizarrely, maintained: “The only positive element that I see in this report is that established our innocence.”
“Playing the game”
UN Security Council resolution 1636 formally endorsed the findings of the Mehlis commission, and extended its mandate until December 15th (with the option of further extensions). The key articles in the resolution relate to the requirements on Syria to co-operate fully in the coming phase of the investigation. It stated that: “Syria must detain those Syrian officials or individuals whom the commission considers as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, organising or perpetrating” of the assassination, and make them fully available to the commission. The resolution also stated that the commission shall have the same rights vis-à-vis Syria as it was accorded in Lebanon in the original resolution (No 1595), passed in April, and that Syria must co-operate fully and unconditionally on that basis. The commission has been given the authority to “determine the location and the modalities for interview of Syrian officials and individuals it deems relevant to the inquiry”.
Mr Mehlis returned to his operating base in Beirut in early November. He submitted, through UN channels, a list of six Syrian officials that he wished to interview, specifying that he wished the meetings to take place in Beirut. Mr Assad devoted a section of his speech to addressing this question of co-operation. He sought to establish that Syria was prepared to “play the game” as required by the UN, but that it also wished to address legitimate concerns with regard to the rights of its citizens. He said that Mr Mehlis had refused an invitation to co-ordinate with Syria’s own commission of inquiry into the Hariri assassination, and that he had rejected numerous suggestions from Damascus about how to stage the interviews. These included setting up a location under the UN flag in Syrian territory, or conducting the interviews at the Arab League headquarters in Cairo. “It is not possible to have an investigation without a judicial basis,” he said. “This is unacceptable under any title, whether it be a UN resolution or anything else.”
Following Mr Assad’s speech, Syria’s ambassador to the UN, Faysal Mekdad, sought to amplify the message that Damascus is being reasonable in the face of the intransigence of Mr Mehlis. He said that Syria was quote prepared to allow the six men on the list to be interviewed in a third country--as long as that was not Lebanon. Mr Mehlis has meanwhile left Beirut, without explanation.
It is evident that Syria’s sensitivity about the interviews taking place in Lebanon relates to the possibility that the Lebanese judicial authorities may seek to arrest the men. Were the interviews to take place in another country, there would be no judicial basis for them to be arrested.
The identities of the six men have not been disclosed. The only Syrian officials directly mentioned the final version of the Mehlis report were Rustom Ghazaleh, the former head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, his deputy, Jameh Jameh, and Assef Shawkat, the overall head of Syrian military intelligence. In an earlier version there was also mention of Maher Assad, the president’s younger brother and commander of the 4th Corps of the Republican Guard, which is responsible for military security in Damascus, Bahjat Suleiman, the former head of the internal division of General Intelligence (a forthright opponent of any Syrian disengagement from Lebanon, Mr Suleiman was replaced after the June 2005 Baath part congress), and Hassan Khalil.
Unless Mr Assad makes a dramatic climbdown, Syria will soon have to face the consequences of being found in breach of Resolution 1636, which has binding force as it was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
posted by Marko at 11/12/2005 08:31:00 AM
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