Early Christmas gift for Chavez
Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, already has a firm hold on most of the country’s political institutions. He is now set to consolidate that control further in December 4th legislative elections. The decision by three opposition parties, announced on November 29th, to pull out of the race, followed by a similar move by Venezuela’s only other major opposition group the next day, ensures that Mr Chávez’s party will gain a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. With that degree of control, he will be able to easily secure constitutional amendments, including one to enable him to remain in office indefinitely.
With a popularity rating of around 70%, Mr Chávez was already expected to increase the number of seats held by his Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) or allied parties. At present the government controls just over one-half of the total 165 seats. Acción Democrática (AD), the largest opposition party, holds 25 seats, COPEI five and Proyecto Venezuela seven. The last party to pull out of the polls, Primero Justicia, has five seats. Now that these parties have withdrawn from the election, these seats are up for grabs.
The centre-left AD—a traditionally powerful but now largely discredited party—has charged that the electoral process is flawed and that the electoral body, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE), is biased in favour of the government. It, along with other Chávez critics, lacks confidence in the electoral registry and in the electronic voting system, saying that it can be manipulated and, because it uses fingerprints for identification, can be used to track who votes for which party. It cited these reasons to justify its withdrawal.
Although there have been accusations in the past of tampering and bias on the part of the CNE—most significantly during last year’s national recall referendum on Mr Chávez’s rule, which was soundly defeated—the opposition parties were apt to lose seats even in the cleanest of elections. It is more likely, therefore, that the move by AD and the others was designed to wrest political legitimacy from the outcome, thereby punishing Mr Chávez.
Indeed, Súmate, the group that organised the signature drive for the referendum, has been actively engaged in recent months in an intensive national and international campaign to warn of the potential for electoral fraud in the December election. It is now calling for mass civil disobedience and anti-government prayers in churches.
However, if the strategy has been to sabotage the vote, it may well backfire. International observers, including from the EU and the Organisation of American States (OAS), are on hand to monitor the election. So far they have not identified major problems, although the OAS has convinced the CNE to dispense with the fingerprinting machine for the upcoming vote. If international monitors endorse the outcome of the December 4th balloting—as they did the results of the 2004 referendum—this will be a boost to Mr Chávez.
Many opposition factions have continued to denounce the referendum’s outcome, and can be expected to do the same after December 4th. However, the loss by the opposition coalition that organised the referendum effort weakened it so severely that the umbrella group subsequently collapsed. The government also swept regional elections held later that year.
More polarisation
The opposition’s decision to drop out of the polls is at least partly intended to raise doubts over the Chávez government’s democratic credentials, and could well bring the administration unwanted international publicity. But in terms of gaining the initiative in the domestic political scene, it is unclear what the opposition parties will gain by not participating. The opposition remains divided between radical and moderate elements. Among much of the electorate, the anti-Chávez parties are seen variously as ineffectual, elitist, corrupt or lacking a coherent, attractive policy platform. Looking further ahead, all appear to lack a presidential candidate capable of taking on Mr Chávez, with the possible exception of Primero Justicia’s leader, Julio Borges.
So, for the moment, Mr Chávez will remain largely unchallenged. Yet with disputes over the legitimacy of the December 4th election results now more likely than ever, the political scene could become more severely polarised that it is now. This raises, once again, the risk of renewed social disturbances.
Still more ominous for those who oppose him will be Mr Chávez’s enlarged powers. There is little doubt that he can win re-election in presidential balloting in late 2006. He would then have to step down in 2012. But if he is able to change the constitution again (he did so in 1999, early in his first term), he might be able to run as many times as he likes.
There are other policies of the Chávez’s administration that could be codified via constitutional amendments. One is the attempt to redefine private property rights. The government has already initiated measures to expropriate land and other property that it deems, according to its own definitions, is not being used productively or for the public good.
The president will be able to continue to push through other laws that further his “Bolivarian Revolution”, a self-styled mixture of nationalism and socialism. The National Assembly has already approved laws that tighten government control of the media (the Radio and Television Social Responsibility Law, which regulates the content of broadcasts) and other measures that the opposition says increase Mr Chávez’s authoritarian powers. But with the court system stacked with Chávez loyalists, there is little chance that any of these laws—or the elections results—can be legally overturned.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Latin America
With a popularity rating of around 70%, Mr Chávez was already expected to increase the number of seats held by his Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) or allied parties. At present the government controls just over one-half of the total 165 seats. Acción Democrática (AD), the largest opposition party, holds 25 seats, COPEI five and Proyecto Venezuela seven. The last party to pull out of the polls, Primero Justicia, has five seats. Now that these parties have withdrawn from the election, these seats are up for grabs.
The centre-left AD—a traditionally powerful but now largely discredited party—has charged that the electoral process is flawed and that the electoral body, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE), is biased in favour of the government. It, along with other Chávez critics, lacks confidence in the electoral registry and in the electronic voting system, saying that it can be manipulated and, because it uses fingerprints for identification, can be used to track who votes for which party. It cited these reasons to justify its withdrawal.
Although there have been accusations in the past of tampering and bias on the part of the CNE—most significantly during last year’s national recall referendum on Mr Chávez’s rule, which was soundly defeated—the opposition parties were apt to lose seats even in the cleanest of elections. It is more likely, therefore, that the move by AD and the others was designed to wrest political legitimacy from the outcome, thereby punishing Mr Chávez.
Indeed, Súmate, the group that organised the signature drive for the referendum, has been actively engaged in recent months in an intensive national and international campaign to warn of the potential for electoral fraud in the December election. It is now calling for mass civil disobedience and anti-government prayers in churches.
However, if the strategy has been to sabotage the vote, it may well backfire. International observers, including from the EU and the Organisation of American States (OAS), are on hand to monitor the election. So far they have not identified major problems, although the OAS has convinced the CNE to dispense with the fingerprinting machine for the upcoming vote. If international monitors endorse the outcome of the December 4th balloting—as they did the results of the 2004 referendum—this will be a boost to Mr Chávez.
Many opposition factions have continued to denounce the referendum’s outcome, and can be expected to do the same after December 4th. However, the loss by the opposition coalition that organised the referendum effort weakened it so severely that the umbrella group subsequently collapsed. The government also swept regional elections held later that year.
More polarisation
The opposition’s decision to drop out of the polls is at least partly intended to raise doubts over the Chávez government’s democratic credentials, and could well bring the administration unwanted international publicity. But in terms of gaining the initiative in the domestic political scene, it is unclear what the opposition parties will gain by not participating. The opposition remains divided between radical and moderate elements. Among much of the electorate, the anti-Chávez parties are seen variously as ineffectual, elitist, corrupt or lacking a coherent, attractive policy platform. Looking further ahead, all appear to lack a presidential candidate capable of taking on Mr Chávez, with the possible exception of Primero Justicia’s leader, Julio Borges.
So, for the moment, Mr Chávez will remain largely unchallenged. Yet with disputes over the legitimacy of the December 4th election results now more likely than ever, the political scene could become more severely polarised that it is now. This raises, once again, the risk of renewed social disturbances.
Still more ominous for those who oppose him will be Mr Chávez’s enlarged powers. There is little doubt that he can win re-election in presidential balloting in late 2006. He would then have to step down in 2012. But if he is able to change the constitution again (he did so in 1999, early in his first term), he might be able to run as many times as he likes.
There are other policies of the Chávez’s administration that could be codified via constitutional amendments. One is the attempt to redefine private property rights. The government has already initiated measures to expropriate land and other property that it deems, according to its own definitions, is not being used productively or for the public good.
The president will be able to continue to push through other laws that further his “Bolivarian Revolution”, a self-styled mixture of nationalism and socialism. The National Assembly has already approved laws that tighten government control of the media (the Radio and Television Social Responsibility Law, which regulates the content of broadcasts) and other measures that the opposition says increase Mr Chávez’s authoritarian powers. But with the court system stacked with Chávez loyalists, there is little chance that any of these laws—or the elections results—can be legally overturned.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Latin America
posted by Marko at 12/02/2005 08:50:00 AM
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