Iran nuclear threat assessment (EIU)
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The slide towards confrontation over Iran's nuclear plans started well before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad entered the reckoning as a serious contender for the presidency. However, since he took office in August last year, the pace has quickened, partly owing to Mr Ahmadinejad's provocative statements on Israel. It was always likely that the dispute would eventually reach the "point of no return", signalled by Iran embarking on enrichment of uranium, the critical step towards developing nuclear weapons. The febrile atmosphere created by Mr Ahmadinejad has merely acted as a catalyst for bringing forward that date.
The EU trio of France, Germany and the UK has decided to present a resolution to the upcoming board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calling for the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council for violating its undertakings according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This move is to be co-ordinated with the US, Russia and China. The effort to maintain such a broad front renders it more difficult for Iran to portray the issue as a conflict between the Islamic Republic and the US.
The trigger for this intensified diplomacy was Iran's decision to break the seals on the Natanz uranium enrichment plant to allow for research on developing the nuclear fuel cycle to resume. This move was, in effect, a practical response the Russia's proposal to co-operate with Iran in the production of nuclear fuels on the basis of critical elements of the enrichment process being conducted on Russian soil. The urgency on the part of the Western powers (and Russia) stems from the suspicion that once Iranian engineers have mastered the technique of spinning centrifuges to enrich uranium the way will be open for Iran to set up a dedicated unit for weapons-grade uranium enrichment.
Masterplan
The IAEA has not yet been found sufficient evidence to accuse Iran of seeking to develop nuclear technology for military uses, but it has placed in record concerns voiced by the EU that Iran's haste to acquire the capability to produce nuclear fuel has not been matched by any effort to build power stations that would use such fuel. The Bushehr nuclear power station is being built with Russian assistance according to an agreement whereby Russia will control the supply of nuclear fuel and the disposal of the spent fuel rods. Iran does not have any other current nuclear power plant projects under way, or even in the design phase. The Bushehr plant is now substantially complete, but implementation of the fuel deal is in a state of suspension. Russian could still go ahead with its fuel supplies as a means to demonstrate the advantages of a co-operative approach to the nuclear question.
The strategic case for the development of nuclear power in Iran is not without merit, even though the country possesses the second-largest gas reserves in the world. Generating a significant portion of Iran's electricity from nuclear power stations would free up gas for reinjection in oilfields--a major element in prolonging the life of older fields--and for export. However, the heavy investment in the nuclear fuel cycle and the secrecy that has shrouded these activities strongly suggest that there has long been a consensus in Iran's centres of political power that the possession of a military nuclear capability would be in the national interest. This would be on the grounds that it would safeguard Iran against aggression--within living memory the country has been invaded by both Iraq and the former Soviet Union--and would enhance the status of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East and wider Muslim world.
The Iranian political and clerical establishment has shown remarkable unity in is support of the basic tenets of the nuclear development plant, which rest on upholding the legitimate right to pursue technological advancement for peaceful purposes. If indeed Iran does have a subsidiary agenda entailing the pursuit of a military nuclear capability, there is no sign of any serious dissension among the various poles of political power.
Calculating the costs
The apparent firmness of Iran's front in the nuclear dispute is matched by a strong international consensus on the need to prevent Iran becoming a nuclear-armed power. This latter consensus depends, however, on maintaining a policy of measured responses to Iran's actions, which could well be interpreted by Iranian decision-makers as a sign of ultimate weakness. The US has been willing to take an essentially subordinate role both because of the lack of direct diplomatic channels between Washington and Tehran and, presumably, because the Bush administration is in no hurry to confront the choice of whether to use military force against Iran at a time when it is still bogged down in Iraq. An Israeli strike remains a possibility, but it is not clear how effective it would be, and it would be likely to trigger a major conflagration on Israel's northern border, involving operations by the Iranian-supplied Lebanese Hizbullah forces. The most powerful weapon that could be used against Iran short of military attack would be a trade embargo, but such a move would play havoc with the global economy as it would risk shutting off not only the supply of Iran's 2.6m barrels/day (b/d) of oil exports but also much of the oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Iraq, should Iran resort to blocking the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf.
Iran can thus be reasonably confident that it will not be exposed to military attack and that any sanctions that might be imposed on it would be of limited scope. Yet a prolonged stalemate, punctuated by selective trade sanctions and measures such as a ban on sporting links would nevertheless have an impact. Investment in Iran's infrastructure and in the oil and gas industry would lag, condemning the Iranian economy to continue to underperform despite the benefits of high oil prices. This in turn could result in a build-up of political pressure from below on the Iranian regime to take advantage of the opportunity it has been offered to develop nuclear technology subject to some restrictions, but with solid economic inducements offered in compensation.
Mr Ahmadinejad seems bent on preventing an accommodation along these lines, which of course would entail Iran accepting to live without a nuclear weapons capability. However, his powers to provoke may yet prove to be just as limited as were the powers of his predecessor, Mohammed Khatami, to reconcile differences between Iran and the West.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
The slide towards confrontation over Iran's nuclear plans started well before Mahmoud Ahmadinejad entered the reckoning as a serious contender for the presidency. However, since he took office in August last year, the pace has quickened, partly owing to Mr Ahmadinejad's provocative statements on Israel. It was always likely that the dispute would eventually reach the "point of no return", signalled by Iran embarking on enrichment of uranium, the critical step towards developing nuclear weapons. The febrile atmosphere created by Mr Ahmadinejad has merely acted as a catalyst for bringing forward that date.
The EU trio of France, Germany and the UK has decided to present a resolution to the upcoming board meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calling for the referral of Iran to the UN Security Council for violating its undertakings according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This move is to be co-ordinated with the US, Russia and China. The effort to maintain such a broad front renders it more difficult for Iran to portray the issue as a conflict between the Islamic Republic and the US.
The trigger for this intensified diplomacy was Iran's decision to break the seals on the Natanz uranium enrichment plant to allow for research on developing the nuclear fuel cycle to resume. This move was, in effect, a practical response the Russia's proposal to co-operate with Iran in the production of nuclear fuels on the basis of critical elements of the enrichment process being conducted on Russian soil. The urgency on the part of the Western powers (and Russia) stems from the suspicion that once Iranian engineers have mastered the technique of spinning centrifuges to enrich uranium the way will be open for Iran to set up a dedicated unit for weapons-grade uranium enrichment.
Masterplan
The IAEA has not yet been found sufficient evidence to accuse Iran of seeking to develop nuclear technology for military uses, but it has placed in record concerns voiced by the EU that Iran's haste to acquire the capability to produce nuclear fuel has not been matched by any effort to build power stations that would use such fuel. The Bushehr nuclear power station is being built with Russian assistance according to an agreement whereby Russia will control the supply of nuclear fuel and the disposal of the spent fuel rods. Iran does not have any other current nuclear power plant projects under way, or even in the design phase. The Bushehr plant is now substantially complete, but implementation of the fuel deal is in a state of suspension. Russian could still go ahead with its fuel supplies as a means to demonstrate the advantages of a co-operative approach to the nuclear question.
The strategic case for the development of nuclear power in Iran is not without merit, even though the country possesses the second-largest gas reserves in the world. Generating a significant portion of Iran's electricity from nuclear power stations would free up gas for reinjection in oilfields--a major element in prolonging the life of older fields--and for export. However, the heavy investment in the nuclear fuel cycle and the secrecy that has shrouded these activities strongly suggest that there has long been a consensus in Iran's centres of political power that the possession of a military nuclear capability would be in the national interest. This would be on the grounds that it would safeguard Iran against aggression--within living memory the country has been invaded by both Iraq and the former Soviet Union--and would enhance the status of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East and wider Muslim world.
The Iranian political and clerical establishment has shown remarkable unity in is support of the basic tenets of the nuclear development plant, which rest on upholding the legitimate right to pursue technological advancement for peaceful purposes. If indeed Iran does have a subsidiary agenda entailing the pursuit of a military nuclear capability, there is no sign of any serious dissension among the various poles of political power.
Calculating the costs
The apparent firmness of Iran's front in the nuclear dispute is matched by a strong international consensus on the need to prevent Iran becoming a nuclear-armed power. This latter consensus depends, however, on maintaining a policy of measured responses to Iran's actions, which could well be interpreted by Iranian decision-makers as a sign of ultimate weakness. The US has been willing to take an essentially subordinate role both because of the lack of direct diplomatic channels between Washington and Tehran and, presumably, because the Bush administration is in no hurry to confront the choice of whether to use military force against Iran at a time when it is still bogged down in Iraq. An Israeli strike remains a possibility, but it is not clear how effective it would be, and it would be likely to trigger a major conflagration on Israel's northern border, involving operations by the Iranian-supplied Lebanese Hizbullah forces. The most powerful weapon that could be used against Iran short of military attack would be a trade embargo, but such a move would play havoc with the global economy as it would risk shutting off not only the supply of Iran's 2.6m barrels/day (b/d) of oil exports but also much of the oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Iraq, should Iran resort to blocking the Strait of Hormuz at the mouth of the Gulf.
Iran can thus be reasonably confident that it will not be exposed to military attack and that any sanctions that might be imposed on it would be of limited scope. Yet a prolonged stalemate, punctuated by selective trade sanctions and measures such as a ban on sporting links would nevertheless have an impact. Investment in Iran's infrastructure and in the oil and gas industry would lag, condemning the Iranian economy to continue to underperform despite the benefits of high oil prices. This in turn could result in a build-up of political pressure from below on the Iranian regime to take advantage of the opportunity it has been offered to develop nuclear technology subject to some restrictions, but with solid economic inducements offered in compensation.
Mr Ahmadinejad seems bent on preventing an accommodation along these lines, which of course would entail Iran accepting to live without a nuclear weapons capability. However, his powers to provoke may yet prove to be just as limited as were the powers of his predecessor, Mohammed Khatami, to reconcile differences between Iran and the West.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
posted by Marko at 1/13/2006 03:00:00 PM
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