Kuwait politics: Who is next in line?

FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

The death of the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jabr al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah, has taken the Gulf state one step down the road to empowerment of a younger generation. The 77-year-old ruler had been unwell for a long period before his death on January 15th, and his successor, Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah, also has a long history of ill health. Real power in Kuwait has resided for the past two years with the prime minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabr al-Sabah, who is likely to be approved as the new crown prince soon after the official mourning period has elapsed. The next steps in the succession are not so clear, however.

Dynastic rules

According to the conventions governing the exercise of power in Kuwait, a balance should be struck between the two main wings of the ruling family, the Al Jabr and the Al Salem. Much of the debate within the family over this issue in recent times has been based on the assumption that Sheikh Saad (an Al Salem) would died before Sheikh Jabr. If this had happened, the appointment of Sheikh Sabah as crown prince would have meant that two successive emirs would have been drawn from the Al Jabr side. In a bid to offset such a concentration of power in the hands of the Al Jabr, the head of the National Guard, Sheikh Salem Ali al-Salem al-Sabah, intimated in 2004 that he should be elevated to the post of prime minister

However, some within the Al Sabah family council made clear their view that the National Guard commander was pushing his case too stridently. This has opened the way for the foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed Sabah al-Salem al-Sabah, who is the only Al Salem in the cabinet, to be considered as the senior aspirant of that branch of the ruling family. However, the popular oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed al‑Fahd al‑Ahmed al-Sabah, also has solid claims for advancement, although he is from the Al Jabr side.

Politics as usual

Debate in the National Assembly (parliament) over further reform of parliamentary politics and over the enabling legislation for the development of the northern oilfields is unlikely to be seriously affected by the changes brought about by Sheikh Jabr's death. Existing reform proposals, officially supported by the government, would reduce the number of constituencies from 25 to ten. The government is uncomfortable with the accusation that financial manipulation of elections is being assisted by the small size of constituencies. However, with the electorate set to double, following the granting of women’s suffrage over the summer, the government is likely to stall on additional changes for the time being. The next election will include female voters for the first time (on the assumption that it does not take place much before its scheduled date of mid-2007, when the bureaucratic procedures for their participation would be complete).

Legislation for Project Kuwait, involving the development of four oilfields on the basis of operating contracts to be carried out by international oil companies, is currently under review by parliamentary committees. There is a substantial body of opposition to the law among MPs, mainly on the grounds that international companies would acquire rights equivalent to those conferred under concession agreements, which are not permitted according to the constitution. This suggests that if the government is determined to pass the law it may be obliged to consider a trade-off involving aspects of the proposed electoral law.



SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East