Iran's WMD profile
Iran's chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, nuclear weapon program and biological warfare capabilities, are meant to deter opponents and to gain influence in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions. The acquisition and creation of these various weapon systems can also be seen as a response to Iran's own experience as a victim of chemical and missile attacks during the Iran-Iraq War.
Nuclear
By early June 2005, the EU-3 (France, Great Britain, and Germany) had not yet submitted their proposal to Iran outlining future nuclear negotiations. The EU-3 requested a delay in negotiations, but Tehran rejected the delay and publicly announced it would resume peaceful nuclear research activities. At issue was Iran's insistance that right to peaceful nuclear research be included in any proposal, a position the United States adamantly opposed. Attempts were made to persuade Iran to give up its fuel cycle ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad, but Tehran made it clear that any proposal that did not guarantee Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology would lead to the cessation of all nuclear related negotiations with the EU-3. In addition, members of the Iranian Majlis, scientists, scholars, and students were protesting and holding rallies to encourage the government to lift the suspension on uranium enrichment and to not succumb to foreign (U.S.) pressure. One week later, Iran once again agreed to temporarily freeze its nuclear program until the end of July when the European Union agreed it would submit a proposal for the next round of talks.
In June, IAEA Deputy Director Pierre Goldschmidt stated that Iran admitted to providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran claimed all such research ceased in 1993, but results from recent tests show experiments took place as late as 1995 and 1998. In early July, Iran asked the IAEA if it could break UN seals and test nuclear-related equipment, stating the testing would not violate Tehran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities. At the end of July, an official letter was submitted to the IAEA stating that the seals at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) would be removed. The IAEA requested that it be given 10 days to install the necessary surveillance equipment. On 1 August, Iran reminded the EU-3 that 3 August would be the last opportunity for a proposal to be submitted to continue negotiations. A few days later, the European Union submitted the Framework for a Long-term Agreement proposal to Iran. The proposal specifically called on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately rejected the proposal as a negation of its inalienable rights. On 8 August, nuclear activities resumed at the Isfahan UCF and two days later, IAEA seals were removed from the remaining parts of the process lines with IAEA inspectors present.
In the days leading up to Iran's resumption of nuclear activities, several countries called on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities. Additionally, some European countries and the United States threatened to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Once again, Iran rejected any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities, but stated they were ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe there was any legal basis for referral to the UN Security council and believed it was only a political move. Iran also threatened to stop all negotiations, prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear facilities, suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol, and withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), if it was referred to the UN Security Council.
In August 2005, the IAEA announced that most of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found at various locations in Iran were found to be of foreign origin. The IAEA concluded much of the HEU found on centrifuge parts were from imported Pakistani equipment, rather than from any enrichment activities conducted by Iran.
In late August, Iran began announcing it would be resuming nuclear activities in Natanz and that Tehran would be willing to negotiate as long as there were no conditions. In August, Iran refused to comply with a resolution from the IAEA to halt its nuclear program, stating that making nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the NPT. The European Union believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear energy under Article 4 of the NPT, it had lost that right because it violated Article 2 of the NPT - "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear related weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." On 24 September 2005, the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance of the NPT. The resolution passed with 21 votes of approval, 12 abstentions, and one opposing vote. Russia and China were among those that abstained from voting and Venezuela was the only country to vote against the resolution. The resolution stated Iran's non-compliance due to "many failures and breaches" over nuclear safeguards of the NPT were grounds for referral to the UN Security Council.
Biological
There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a biological weapon program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973, the U.S. government believes Iran began biological weapon efforts in the early to mid-1980s, and that it continues to pursue an offensive biological weapon program linked to its civilian biotechnology activities. The United States alleges that Iran may have started to develop small quantities of agent, possibly including mycotoxins, ricin, and the smallpox virus. Iran strongly denies acquiring or producing biological weapons.
Chemical
Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Iraqi chemical weapons over the period 1982 to 1988. As a consequence Iran has a great deal of experience of the effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran has continued to maintain a significant defensive CW capability since the end of the Gulf War in 1988. The most important incentive for this effort was probably concern that Iraq continued to possess chemical weapons. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program developed during the latter stages of the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. On ratifying the CWC Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all offensive CW activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed. Nevertheless the United States has continued to claim that Iran maintains an active program of development and production of chemical weapons. This program reportedly includes the production of sarin, mustard, phosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. The U.S. government estimates that Iran can produce 1,000 metric tons of agent per year and may have a stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent. Open-sources do not provide unambiguous support to these accusations. Iran strongly denies producing or possessing chemical weapons. To date the United States has not pursued options available to it under international law to convincingly demonstrate Iranian noncompliance with the CWC.
Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this has involved an ongoing process of modernisation and expansion in the chemical industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and technology. Due to U.S. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production Iran encounters regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are restricted by members of the Australia Group.
Chemical Facilities
Abu Musa Island
Other Names: n/a
Location: 25052'30''N 55001'48''E. Located in the Strait of Hormuz in the mouth of the Persian Gulf, halfway between Iran and the United Arab Emirates.
Website: n/a
Phone Number: n/a
Subordinate to: Disputed territory that is jointly administered by Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Size: Only a few square miles.
Primary Function: Serves as a forward location for the Iranian military, which claims control over the island.
History: Iran has claimed its authority over the island since 1971 and asserted a physical presence since 1992. In 1992, the dispute over Abu Musa became more acute when Iran unilaterally tried to control the entry of third country nationals into the UAE portion of Abu Musa island. Tehran subsequently backed off in the face of significant diplomatic support for the UAE in the region, but in 1994 it increased its military presence on the disputed islands.
Activities: Although Abu Musa island is not a CW facility per se, there have been reports that during a period of tension between Iraq and Iran, Iran deployed CW munitions on the island. The New York Times reported in late March 1995 that, according to administration officials, Iran's military deployment on disputed islands in the Gulf included chemical weapons. Jane's Defense Weekly also reported in April 1995 that US Defense Secretary William Perry revealed that Iran had placed chemical weapons on disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. According to Pentagon officials, the weapons deployed on Abu Musa island were mostly 155mm artillery shells. The Journal of Commerce also reported that Secretary Perry said that Iran had deployed "...6,000 troops, chemical weapons, and anti-ship missiles to unmanned islands in the Strait of Hormuz." Finally, according to a study by the National Defense University from April 1997, "The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz."
ngineering Research Center for the Contruction Crusade (Jihad-e Sazandegi)
Other Names: Engineering Research Center of: the Construction Crusade, Jihad e-Sazandegi, Jahaad-e Saazandegi, Construction Jihad, Jahad-e Sazandegi, and Jahad. Also Jahad Engineering Research Center, Jahad Sazandegi Research Center.
Address: Main Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi Offices (Tehran):
Ministry of Construction Crusade
Islamic Republic of Iran
Kuche Khosrow Khavar, No 20
Vali Asr. Sq., Near Kowsar Hotel
Tehran, Iran
Ministry of Construction Crusade
P.O. Box 15875-4347
Central Bldg., Valy-e Asr Juncation, Taleghani Ave.
Tehran, Iran
Location: There are four engineering research branches in the cities of Esfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashad.
Website: Unknown
Email: Mr. Ghasem Yazdim, comenrjs@dci.iran.com
Phone Number: +98 21 8895354-5, +98 21 61361
Subordinate to: Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi (also known as the Ministry of Construction Crusade and Ministry of Construction Jihad)
Size: Size of individual research centers unknown. The entire ministry has 12 different divisions and a number of organizations, directorates, offices, and companies. Research centers were established in 20 provinces throughout the country. According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, there are four affiliate research institutes in the cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashad that are involved in production and research for WMD.
Fourteen applied-science training centers in more than 30 courses of study needed by the ministry have been active. Today, the ministry has acquired 300 researchers at doctorate and graduate levels, 1,000 researchers at undergraduate levels, and 2,500 at technician levels. Approximately 5,000 of the ministry's personnel are pursuing their studies in training centers at home or abroad in livestock, natural resources, fisheries, and rural development fields.
Primary Function: Engineering research for defense, natural resources, animal husbandry, fisheries, and utilization and processing of products.
History: The Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi (or "striving for construction and development," better known as Construction Crusade) was formed in 1983 by Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Consultative Parliament to address poverty through rural development and construction and agricultural growth and self-sufficiency. The ministry played a crucial role in the Iran-Iraq War by constructing strategic bridges, floating bridges, floating vehicles, submarines, freeways for armored vehicles, and special vehicles for use in marshy fields. In the spring of 1983, the office dedicated to army engineering research was moved from war fronts in the south of Iran to Tehran. This Engineering Research Center was the starting point for Jihad-e Sazandegi's future engineering research activities.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran reports that during the Iran-Iraq War, the Construction Crusade was affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a revolutionary group that reportedly directs the production and employment of WMD in Iran, while also advocating the funding of terrorist groups. The same source notes that the Research Center, now managed by Fadhlallah Wakili-Fard, was originally supposed to be part of the Defense Ministry, but was established separately by IRGC Minister Muhsin Rafiqdust as a means of covering its true intent. According to Paula A. De Sutter, the Construction Crusade acted as the corps of engineers for the IRGC, aiding in the production of material for Iran's biological, nuclear, chemical and missile programs. In 1986, the Tehran Domestic Service reported the IRGC Minister's announcement that "the armament industries of the Corps have made notable progress in the missile, aircraft, biological, chemical and nuclear fields."
Activities: The Construction Crusade's engineering research centers have implemented projects in the fields of defense, natural resources engineering, animal husbandry engineering, fisheries engineering, and utilization and processing of products. The ministry also provides natural disaster relief, army engineering in war fronts, and reconstruction of war-stricken villages.
Rural projects include construction of roads, baths, mortuaries, and libraries in rural areas. The ministry also works to provide training, employment, electricity, potable water, and water for irrigation. After 1987, the ministry began projects to support rural industries and cooperatives, increase livestock production, and develop Iran's fisheries. The ministry also constructed three large wheat silos in the cities of Tabriz, Takistan, and Rasht. According to reports by US experts and Israeli sources, the facility near Tarbiz is being used to store stocks of biological agent such as anthrax and botulinum toxin.
According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the engineering research center is the government department responsible for all chemical development facilities. Iran established at least one large research and development center under the control of the center, which had allegedly established a significant chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989. The same source reports that the center focuses on research and production of VX. (However, perhaps one could question the accuracy of those allegations due to the Council's reference to VX as a "biological agent"). It is also reported that the Research Center is manufacturing an advanced fermenter designed by its own scientists.
Additional Info: Directly accountable to the Majlis, the Minister of Jihad-e Sazandegi is a member of the President of Iran's cabinet.
Damghan
Other Names: n/a
Location: One source reports a warhead assembly plant located in Damghan between the Semnan and Shahroud missiles complexes to the east of Tehran. The city of Damghan is located near a dry lake approximately 375 miles to the southwest of Mashad, or 300km east of Teheran.
Size: Unknown
Primary Function: Reported research on weaponization of CBW agents; houses munitions-filling factory/ies (155mm artillery shells and Scud warheads).
History: According to the Federation of American Scientists, there are uncorroborated reports that Iran had a chemical weapons plant in operation at this location as early as March 1988.
Activities: According to several sources, Iran's primary suspected chemical weapons production facility is located in the city of Damghan. In addition, US experts believe that Iran has at least one chemical warhead assembly plant near Damghan. Middle East Defense News reports (spring 1988) claimed that "neuro-toxic" warheads (presumably nerve agent-type) were being assembled for Iran's Scud-B missiles at Damghan between the Semnan and Shahroud missiles complexes to the east of Tehran. Finally, in March 1988, Die Welt reported that, according to Iraqi intelligence, Iran had converted a medical factory in the area of Damghan into a CW munitions production factory.
In a 1995 Special Report, Jane's Intelligence Review noted that the Damghan facility is suspicious because "it has several characteristics of chemical weapon plants: isolation, links to transportation lines, and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind of town, surrounded by fallow fields and linked to the railroad by a spur." The report states that in addition to the claims of 155mm shells, the facility also has loaded Scud-B warheads with nerve gas. The missile assembly facility is just 130km away and is connected by the same rail line.
Isfahan
Other Names: Esfahan
Address: Names of all suspected weapons facilities are unknown.
However, the following addresses correspond to chemical laboratories in Isfahan:
Poly-Acryl Iran Corporation (PIC)
Abshar Crossroads
P.O. Box 4415
Isfahan, Isfahan, Islamic Republic of Iran
(Another source lists a different street address in EIfahan: 45 Km. Mobrake Rd.)
Linear Alkyl Benzene Complex (LAB):
Isfahan-Tehran Rd., km.15
West of Shahid Mohammad Montazeri Power Plant
Isfahan, Iran
Chemical Industries Group (CIG) (Central Office):
P.O. Box 16765-358
2nd floor, Sanam Bldg.
Nobonyad Square
Tehran, Iran
Location: n/a
Website: LAB Complex, Poly-acryl Iran Corporation, and Chemical Industries Group websites are unknown.
Phone: Poly-Acryl Iran Corporation: +98 (31) 310051, 276400
Chemical Industries Group (office): +98 21 2546602
Phone number of LAB Complex unknown.
Subordinate to: Unknown
Size: Presently, PIC plants comprise five production units with an aggregate annual capacity of 95,000 metric tons. CIG's Bofors plant operates with a staff of 300 people. The size of the LAB Complex is unknown.
Primary Function: Chemical production
History:
Polyacryl Iran Corporation was founded in August 1974. The first Linear Alkyl Benzyne Complex was officially founded by President Rafsanjani in June 1994. Within the Chemical Industries Group (CIG), a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Isfahan starting in the late 1970s; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages.
Activities:
Several sources report that the Iranian government maintains chemical weapon production facilities in the city of Isfahan. Unconfirmed reports from the National Council of Resistance of Iran claim that nerve gas produced in a facility near Semnan was transported to a missile plant in Isfahan for weaponization on ballistic missiles, including the Scud-B.
Although the exact location of the suspected facilities are unknown, Isfahan is home to several chemical companies with production capabilities: Poly-Acryl Corporation, Linear Alkyl Benzene Complex, and the Chemical Industries Group.
PIC ranks as the largest and most technologically advanced man-made fiber manufacturer in Iran. Presently, PIC plants comprise five production units with an aggregate annual capacity of 95,000 metric tons, including 33000 tons polyester staple, 22500 tons polyester yarn, 2000 tons polyester tops, 22500 tons acrylic staple and 15000 tons acrylic tops.
The commercial plant of the Poly-Acryl Corporation, a privately owned, independent commercial enterprise about 45km from the city of Isfahan, reportedly "developed into a major chemical weapons production facility." Steinberg notes sources that reported on "Chinese assistance, in terms of both infrastructure for building chemical plants and some of the necessary precursors for...the production of Poly-acryl corp for chemical weapons near Ishfahan."
The first Linear Alkyl Benzyne (LAB) Complex was officially founded by President Rafsanjani in June 1994. The LAB complex in Isfahan produces linear alkyl benzene, the raw material for the production of synthetic household detergents. The raw materials used, kerosene and benzene, are supplied from Isfahan Refinery and Isfahan Petrochemical Complex respectively. All management activities, coordination, planning/scheduling, project control, and procurement activities for the construction of the LAB complex have been performed by Iran Chemical Industries Investment Company (ICIIC) management team. A portion of engineering and supervision activities have been performed by Iranian consulting engineers, and all construction and erection activities have been performed by Iranian contractors. All activities related to precommissioning, commissioning, and start-up of the LAB complex have been performed by ICIIC personnel. Links to CW production are unclear.
Located in Isfahan, the Chemical Industries Group is the backbone of the Iranian weapons industry. According to US intelligence sources, CIG is making solid-fuel propellant powders for Iran's ballistic missile and artillery rocket programs. Within the CIG, a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Isfahan starting in the late 1970s as a dual-use fertilizer and explosives factory; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages. The Bofors chemical plant in Isfahan produces TNT, RDX, Hexotol B, Hexotol B4, plastic explosives (C4), and nitrocellulose. Despite very large batch runs of TNT, Hexatol, and Hexogen, the plant operates with a staff of only 300 people since all primary filling lines are fully automated. Today, the plant is fully staffed by Iranians.
It is interesting to note that Bofors was involved in an illegal arms trade scandal in 1987, when it was discovered the company had been illegally selling weapons to Iran, Bahrein, Dubai, Libya, and Oman for 10 years. It is also possible that real or perceived use of cyanide as a CW agent by Iran, such as during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), could have been due to its acrylonitrile production capacity, a process that utilizes hydrogen cyanide—but this is mostly speculation.
Missile
Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. It has purchased North Korean Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, and Nodong ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery rockets and is producing the Scud-B and the Scud-C—called the Shehab-1 and Shehab-2, respectively. Iran recently flight-tested the 1,300 km-range Shehab-3, which is based on the North Korean Nodong. The Shehab-3 is capable of reaching Israel. Following this most recent flight-test, the Shehab-3 was placed in service and revolutionary guard units were officially armed with the missiles. There are conflicting reports about the development of even longer-ranged missiles, such as the Shehab-4 and the Kosar intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). U.S. intelligence agencies assess that barring acquisition of a complete system or major subsystem from North Korea, Iran is unlikely to launch an ICBM or satellite launch vehicle (SLV) before mid-decade. At present, Iran's capabilities in missile production have kept in line with its doctrine of protection from regional threats. Iran has developed new missiles including the Ra'ad and Kosar and continues to test its Nodong based, Shehab-3 missile.
On October 20, 2004, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani confirmed the latest successful test of Iran’s Shehab-3 with a 2,000-kilometer range in front of observers.
Iran has openly declared its ability to mass produce the Shehab-3 medium-range missile. Intelligence reports regarding Iran's expansion of capabilities and persistent interest in acquiring new technologies have led the United States to seek other options in dealing with Iran as a regional threat.
Missile Facilities
Tehran
Subordinate to: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Location: Latitude 35° 42' North; longitude 51° 24' East; province of Tehran
Primary Function: Production and testing of ballistic missiles; rocket research, development and production.
Description: The missile site in Tehran appears to be a network of related facilities, apparently located at Fajr Air Base, east of Tehran. China is believed to have assisted in the construction of a ballistic missile plant where scientists carry out research using Russian SS-4 ballistic missile technology and produce other ballistic missile technologies. There also appears to be a Chinese-built ballistic missile test range as part of the facilities in Tehran. In addition, it is probable that there is a facility that researches, develops and produces Chinese C-802 Saccade missiles.
Abu Musa Island
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Aliabad
Arak
Bakhtaran
Bandar Abbas
The Instrumentation Factory Plant or Department 140/16
Farhin
Garmsar
Gostaresh
HASA
Isfahan
Karaj Missile Development Complex
Khoramabad
Kuhestak
Manzariyah
Mashhad
Parchin
Qeshm Island
Qom
Sanam College
Semnan
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
Shahroud
Shiraz
Sirjan
Sirri Island
Tabas
Tehran
(SOURCE: NTI.ORG)
Nuclear
By early June 2005, the EU-3 (France, Great Britain, and Germany) had not yet submitted their proposal to Iran outlining future nuclear negotiations. The EU-3 requested a delay in negotiations, but Tehran rejected the delay and publicly announced it would resume peaceful nuclear research activities. At issue was Iran's insistance that right to peaceful nuclear research be included in any proposal, a position the United States adamantly opposed. Attempts were made to persuade Iran to give up its fuel cycle ambitions and accept nuclear fuel from abroad, but Tehran made it clear that any proposal that did not guarantee Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology would lead to the cessation of all nuclear related negotiations with the EU-3. In addition, members of the Iranian Majlis, scientists, scholars, and students were protesting and holding rallies to encourage the government to lift the suspension on uranium enrichment and to not succumb to foreign (U.S.) pressure. One week later, Iran once again agreed to temporarily freeze its nuclear program until the end of July when the European Union agreed it would submit a proposal for the next round of talks.
In June, IAEA Deputy Director Pierre Goldschmidt stated that Iran admitted to providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran claimed all such research ceased in 1993, but results from recent tests show experiments took place as late as 1995 and 1998. In early July, Iran asked the IAEA if it could break UN seals and test nuclear-related equipment, stating the testing would not violate Tehran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities. At the end of July, an official letter was submitted to the IAEA stating that the seals at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) would be removed. The IAEA requested that it be given 10 days to install the necessary surveillance equipment. On 1 August, Iran reminded the EU-3 that 3 August would be the last opportunity for a proposal to be submitted to continue negotiations. A few days later, the European Union submitted the Framework for a Long-term Agreement proposal to Iran. The proposal specifically called on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity. Tehran immediately rejected the proposal as a negation of its inalienable rights. On 8 August, nuclear activities resumed at the Isfahan UCF and two days later, IAEA seals were removed from the remaining parts of the process lines with IAEA inspectors present.
In the days leading up to Iran's resumption of nuclear activities, several countries called on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities. Additionally, some European countries and the United States threatened to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Once again, Iran rejected any proposal related to the suspension of conversion activities, but stated they were ready to continue negotiations. Tehran did not believe there was any legal basis for referral to the UN Security council and believed it was only a political move. Iran also threatened to stop all negotiations, prevent any further inspections at all its nuclear facilities, suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol, and withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), if it was referred to the UN Security Council.
In August 2005, the IAEA announced that most of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) particle contamination found at various locations in Iran were found to be of foreign origin. The IAEA concluded much of the HEU found on centrifuge parts were from imported Pakistani equipment, rather than from any enrichment activities conducted by Iran.
In late August, Iran began announcing it would be resuming nuclear activities in Natanz and that Tehran would be willing to negotiate as long as there were no conditions. In August, Iran refused to comply with a resolution from the IAEA to halt its nuclear program, stating that making nuclear fuel was its right as a member of the NPT. The European Union believed that although Iran did have a right to nuclear energy under Article 4 of the NPT, it had lost that right because it violated Article 2 of the NPT - "not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear related weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." On 24 September 2005, the IAEA found Iran in non-compliance of the NPT. The resolution passed with 21 votes of approval, 12 abstentions, and one opposing vote. Russia and China were among those that abstained from voting and Venezuela was the only country to vote against the resolution. The resolution stated Iran's non-compliance due to "many failures and breaches" over nuclear safeguards of the NPT were grounds for referral to the UN Security Council.
Biological
There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a biological weapon program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1929 and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1973, the U.S. government believes Iran began biological weapon efforts in the early to mid-1980s, and that it continues to pursue an offensive biological weapon program linked to its civilian biotechnology activities. The United States alleges that Iran may have started to develop small quantities of agent, possibly including mycotoxins, ricin, and the smallpox virus. Iran strongly denies acquiring or producing biological weapons.
Chemical
Iran suffered severe losses from the use of Iraqi chemical weapons over the period 1982 to 1988. As a consequence Iran has a great deal of experience of the effects of chemical warfare (CW). Iran has continued to maintain a significant defensive CW capability since the end of the Gulf War in 1988. The most important incentive for this effort was probably concern that Iraq continued to possess chemical weapons. Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons program developed during the latter stages of the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. On ratifying the CWC Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all offensive CW activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed. Nevertheless the United States has continued to claim that Iran maintains an active program of development and production of chemical weapons. This program reportedly includes the production of sarin, mustard, phosgene, and hydrocyanic acid. The U.S. government estimates that Iran can produce 1,000 metric tons of agent per year and may have a stockpile of at least several thousand metric tons of weaponized and bulk agent. Open-sources do not provide unambiguous support to these accusations. Iran strongly denies producing or possessing chemical weapons. To date the United States has not pursued options available to it under international law to convincingly demonstrate Iranian noncompliance with the CWC.
Iran is committed to the development of its civilian and military industries and this has involved an ongoing process of modernisation and expansion in the chemical industry aimed at reducing dependence on foreign suppliers of materials and technology. Due to U.S. claims of ongoing chemical weapons production Iran encounters regular difficulties with chemical industry related imports that are restricted by members of the Australia Group.
Chemical Facilities
Abu Musa Island
Other Names: n/a
Location: 25052'30''N 55001'48''E. Located in the Strait of Hormuz in the mouth of the Persian Gulf, halfway between Iran and the United Arab Emirates.
Website: n/a
Phone Number: n/a
Subordinate to: Disputed territory that is jointly administered by Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Size: Only a few square miles.
Primary Function: Serves as a forward location for the Iranian military, which claims control over the island.
History: Iran has claimed its authority over the island since 1971 and asserted a physical presence since 1992. In 1992, the dispute over Abu Musa became more acute when Iran unilaterally tried to control the entry of third country nationals into the UAE portion of Abu Musa island. Tehran subsequently backed off in the face of significant diplomatic support for the UAE in the region, but in 1994 it increased its military presence on the disputed islands.
Activities: Although Abu Musa island is not a CW facility per se, there have been reports that during a period of tension between Iraq and Iran, Iran deployed CW munitions on the island. The New York Times reported in late March 1995 that, according to administration officials, Iran's military deployment on disputed islands in the Gulf included chemical weapons. Jane's Defense Weekly also reported in April 1995 that US Defense Secretary William Perry revealed that Iran had placed chemical weapons on disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. According to Pentagon officials, the weapons deployed on Abu Musa island were mostly 155mm artillery shells. The Journal of Commerce also reported that Secretary Perry said that Iran had deployed "...6,000 troops, chemical weapons, and anti-ship missiles to unmanned islands in the Strait of Hormuz." Finally, according to a study by the National Defense University from April 1997, "The United States believes that Iran has some weaponized biological weapons and a large chemical weapons stockpile, some of which are deployed on Abu Musa island in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz."
ngineering Research Center for the Contruction Crusade (Jihad-e Sazandegi)
Other Names: Engineering Research Center of: the Construction Crusade, Jihad e-Sazandegi, Jahaad-e Saazandegi, Construction Jihad, Jahad-e Sazandegi, and Jahad. Also Jahad Engineering Research Center, Jahad Sazandegi Research Center.
Address: Main Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi Offices (Tehran):
Ministry of Construction Crusade
Islamic Republic of Iran
Kuche Khosrow Khavar, No 20
Vali Asr. Sq., Near Kowsar Hotel
Tehran, Iran
Ministry of Construction Crusade
P.O. Box 15875-4347
Central Bldg., Valy-e Asr Juncation, Taleghani Ave.
Tehran, Iran
Location: There are four engineering research branches in the cities of Esfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashad.
Website: Unknown
Email: Mr. Ghasem Yazdim, comenrjs@dci.iran.com
Phone Number: +98 21 8895354-5, +98 21 61361
Subordinate to: Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi (also known as the Ministry of Construction Crusade and Ministry of Construction Jihad)
Size: Size of individual research centers unknown. The entire ministry has 12 different divisions and a number of organizations, directorates, offices, and companies. Research centers were established in 20 provinces throughout the country. According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, there are four affiliate research institutes in the cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Mashad that are involved in production and research for WMD.
Fourteen applied-science training centers in more than 30 courses of study needed by the ministry have been active. Today, the ministry has acquired 300 researchers at doctorate and graduate levels, 1,000 researchers at undergraduate levels, and 2,500 at technician levels. Approximately 5,000 of the ministry's personnel are pursuing their studies in training centers at home or abroad in livestock, natural resources, fisheries, and rural development fields.
Primary Function: Engineering research for defense, natural resources, animal husbandry, fisheries, and utilization and processing of products.
History: The Ministry of Jihad-e Sazandegi (or "striving for construction and development," better known as Construction Crusade) was formed in 1983 by Imam Khomeini and the Islamic Consultative Parliament to address poverty through rural development and construction and agricultural growth and self-sufficiency. The ministry played a crucial role in the Iran-Iraq War by constructing strategic bridges, floating bridges, floating vehicles, submarines, freeways for armored vehicles, and special vehicles for use in marshy fields. In the spring of 1983, the office dedicated to army engineering research was moved from war fronts in the south of Iran to Tehran. This Engineering Research Center was the starting point for Jihad-e Sazandegi's future engineering research activities.
The National Council of Resistance of Iran reports that during the Iran-Iraq War, the Construction Crusade was affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a revolutionary group that reportedly directs the production and employment of WMD in Iran, while also advocating the funding of terrorist groups. The same source notes that the Research Center, now managed by Fadhlallah Wakili-Fard, was originally supposed to be part of the Defense Ministry, but was established separately by IRGC Minister Muhsin Rafiqdust as a means of covering its true intent. According to Paula A. De Sutter, the Construction Crusade acted as the corps of engineers for the IRGC, aiding in the production of material for Iran's biological, nuclear, chemical and missile programs. In 1986, the Tehran Domestic Service reported the IRGC Minister's announcement that "the armament industries of the Corps have made notable progress in the missile, aircraft, biological, chemical and nuclear fields."
Activities: The Construction Crusade's engineering research centers have implemented projects in the fields of defense, natural resources engineering, animal husbandry engineering, fisheries engineering, and utilization and processing of products. The ministry also provides natural disaster relief, army engineering in war fronts, and reconstruction of war-stricken villages.
Rural projects include construction of roads, baths, mortuaries, and libraries in rural areas. The ministry also works to provide training, employment, electricity, potable water, and water for irrigation. After 1987, the ministry began projects to support rural industries and cooperatives, increase livestock production, and develop Iran's fisheries. The ministry also constructed three large wheat silos in the cities of Tabriz, Takistan, and Rasht. According to reports by US experts and Israeli sources, the facility near Tarbiz is being used to store stocks of biological agent such as anthrax and botulinum toxin.
According to the National Council of Resistance of Iran, the engineering research center is the government department responsible for all chemical development facilities. Iran established at least one large research and development center under the control of the center, which had allegedly established a significant chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989. The same source reports that the center focuses on research and production of VX. (However, perhaps one could question the accuracy of those allegations due to the Council's reference to VX as a "biological agent"). It is also reported that the Research Center is manufacturing an advanced fermenter designed by its own scientists.
Additional Info: Directly accountable to the Majlis, the Minister of Jihad-e Sazandegi is a member of the President of Iran's cabinet.
Damghan
Other Names: n/a
Location: One source reports a warhead assembly plant located in Damghan between the Semnan and Shahroud missiles complexes to the east of Tehran. The city of Damghan is located near a dry lake approximately 375 miles to the southwest of Mashad, or 300km east of Teheran.
Size: Unknown
Primary Function: Reported research on weaponization of CBW agents; houses munitions-filling factory/ies (155mm artillery shells and Scud warheads).
History: According to the Federation of American Scientists, there are uncorroborated reports that Iran had a chemical weapons plant in operation at this location as early as March 1988.
Activities: According to several sources, Iran's primary suspected chemical weapons production facility is located in the city of Damghan. In addition, US experts believe that Iran has at least one chemical warhead assembly plant near Damghan. Middle East Defense News reports (spring 1988) claimed that "neuro-toxic" warheads (presumably nerve agent-type) were being assembled for Iran's Scud-B missiles at Damghan between the Semnan and Shahroud missiles complexes to the east of Tehran. Finally, in March 1988, Die Welt reported that, according to Iraqi intelligence, Iran had converted a medical factory in the area of Damghan into a CW munitions production factory.
In a 1995 Special Report, Jane's Intelligence Review noted that the Damghan facility is suspicious because "it has several characteristics of chemical weapon plants: isolation, links to transportation lines, and security. The facility at Damghan is hidden by trees, downwind of town, surrounded by fallow fields and linked to the railroad by a spur." The report states that in addition to the claims of 155mm shells, the facility also has loaded Scud-B warheads with nerve gas. The missile assembly facility is just 130km away and is connected by the same rail line.
Isfahan
Other Names: Esfahan
Address: Names of all suspected weapons facilities are unknown.
However, the following addresses correspond to chemical laboratories in Isfahan:
Poly-Acryl Iran Corporation (PIC)
Abshar Crossroads
P.O. Box 4415
Isfahan, Isfahan, Islamic Republic of Iran
(Another source lists a different street address in EIfahan: 45 Km. Mobrake Rd.)
Linear Alkyl Benzene Complex (LAB):
Isfahan-Tehran Rd., km.15
West of Shahid Mohammad Montazeri Power Plant
Isfahan, Iran
Chemical Industries Group (CIG) (Central Office):
P.O. Box 16765-358
2nd floor, Sanam Bldg.
Nobonyad Square
Tehran, Iran
Location: n/a
Website: LAB Complex, Poly-acryl Iran Corporation, and Chemical Industries Group websites are unknown.
Phone: Poly-Acryl Iran Corporation: +98 (31) 310051, 276400
Chemical Industries Group (office): +98 21 2546602
Phone number of LAB Complex unknown.
Subordinate to: Unknown
Size: Presently, PIC plants comprise five production units with an aggregate annual capacity of 95,000 metric tons. CIG's Bofors plant operates with a staff of 300 people. The size of the LAB Complex is unknown.
Primary Function: Chemical production
History:
Polyacryl Iran Corporation was founded in August 1974. The first Linear Alkyl Benzyne Complex was officially founded by President Rafsanjani in June 1994. Within the Chemical Industries Group (CIG), a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Isfahan starting in the late 1970s; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages.
Activities:
Several sources report that the Iranian government maintains chemical weapon production facilities in the city of Isfahan. Unconfirmed reports from the National Council of Resistance of Iran claim that nerve gas produced in a facility near Semnan was transported to a missile plant in Isfahan for weaponization on ballistic missiles, including the Scud-B.
Although the exact location of the suspected facilities are unknown, Isfahan is home to several chemical companies with production capabilities: Poly-Acryl Corporation, Linear Alkyl Benzene Complex, and the Chemical Industries Group.
PIC ranks as the largest and most technologically advanced man-made fiber manufacturer in Iran. Presently, PIC plants comprise five production units with an aggregate annual capacity of 95,000 metric tons, including 33000 tons polyester staple, 22500 tons polyester yarn, 2000 tons polyester tops, 22500 tons acrylic staple and 15000 tons acrylic tops.
The commercial plant of the Poly-Acryl Corporation, a privately owned, independent commercial enterprise about 45km from the city of Isfahan, reportedly "developed into a major chemical weapons production facility." Steinberg notes sources that reported on "Chinese assistance, in terms of both infrastructure for building chemical plants and some of the necessary precursors for...the production of Poly-acryl corp for chemical weapons near Ishfahan."
The first Linear Alkyl Benzyne (LAB) Complex was officially founded by President Rafsanjani in June 1994. The LAB complex in Isfahan produces linear alkyl benzene, the raw material for the production of synthetic household detergents. The raw materials used, kerosene and benzene, are supplied from Isfahan Refinery and Isfahan Petrochemical Complex respectively. All management activities, coordination, planning/scheduling, project control, and procurement activities for the construction of the LAB complex have been performed by Iran Chemical Industries Investment Company (ICIIC) management team. A portion of engineering and supervision activities have been performed by Iranian consulting engineers, and all construction and erection activities have been performed by Iranian contractors. All activities related to precommissioning, commissioning, and start-up of the LAB complex have been performed by ICIIC personnel. Links to CW production are unclear.
Located in Isfahan, the Chemical Industries Group is the backbone of the Iranian weapons industry. According to US intelligence sources, CIG is making solid-fuel propellant powders for Iran's ballistic missile and artillery rocket programs. Within the CIG, a state-of-the art chemical plant was built by the Swedish group Bofors in Isfahan starting in the late 1970s as a dual-use fertilizer and explosives factory; however, the plant did not open until 1987 due to Iraqi artillery and missile barrages. The Bofors chemical plant in Isfahan produces TNT, RDX, Hexotol B, Hexotol B4, plastic explosives (C4), and nitrocellulose. Despite very large batch runs of TNT, Hexatol, and Hexogen, the plant operates with a staff of only 300 people since all primary filling lines are fully automated. Today, the plant is fully staffed by Iranians.
It is interesting to note that Bofors was involved in an illegal arms trade scandal in 1987, when it was discovered the company had been illegally selling weapons to Iran, Bahrein, Dubai, Libya, and Oman for 10 years. It is also possible that real or perceived use of cyanide as a CW agent by Iran, such as during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), could have been due to its acrylonitrile production capacity, a process that utilizes hydrogen cyanide—but this is mostly speculation.
Missile
Iran possesses one of the largest missile inventories in the Middle East and has acquired complete missile systems and developed an infrastructure to build missiles indigenously. It has purchased North Korean Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, and Nodong ballistic missiles. Meanwhile, Iran has also developed short-range artillery rockets and is producing the Scud-B and the Scud-C—called the Shehab-1 and Shehab-2, respectively. Iran recently flight-tested the 1,300 km-range Shehab-3, which is based on the North Korean Nodong. The Shehab-3 is capable of reaching Israel. Following this most recent flight-test, the Shehab-3 was placed in service and revolutionary guard units were officially armed with the missiles. There are conflicting reports about the development of even longer-ranged missiles, such as the Shehab-4 and the Kosar intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). U.S. intelligence agencies assess that barring acquisition of a complete system or major subsystem from North Korea, Iran is unlikely to launch an ICBM or satellite launch vehicle (SLV) before mid-decade. At present, Iran's capabilities in missile production have kept in line with its doctrine of protection from regional threats. Iran has developed new missiles including the Ra'ad and Kosar and continues to test its Nodong based, Shehab-3 missile.
On October 20, 2004, Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani confirmed the latest successful test of Iran’s Shehab-3 with a 2,000-kilometer range in front of observers.
Iran has openly declared its ability to mass produce the Shehab-3 medium-range missile. Intelligence reports regarding Iran's expansion of capabilities and persistent interest in acquiring new technologies have led the United States to seek other options in dealing with Iran as a regional threat.
Missile Facilities
Tehran
Subordinate to: Defense Industries Organization (DIO)
Location: Latitude 35° 42' North; longitude 51° 24' East; province of Tehran
Primary Function: Production and testing of ballistic missiles; rocket research, development and production.
Description: The missile site in Tehran appears to be a network of related facilities, apparently located at Fajr Air Base, east of Tehran. China is believed to have assisted in the construction of a ballistic missile plant where scientists carry out research using Russian SS-4 ballistic missile technology and produce other ballistic missile technologies. There also appears to be a Chinese-built ballistic missile test range as part of the facilities in Tehran. In addition, it is probable that there is a facility that researches, develops and produces Chinese C-802 Saccade missiles.
Abu Musa Island
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO)
Aliabad
Arak
Bakhtaran
Bandar Abbas
The Instrumentation Factory Plant or Department 140/16
Farhin
Garmsar
Gostaresh
HASA
Isfahan
Karaj Missile Development Complex
Khoramabad
Kuhestak
Manzariyah
Mashhad
Parchin
Qeshm Island
Qom
Sanam College
Semnan
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group
Shahroud
Shiraz
Sirjan
Sirri Island
Tabas
Tehran
(SOURCE: NTI.ORG)
posted by Marko at 2/13/2006 02:12:00 PM
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