Al-Qaeda in the Andes: Spotlight on Colombia
By Chris Zambelis
Colombian authorities claim to have dismantled an extensive counterfeit passport ring in January 2006 that allegedly supplied an unknown number of Pakistanis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Iraqis, and others purported to be working with al-Qaeda with Colombian, Portuguese, German, and Spanish citizenship, enabling them to travel freely in the United States and Europe. Bogota also mentioned that the network had ties to Hamas militants (al-Hayat, January 28; Caracol Radio, January 26).
In contrast, U.S. Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security officials expressed surprise at Bogota's announcement while emphatically disputing its claim, alleging that they had no knowledge of known links between the document forgery operation and any brand of Islamist terrorism, let alone al-Qaeda. Instead, they acknowledged that the sting operation involved Colombians posing as members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country's largest and most powerful rebel group, interested in purchasing forged documents and possibly even weapons (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Report, January 27). Washington classifies FARC as an international terrorist organization.
Since the September 11 attacks, Washington fears that radical Islamist terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda may exploit Latin America's porous borders, endemic corruption, and weak institutions to gain a foothold in the region in order to infiltrate U.S. territory or to stage attacks against vital U.S. interests in the region. Many observers believe that Colombia, a strong ally of Washington, with its vibrant narcotics trade, ongoing insurgencies, robust energy reserves, and proximity to the Panama Canal and other vital shipping lanes, represents an ideal target.
FARC's extensive involvement in the drug business and its documented ties to regional and international drug cartels and organized crime, coupled with the control it wields over large swathes of Colombian territory out of Bogota's reach, is of particular concern. In a worst case scenario, Washington worries that al-Qaeda may cultivate alliances of convenience with organizations such as FARC or others involved in the drug trade in order to raise finances or procure armaments. At the same time, it is important to note that there is no credible evidence pointing to this kind of formal cooperation. At the very least, however, terrorist organizations can exploit established money laundering and finance networks used by narcotics traffickers and organized crime syndicates in the region, especially the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), to fund future operations (El Siglo, June 25, 2003).
It is against this background that Colombian and regional governments have played on U.S. concerns by moving to curry favor with the U.S. to further their own domestic agendas and international standing in the context of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. In doing so, they often highlight the alleged threat of al-Qaeda or other brands of radical Islamist terrorism within their own borders.
Based on the evidence, this latest attempt by Bogota is a case in point in that it likely represents an effort to enhance its position in the eyes of Washington and the international community in its longstanding war with FARC guerillas. Since one of the alleged members of the smuggling ring, Jalal Saadat Moheisen, happened to be of Palestinian descent, it is likely that Colombia seized the opportunity to win political points in Washington by pointing to a possible link to Middle East terrorist networks.
What makes Colombia's bold claims especially interesting is that the sting operation was in fact led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials and other investigators, who worked in concert with their Colombian counterparts in the Department of Administrative Security (DAS).
Normally, references to alleged al-Qaeda infiltration are enough to gain the attention and headlines governments in Latin America seek. For example, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras have pointed to alleged al-Qaeda links with the Maras street gangs that terrorize their cities. Mexican officials have hinted at al-Qaeda involvement with rebel indigenous groups in Chiapas. Trinidadian authorities have employed similar tactics when it comes to discrediting their own homegrown Islamist opposition centered in the Afro-Trinidadian Muslim community.
U.S. concern over the strong showing by Hamas in the recent Palestinian elections is likely responsible for Bogota's decision to include Hamas alongside al-Qaeda in its recent claims of radical Islamist involvement in the document forgery ring.
Islam in Colombia
Colombia is home to a small, albeit diverse, Muslim population. Most Colombian Muslims are of Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian origin, but Arab Christians from the Levant with a long history in the country dating back to the Ottoman era far outnumber their Muslim counterparts. In contrast, unlike elsewhere in the region, Arab Muslims made their presence felt in Colombia beginning in the late 1960s and 70s after a wave of migration from the Middle East that was prompted by the Lebanese Civil War and other regional tensions (Los Cromos, April 1, 2005).
Recent Muslim migrants from the Middle East tend to be more pious and traditional compared to their second and third generation kin who have become assimilated into Colombian society. For example, many still speak Arabic and live in tight-knit communities, not unlike immigrant communities elsewhere. Demographic assessments on Colombia's Muslim population vary. According to some local reports, Colombia's Muslim population numbers approximately 15,000 adherents (webislam.com, January 4, 2005).
As a result of intermarriage and religious conversion, Islam has become one of the fastest growing faiths in Colombia and Latin America. Growing disenchantment with the Roman Catholic Church establishment in Colombia and elsewhere in the region has also led many to seek spiritual guidance elsewhere. Many former Roman Catholics that have strayed from the Church have come to see Catholicism as a European colonial tradition that was imposed on the peoples of the Americas. Therefore, conversion to Islam represents an assertion of ethno-national, as well as spiritual, identity. Protestant missionaries have been making inroads into Latin America for many of the same reasons for decades, especially among underserved communities and indigenous populations.
Colombian Christians who become Muslims find solace in Islam's reverence of Jesus Christ and Mary. Other Muslim converts see Islam as a native tradition untainted by the region's colonial experience. Many Muslims in Colombia also emphasize what they believe are their natural cultural and even ethnic links with Arabs and Muslims, stemming from Spain's Moorish heritage. In this regard, conversion to Islam symbolizes a reversion to their original state, which they see as having been suppressed by colonialism. There is also evidence suggesting that Colombian Muslims are becoming more open about asserting their identity, especially since Bogota abolished Catholicism as the official state religion in an effort to promote a broader definition of Colombian identity.
Many analysts are alarmed by increasing Muslim conversion trends, which they interpret as a sign of radicalization, especially in light of al-Qaeda's proven successes in luring Muslim converts to their cause. Despite these concerns, there is no evidence that Muslim conversion in Colombia or elsewhere in Latin America stems from a turn to political radicalization.
Maicao
Although accurate demographic measures are hard to come by, the municipality of Maicao, in northeastern Colombia in the department of La Guajira, an indigenous reserve located along the border with Venezuela and the Caribbean, is home to Colombia's largest Muslim community. Maicao's Muslim population is believed to number anywhere between 4,000 to 8,000 adherents. Maicao is also home of the Omar Ibn al-Khattab Mosque, which was completed in 1987. It is Colombia's largest mosque and is counted as one of the largest in South America (Latino Muslim Voice, December 2003).
Most of Maicao's Muslims are Sunni Arabs from the Levant, especially Lebanon, while a minority originates from Syria and Palestine. Maicao is also home to a small Shiite Arab population. The region's Arab community lives alongside the Way'uu, an indigenous group. As a result of its position on the coast, La Guajira has always lured immigrants seeking potentially lucrative trade opportunities and jobs, especially migrants from the Middle East.
Maicao is also a free trade zone (FTZ) and a known center of smuggling of counterfeit goods such as cigarettes and electric appliances, arms, and narcotics, money laundering, and other illicit forms of commerce to Venezuela, Central America, and the Caribbean. According to some reports, recent efforts by Bogota to enforce tax codes and root out corruption and smuggling hit Maicao's merchants particularly hard, especially Arab Muslims who figure prominently in the local economy. This includes merchants engaged in both legal and illegal business. As a result, Maicao's Arab Muslim population is said to be dwindling, as local merchants seek out opportunities elsewhere in Colombia and in the region (Los Cromos, April 1, 2005).
Many observers worry that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations can exploit Maicao and the Colombian island of San Andres, another FTZ located off the coast of Panama, to raise funds to finance operations. San Andres is also home to a sizeable Arab Muslim and Christian community. FTZs in Colon, Panama, Iquique, Chile, Margarita Island, Venezuela, and elsewhere in the region are frequently cited as potential terrorist finance centers.
Conclusion
Despite a lack of concrete evidence to date, Colombia appears susceptible to al-Qaeda infiltration, but it is highly unlikely to come in the form of an alliance with FARC or the radicalization of Colombia's Muslims. In contrast, Colombia's weak institutions and ongoing conflict may present an opening for radical Islamists to gain a foothold. Given this background, it is important to consider the politics behind allegations of al-Qaeda infiltration, as they may divert attention away from the far more pressing themes shaping the threat at hand.
Colombian authorities claim to have dismantled an extensive counterfeit passport ring in January 2006 that allegedly supplied an unknown number of Pakistanis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Iraqis, and others purported to be working with al-Qaeda with Colombian, Portuguese, German, and Spanish citizenship, enabling them to travel freely in the United States and Europe. Bogota also mentioned that the network had ties to Hamas militants (al-Hayat, January 28; Caracol Radio, January 26).
In contrast, U.S. Justice Department and Department of Homeland Security officials expressed surprise at Bogota's announcement while emphatically disputing its claim, alleging that they had no knowledge of known links between the document forgery operation and any brand of Islamist terrorism, let alone al-Qaeda. Instead, they acknowledged that the sting operation involved Colombians posing as members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the country's largest and most powerful rebel group, interested in purchasing forged documents and possibly even weapons (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Report, January 27). Washington classifies FARC as an international terrorist organization.
Since the September 11 attacks, Washington fears that radical Islamist terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda may exploit Latin America's porous borders, endemic corruption, and weak institutions to gain a foothold in the region in order to infiltrate U.S. territory or to stage attacks against vital U.S. interests in the region. Many observers believe that Colombia, a strong ally of Washington, with its vibrant narcotics trade, ongoing insurgencies, robust energy reserves, and proximity to the Panama Canal and other vital shipping lanes, represents an ideal target.
FARC's extensive involvement in the drug business and its documented ties to regional and international drug cartels and organized crime, coupled with the control it wields over large swathes of Colombian territory out of Bogota's reach, is of particular concern. In a worst case scenario, Washington worries that al-Qaeda may cultivate alliances of convenience with organizations such as FARC or others involved in the drug trade in order to raise finances or procure armaments. At the same time, it is important to note that there is no credible evidence pointing to this kind of formal cooperation. At the very least, however, terrorist organizations can exploit established money laundering and finance networks used by narcotics traffickers and organized crime syndicates in the region, especially the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE), to fund future operations (El Siglo, June 25, 2003).
It is against this background that Colombian and regional governments have played on U.S. concerns by moving to curry favor with the U.S. to further their own domestic agendas and international standing in the context of the Bush Administration's war on terrorism. In doing so, they often highlight the alleged threat of al-Qaeda or other brands of radical Islamist terrorism within their own borders.
Based on the evidence, this latest attempt by Bogota is a case in point in that it likely represents an effort to enhance its position in the eyes of Washington and the international community in its longstanding war with FARC guerillas. Since one of the alleged members of the smuggling ring, Jalal Saadat Moheisen, happened to be of Palestinian descent, it is likely that Colombia seized the opportunity to win political points in Washington by pointing to a possible link to Middle East terrorist networks.
What makes Colombia's bold claims especially interesting is that the sting operation was in fact led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials and other investigators, who worked in concert with their Colombian counterparts in the Department of Administrative Security (DAS).
Normally, references to alleged al-Qaeda infiltration are enough to gain the attention and headlines governments in Latin America seek. For example, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras have pointed to alleged al-Qaeda links with the Maras street gangs that terrorize their cities. Mexican officials have hinted at al-Qaeda involvement with rebel indigenous groups in Chiapas. Trinidadian authorities have employed similar tactics when it comes to discrediting their own homegrown Islamist opposition centered in the Afro-Trinidadian Muslim community.
U.S. concern over the strong showing by Hamas in the recent Palestinian elections is likely responsible for Bogota's decision to include Hamas alongside al-Qaeda in its recent claims of radical Islamist involvement in the document forgery ring.
Islam in Colombia
Colombia is home to a small, albeit diverse, Muslim population. Most Colombian Muslims are of Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian origin, but Arab Christians from the Levant with a long history in the country dating back to the Ottoman era far outnumber their Muslim counterparts. In contrast, unlike elsewhere in the region, Arab Muslims made their presence felt in Colombia beginning in the late 1960s and 70s after a wave of migration from the Middle East that was prompted by the Lebanese Civil War and other regional tensions (Los Cromos, April 1, 2005).
Recent Muslim migrants from the Middle East tend to be more pious and traditional compared to their second and third generation kin who have become assimilated into Colombian society. For example, many still speak Arabic and live in tight-knit communities, not unlike immigrant communities elsewhere. Demographic assessments on Colombia's Muslim population vary. According to some local reports, Colombia's Muslim population numbers approximately 15,000 adherents (webislam.com, January 4, 2005).
As a result of intermarriage and religious conversion, Islam has become one of the fastest growing faiths in Colombia and Latin America. Growing disenchantment with the Roman Catholic Church establishment in Colombia and elsewhere in the region has also led many to seek spiritual guidance elsewhere. Many former Roman Catholics that have strayed from the Church have come to see Catholicism as a European colonial tradition that was imposed on the peoples of the Americas. Therefore, conversion to Islam represents an assertion of ethno-national, as well as spiritual, identity. Protestant missionaries have been making inroads into Latin America for many of the same reasons for decades, especially among underserved communities and indigenous populations.
Colombian Christians who become Muslims find solace in Islam's reverence of Jesus Christ and Mary. Other Muslim converts see Islam as a native tradition untainted by the region's colonial experience. Many Muslims in Colombia also emphasize what they believe are their natural cultural and even ethnic links with Arabs and Muslims, stemming from Spain's Moorish heritage. In this regard, conversion to Islam symbolizes a reversion to their original state, which they see as having been suppressed by colonialism. There is also evidence suggesting that Colombian Muslims are becoming more open about asserting their identity, especially since Bogota abolished Catholicism as the official state religion in an effort to promote a broader definition of Colombian identity.
Many analysts are alarmed by increasing Muslim conversion trends, which they interpret as a sign of radicalization, especially in light of al-Qaeda's proven successes in luring Muslim converts to their cause. Despite these concerns, there is no evidence that Muslim conversion in Colombia or elsewhere in Latin America stems from a turn to political radicalization.
Maicao
Although accurate demographic measures are hard to come by, the municipality of Maicao, in northeastern Colombia in the department of La Guajira, an indigenous reserve located along the border with Venezuela and the Caribbean, is home to Colombia's largest Muslim community. Maicao's Muslim population is believed to number anywhere between 4,000 to 8,000 adherents. Maicao is also home of the Omar Ibn al-Khattab Mosque, which was completed in 1987. It is Colombia's largest mosque and is counted as one of the largest in South America (Latino Muslim Voice, December 2003).
Most of Maicao's Muslims are Sunni Arabs from the Levant, especially Lebanon, while a minority originates from Syria and Palestine. Maicao is also home to a small Shiite Arab population. The region's Arab community lives alongside the Way'uu, an indigenous group. As a result of its position on the coast, La Guajira has always lured immigrants seeking potentially lucrative trade opportunities and jobs, especially migrants from the Middle East.
Maicao is also a free trade zone (FTZ) and a known center of smuggling of counterfeit goods such as cigarettes and electric appliances, arms, and narcotics, money laundering, and other illicit forms of commerce to Venezuela, Central America, and the Caribbean. According to some reports, recent efforts by Bogota to enforce tax codes and root out corruption and smuggling hit Maicao's merchants particularly hard, especially Arab Muslims who figure prominently in the local economy. This includes merchants engaged in both legal and illegal business. As a result, Maicao's Arab Muslim population is said to be dwindling, as local merchants seek out opportunities elsewhere in Colombia and in the region (Los Cromos, April 1, 2005).
Many observers worry that al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations can exploit Maicao and the Colombian island of San Andres, another FTZ located off the coast of Panama, to raise funds to finance operations. San Andres is also home to a sizeable Arab Muslim and Christian community. FTZs in Colon, Panama, Iquique, Chile, Margarita Island, Venezuela, and elsewhere in the region are frequently cited as potential terrorist finance centers.
Conclusion
Despite a lack of concrete evidence to date, Colombia appears susceptible to al-Qaeda infiltration, but it is highly unlikely to come in the form of an alliance with FARC or the radicalization of Colombia's Muslims. In contrast, Colombia's weak institutions and ongoing conflict may present an opening for radical Islamists to gain a foothold. Given this background, it is important to consider the politics behind allegations of al-Qaeda infiltration, as they may divert attention away from the far more pressing themes shaping the threat at hand.
posted by Marko at 4/10/2006 08:57:00 AM
<< Home