Chad politics: Emergency measures

FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

In an announcement which took both domestic and international observers by surprise Chad's prime minister, Pascal Yoadimnadji, declared a state of emergency across most of the country in November. The measure covers all of the provinces bordering Sudan and the Central African Republic--Biltine, Ouaddai, Salamat and Moyen-Chari--as well as the Borkou, Ennedi, Tibesti, Chari-Barguini regions and the capital, N'Djamena. According to Mr Yoadimnadji, the primary reason for imposing emergency measures is the flare-up in violence in Ouaddai and Salamat provinces in recent months. Calling for international action to prevent cross-border raids allegedly sponsored by the Sudanese government, the prime minister described the violence--in which hundreds have been killed, entire villages burned and herds of livestock slaughtered--as "inter-ethnic". In truth, however, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between political and inter-communal violence, given that tensions in the region are simultaneously inflamed by the government’s arming of local militia, and the acute dislocation of both pastoral and sedentary livelihoods by the fighting.

The immediate practical impact of the state of emergency has been the nomination of regional military rulers, and imposition of systematic media censorship. In announcing the suspension of media freedom, the Mr Yoadimnadji accused the private media of being apologist for rebel forces, and of having systematically ignored government warnings. Unsurprisingly, the private press association, Association des editeurs de la presse privee au Tchad, has denounced the censorship as “unjustified”. The sweeping geographic scope of the measures, coupled with the official targeting of both the Sudanese government and domestic journalists, certainly heighten suspicions that the measure is in part designed to distract attention from the problems of the president, Idriss Deby Itno, who lacks leverage over the Sudanese government in Khartoum. Amid a growing number of counter-accusations, it appears there is mounting evidence of punitive Janjaweed (Sudanese Arab militia) devastation of eastern Chadian settlements, whose mixed ethnic profiles mirror those of neighbouring Darfur region in Sudan. The clear risk is that the patterns of fear, violence and reprisals that are well-established in Darfur are being extended into Chad. In addition, there is evidence of Sudanese logistical support for the Chadian rebel groups, although liaison between them and Sudanese Janjaweed irregulars has yet to be proved.

The situation in Ouaddai and Salamat adds to the feeling of uncertainty in the country, and suggests that Chad's president will struggle to maintain his grasp on power. Mr Deby Itno faces increasing threats from several armed opposition groups, overshadowing the civilian opposition, which will remain largely ineffective. Divisions and defections from within his own military and political entourage and his Zaghawa clan are expected to grow, while the rebel assaults in the east of the country will continue. Meanwhile, mounting casualties among senior military ranks will weaken military morale and motivation. Attempts to head off further internal military dissent will continue to focus largely on promises of rapid promotions and large cash bonuses. This may halt short-term defections, but such overt patronage-based promotion is in the long term likely to weaken army cohesion further, so undermining effectiveness.