JINSA: Which Way will Egypt Go?

Harold's List

Part I

It is our view that Israel withdrew from Gaza NOT in hopes of energizing some mythical "peace process," but precisely because there could be no peace, and indeed no process of any sort with any existing Palestinian leadership. The descent into chaos in Gaza was predictable and predicted. The torching of empty synagogue buildings is emblematic. What was sacred about the space was gone, but the very idea that these had been places in which Jews studied and prayed drove Palestinian looters to frenzy. Greenhouses, purchased by private donors as a gift to provide employment for Palestinians, were looted by people for whom tomorrow is an alien concept.

With no hope of Palestinian security control of Palestinian territory, eyes turn to Egypt on the southern border - the Philadelphi Corridor - where tunnels 10-20 meters under the surface and wide enough to drive electric handcarts through have been used to smuggle arms and ammunition to Palestinian gangs. What will Egypt do?

There are two schools of thought, both most reasonable.

Such serious security thinkers as Yuval Steinitz, Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, espouse the first scenario which is described here. Egypt and the Palestinians will make common military cause against Israel and the killing of a Palestinian by Egyptian security forces in Rafah was a diversion to create confusion to allow smuggling to increase. Under this scenario, the Egyptians will return to their pre-1967 line in northern Gaza and be 6 miles from
Israel's port and major energy center in Ashkelon.This squares with longstanding JINSA concerns about Egyptian military intentions. In 2001, we wrote: "The U.S. has transformed the Egyptian military from a Russian-style force to a modern American-equipped one with F-16D jet fighters, M1A1 tanks with depleted uranium rounds, frigates, air-defense radars, and plans for the Multiple Launch Rocket System. [Will we add] "Harpoon Block II surface-to-surface missiles and patrol boats?" (JINSA Reports #225-227) In 2002, there was Egyptian help for the Karine-A weapons ship (#234) and collaboration with North Korea on ballistic missiles. (#237) In 2004, it was Egyptian-Libyan collaboration on long-range missiles and nuclear technology, and the links of both to Pakistan and North Korea. (#401) Most recently, proposed French sales of sea-to-sea and sea-land missiles, plus American JDAMS that would upgrade the capabilities of Egypt's existing arsenal of bombs. (#502)

None of these do you need for peacekeeping or border security between Egypt and Gaza; all are what you want if you plan to attack another country.

And, while Egypt is amassing its arsenal, it is beset by domestic problems emanating from the dictatorial rule of Hosni Mubarak. We hope Egypt's government changes through evolution rather than revolution, and so argue for changing American military aid into economic assistance.

It is Egypt's own fear of revolution, in fact, that may make it Israel's ally on Gaza rather than its adversary. That's the scenario to be discussed tomorrow. (PART II)


Part II

Yesterday's theory was that Egypt and the Palestinians could combine militarily to allow Egypt to threaten Israel in a way it has not since 1967. The military capability Egypt has amassed, plus the ghoulish joy in killing and dying evidenced by segments of the Palestinian population, makes this a serious concern.

But Egypt has another concern - internal stability and evolutionary regime change - shared by the U.S. and Israel, but inimical to Palestinian radicals. Mubarak's personal goal, like that of every despot, is to remain in power until he dies, and his greatest fear is violent overthrow and the revenge of the masses. The Senior Assad model is much preferred to the Ceausescu model. The best-organized opposition to Mubarak's secular, nationalist and dictatorial reign is the pan-Arab,
Islamic, dictatorial Muslim Brotherhood with links to other radical organizations, including al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad.

So, while it is true that Egypt actively abetted or at least turned a blind eye to the smuggling of arms, ammunition and spare parts into Gaza by radicals of every stripe, that was when Mubarak thought Israel would be the target. Now there is an increasing concern that Egypt will be the target, and Mubarak has to worry about Gaza as a center of pan-Islamic terrorism with Cairo as its target. An influx of radical Palestinians and their allies into Egypt would result in a strengthening of the Brotherhood that Mubarak has worked so hard and so brutally to suppress.

Early indications are that the Palestinians will not cooperate with Egypt any more than they did with Israel to control extremism. The first days of Palestinian/Egyptian "cooperation" on the border resulted in thousands of Palestinians flooding into Egyptian territory and waves of arms flooding the other way. The Egyptian government is furious and has declared that the border will be closed. But Abu Mazen has all but given up his (limited) efforts to "co-opt" Hamas and Islamic Jihad into a "political" process and both of those organizations have declared their intention to continue operations in hopes of destroying Israel. Money
and arms will have to come from somewhere - we're betting on Iran, the granddaddy of terror-sponsors.

Winston Churchill defined appeasement as "feeding the alligator in hopes it will eat you last." Egypt and the other Arabs have been feeding the alligator in Gaza and the chickens are coming home to roost - to mix wildly a metaphor. If the Egyptians cannot control the border, the spillover will result in more terrorism for them and an ever-more repressive response from the government.

American diplomacy must begin with the requirement that Egypt meet its security commitments on the Gaza border, bringing in soldiers or third parties as necessary (Israel has already agreed to a British presence). There should be no objection, as it suits Mubarak's interest. Then the U.S. should help to ensure increased openings for a free press, political parties and a parliamentary election that come closer to the goal of consensual government as a way of meeting the legitimate
political aspirations of Egyptians. Only the combination will meet Egypt's need for evolutionary change.