FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The release on September 19th of a joint "statement of principles" by the six participants in talks on North Korea's nuclear-weapons programme has been hailed in some quarters as a breakthrough. Granted, the agreement is unprecedented in the 23-month history of the six-nation talks, and some important concessions appear to have been made. But the vagueness of the document, which is far from the kind of detailed settlement that would be needed to resolve the nuclear issue, and the fact that the North is already backing away from it, suggests there has been little progress on fundamental differences between the key participants. Perhaps the most important implication of the deal is that it will keep the six-nation talks process going.
The document outlines a number of statements on which the six nations—the US, North Korea, China, Japan, South Korea and Russia—agree. These include that Pyongyang will abandon its existing nuclear programmes, rejoin the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to be reapplied, and that the US has no intention to attack or invade North Korea. The document also states that Japan and the US will take steps to normalise their diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, and—most importantly—that the five other parties respect North Korea's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Until the agreement was announced, the US had refused to allow the possibility that North Korea could maintain nuclear facilities for any reason.
A flimsy document
Barring the "peaceful use" clause, there is little new in the document. The US has frequently said it has no intention to attack the North, and has raised the possibility of normal diplomatic relations (and extensive aid) if Pyongyang verifiably dismantles its nuclear programme, as has Japan. It is no surprise, either, that the North has formally agreed to abandon its nuclear-weapons programme. It entered the six-nation talks in the knowledge that the US would never allow it to retain a nuclear capability: its goal has always been to maximise what it could extract in return for abandoning it.
The document is hedged with the sort of compromise language that reportedly made the US very reluctant to support it. It says North Korea will rejoin the NPT "at an early date"; that the other parties "respect" the North's right to a peaceful nuclear programme; and that the subject of providing civilian light-water reactors (LWRs) will be discussed "at an appropriate time". Key issues, such as the sequence of events and how to verify to the US's satisfaction that the North's nuclear programme has been dismantled, are not addressed.
As a result, there does not appear to be much confidence on the part of the key signatories that the joint statement will lead to much. The US has quickly said that the test of the agreement would be in its implementation, and restated its position that the first step must be for North Korea to begin dismantling its existing nuclear facilities. The ink was barely dry on the document before the North's official news agency issued a statement saying the US "should not even dream of the issue of [North Korea's] dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing" a LWR, which it called "a physical guarantee for confidence-building". It also warned that should the US insist on the dismantling of North Korea's atomic weapons before the provision of LWRs, "there will be no change in the nuclear issue".
Saving the talks
This negative assessment begs the question, why was the deal signed in the first place? Although hardly the breakthrough portrayed by some media sources, the statement does at least prove that none of the participants is (yet) willing to let the six-nation process collapse. Before the statement—China's fifth draft, on the 20th day of the fourth round of talks—was issued, the process did seem to be heading towards breakdown.
Matters have not been helped by the differing priorities of each of the participants. Whereas preventing nuclear proliferation is at the top of the US's agenda, China is arguably more concerned about preventing the collapse of the North Korean state (which could lead to a destabilising influx of refugees and the loss of a strategically important buffer); South Korea is prioritising inter-Korean relations; and Japan, although sharing the US's security concerns, has been focused on resolving the abductions issue. The agreement reveals that they all at least share the priority of keeping the talks going.
A theory had been circulating that the US had been prepared to allow the talks to fail and had been insisting on stringent requirements—including no civilian nuclear facilities—in order that this might happen. Then, the argument went, the US would be able to move the process to the next stage, probably bringing the matter before the UN Security Council, while insisting that it had exhausted the preliminary diplomatic channels.
Its policy shift on "peaceful use" facilities discredits this theory to some extent. The shift, which in effect saved the six-nation talks, could be down to a number of factors. These might include the realisation that pursuing a military solution would not be feasible in the foreseeable future, or a change of personnel at the State Department since the president's election victory last November. Still, it seems highly improbable that the current US administration will be willing to agree to a deal like the one negotiated in 1994, in which an international consortium agreed to build two LWRs for North Korea in return for the suspension of its nuclear programme.
North Korea, for its part, is evidently not yet willing to step into the abyss by allowing the six-nation talks to collapse. By all accounts the tone of the fourth round of talks was more positive than previous rounds, perhaps convincing the North Korean delegation that it had more to gain by prolonging the negotiations than by risking their failure. Far more bilateral negotiating has occurred, for one thing, allowing progress with each nation on its particular priority: talks with Japan towards resolving the abductions issue, and towards establishing diplomatic relations (a goal Japan's prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, outlined three years ago on a groundbreaking trip to Pyongyang), were particularly fruitful. Then there is the promise of 2m kilowatts of electricity the South recently pledged to supply, linked to denuclearisation. Considering the North's impoverishment, this might have been too tempting an offer to risk losing.
Sticking points
It is still hard to see how the joint statement of principles will move the process of denuclearisation forward, though. The biggest obstacles to a resolution have yet to be worked out, particularly concerning sequencing and verification. The deal says that future steps will be implemented on a "commitment for commitment, action for action" basis, but the North's immediate clarification that it expects the US to supply a LWR before it gives up its nuclear deterrent means the issue of who makes the first move is still up in the air.
Assuming this can be sorted out, the biggest problem will be one of verification. The US is not certain how many nuclear weapons North Korea has, or where they are. In order for Washington to be satisfied that "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes" had been destroyed, Pyongyang would first have to disclose the extent of its facilities. This is complicated by its suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) programme, which the statement does not mention. The whole crisis was sparked in late 2002 when the US accused North Korea of breaching the terms of the 1994 deal by operating a covert HEU programme, in addition to its known plutonium-based facilities. Pyongyang has continued to deny an HEU programme exists, but convincing the US of this could be difficult.
What next?
With these details still to work out, the Economist Intelligence Unit does not expect much in the way of substantive progress on denuclearisation in the near future, despite the joint statement. This is mostly because the fundamental differences between the two main participants—North Korea and the US—are no closer to being resolved. The US is more or less determined to secure a Libya-type deal, in which North Korea shows its sincerity by beginning to dismantle its nuclear facilities before any inducements are provided (Pyongyang's history of reneging on international agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework, has reinforced the US's resolve on this matter). North Korea, even if it has now acknowledged that it will eventually give up its nuclear programme, is determined to extract as much as possible by way of rewards in advance.
The participants have agreed to return to the negotiating table in November to hammer out the details of the joint statement. Despite the North's subsequent backtracking on the statement, and the US's evident scepticism, all sides have made it clear that a negotiated solution is still the preferred route to take. However, it might not be long before one or more of the participants concludes that keeping the talks going for their own sake is a waste of time.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Asia
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