A Threat's Journey From Iraq to New York

The New York Times
By WILLIAM K. RASHBAUM and JIM RUTENBERG

The New York Police Department first learned of the possible threat against the city's subways as far back as Sept. 27, according to law enforcement officials in New York and Washington. The information, which originated in Iraq, came from the Defense Intelligence Agency by way of the Joint Terrorist Task Force, a team of several hundred F.B.I. agents, city police detectives and investigators from nearly three dozen other agencies that investigate terrorism.

At first, it did not seem significantly different from the other reports of threats that churn through the intelligence and counterterrorism networks, almost all of which are eventually discounted.

But within days, the information from the intelligence agency's source in Iraq provoked one of the more pronounced and public terror-prevention efforts the city has mounted since 9/11.

The source told his contacts that three men who had undergone terrorist training in explosives were working with other operatives - possibly already in New York City - to set off 19 bombs on the city's subways, according to several officials, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because much of the information about the case is still classified.

The concerns about the possible threat increased against the backdrop of military operations in Iraq, included a nighttime meeting on a Manhattan street between the city's mayor and police commissioner, and stretched over nine days, culminating Thursday with a major police action and a hastily called news conference at which city officials said they were reacting to the most specific threat against the city's subways ever received.

In the end, there was no attack, there were no bombs hidden in baby strollers, and now there are serious questions about the quality of the intelligence that drove the investigation, and the city's reaction.

Not surprising, then, the threat, how it washed out, and the timing of its announcement - just over an hour before a mayoral debate in Harlem that Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg had already chosen to skip - have combined to raise some concerns among experts on antiterrorism and at least some of Mr. Bloomberg's political opponents.

One set of concerns involves the coordination between local officials and at least some federal authorities, who appeared to have sharply different reactions to the information about the threat. Another, hinted at by Mr. Bloomberg's rival for City Hall and explicitly stated in recent days by outspoken critics of the mayor, is that the announcement might have been meant to blunt criticism of Mr. Bloomberg's decision to miss the Harlem debate.

Perhaps in an effort to reassure the public and defuse any charges by political rivals, the mayor, his aides in City Hall and other officials have created at least a rough timeline covering the nine days during which the reported threat was weighed. That timeline includes conference calls with the F.B.I., reports of polygraph tests administered to the investigation's informant, and word of an ominous claim made by one of the men detained in Iraq suggesting that the plan could not be stopped.

In some instances, the accounts could be verified; in others, they could not.

But the information, at minimum, sheds some light on the delicate process of evaluating intelligence information, the deliberations that preceded the city's actions and the frank discussions about the political environment of the events.

In fact, Mr. Bloomberg's aides say they knew that by making the announcement on the Thursday of the Harlem debate they would face claims of a conspiracy. At one point, according to a mayoral aide, the administration considered having Mr. Bloomberg skip the threat announcement and let Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly handle it.

"We talked about it on the way over to Police Plaza," said Edward Skyler, Mr. Bloomberg's communications director. "But the mayor has a job to do, and you can't let politics stop you from doing your job."

A senior American intelligence official in Washington said that the office of John D. Negroponte, the director of national intelligence, "would take a long look" at the episode in New York to find lessons for intelligence sharing.

For his part, Mr. Kelly said that the apparently confused stream of information from Washington warranted a review. "I think we have to get together with federal agencies," he said at a groundbreaking ceremony for an expansion of the Harlem Hospital Center. "They have a responsibility in Washington to speak with one voice and to proactively put out information that is going to help localities."

The information first reached police headquarters late in the day on Tuesday, Sept. 27, according to several law enforcement officials. Police officials were told that the source's information had proved accurate 8 out of 15 times.

The matter was discussed the next morning at the Police Department's regular 9 a.m. intelligence briefing, where discussions about possible plots against the city are not unusual, several officials said. Officials learned that the source would be given a polygraph examination the next day that would focus on the information he had provided about the possible New York threat, the official said.

On Friday, Sept. 30, at about 9:30 a.m., officials were given a preliminary report on the polygraph results, which suggested that the source was not lying when he talked about what he had heard of the New York plot, the official said, increasing the level of concern among police officials.

By Monday, Oct. 3, officials had a report on the polygraph, which one described as "very detailed and very specific." The source had described an 18-hour drive to a training camp with the three men.

At the end of the day, with his concern growing, Mr. Kelly telephoned the mayor, suggesting that they speak in person, another official said. The mayor was on the Upper East Side, having Rosh Hashana dinner, and the police commissioner drove uptown and the mayor met him on the street, the official said. The two stood on the sidewalk on Madison Avenue, where he briefed the mayor. Throughout the week, according to aides to the mayor, Mr. Bloomberg and Mr. Kelly were in regular contact - by telephone, hand-held computer and face-to-face meetings.

On Tuesday, Oct. 4, the department got word that the military and intelligence authorities were looking for the three men identified by the source, and a Channel 4 television reporter, Jonathan Dienst, called federal authorities and police officials, several officials said. Mr. Dienst had details on the Defense Intelligence Agency source's account, but was persuaded by senior law enforcement officials in Washington and New York not to broadcast the report, Mr. Dienst and several law enforcement officials said.

By Wednesday, the military had located the three men in Iraq and had them under surveillance, officials said, and two of the three were captured the next day. At first, there were questions of whether one of the men in custody was the man himself or his brother, one official said.

Two versions of the plot as described by the informant gave different timelines for when the possible New York attack would occur, one official said. In one, it would occur sometime after Oct. 7; in the other, between Oct. 7 and Oct. 12. At first, Mr. Skyler said, he had not expected an announcement of the threat and the deployment of officers to come before Friday, Oct. 7th.

But on Thursday, department officials learned in a conference call with the F.B.I. that when one of the men was taken into custody, he told his captors in clear English, "It's too late, you can't stop us," several officials said. Mr. Kelly notified the mayor, and later in the day, he began to beef up security. Word spread to reporters, who began calling the Police Department and City Hall.

Shortly after 4 p.m., Mr. Skyler interrupted a City Hall meeting to tell the mayor, "This isn't going to hold."

About 5:40 p.m. on Thursday, the administration told the public of the threat.