Horn of a dilemma
The UN has warned that a build-up of tensions--and troops--along the Ethiopia-Eritrean border could lead to another outbreak of war. Speaking in early November, Rajender Singh, head of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), commented “I am not saying that things which are happening today will lead tomorrow to war. But a situation may in fact deteriorate to that level in which the worst can happen. And the worst is the war, of course.”
The two sides have existed in an uneasy peace since the end of a two-year border conflict in 2000. Both are awaiting a new date for the physical demarcation of their common border--a process originally scheduled for completion by November 2003, but yet to commence. Indeed, in October the Eritrean government banned UNMEE helicopters from using Eritrean air space, a development that significantly reduced the UN’s ability to monitor the situation in the temporary security zone, because this was largely dependent on aerial surveillance.
There are two possible interpretations of Asmara’s decision. Some observers suggest that the goal is to force the border issue higher up the international agenda. Eritrea suspects that the international community is both weary of the dispute and biased in favour of Ethiopia--a claim that is not totally unjustified since Ethiopia has sought to avoid the “final and binding” border ruling on a technicality, by agreeing to it only in principle. The alternative interpretation, fuelled by strong words about Eritrea defending its territorial integrity by “any means possible”, is that Eritrea is gearing up for a resumption of the military conflict. Asmara continues to rebuff appeals for dialogue and UN mediation until Ethiopia accepts the boundary ruling in full.
The Ethiopian government is highly unlikely to do so, however, particularly given its current domestic difficulties. The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) may have won the May elections, but the two main opposition parties, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Front, increased their representation to 161 seats from just 12 in the 2000 poll. More to the point, the opposition remains convinced that the EPRDF “stole” the poll, and this has led to periodic outbursts of unrest and violence within--and, as of early November--outside the capital.
It is not yet clear whether the CUD will take its 109 seats in parliament, and it is still possible that there will be a steady increase in co-operation between the government and the opposition once the intensity of the election period begins to fade. However, given the lack of trust between the two sides a prolonged and tense stand-off seems more likely. What is certain is that the opposition’s strong showing does not bode well for a settlement of the border dispute. The opposition rejects the limited peace overtures previously made by the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, to Eritrea, and does not recognise Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in the early 1990s. Although the opposition will not set Ethiopia’s agenda, its strong electoral performance will make Mr Meles's government even more reluctant than before to find a solution to the border crisis--and perhaps more willing to indulge in sabre-rattling. As it is, Ethiopia has been moving troops to the border--indeed, the country is thought to have nearly half of its armoured units in the area. There is a clear risk, therefore, that what Major-General Singh terms a “miscalculation” by one or other side could lead to renewed conflict.
Most observers consider Ethiopia to be militarily stronger than Eritrea, and think that it would win any renewed fighting. In the final push of the 1998-2000 border war, for example, Ethiopia pushed deep inside Eritrean territory and stopped voluntarily before taking the capital. Additionally, since 2000 Ethiopia has benefited from consistent international support (military, economic and political), whereas Eritrea has suffered the effects of closed borders, the destruction of war, economic decline and drought.
Hopefully the Eritrean government is also aware of these realities, and is indeed trying to raise the international profile of the border dispute, rather than preparing for war. The problem is that while the international community is determined to prevent any fresh conflict, some form of intervention by one or more countries with influence over both governments is not yet forthcoming.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Africa
The two sides have existed in an uneasy peace since the end of a two-year border conflict in 2000. Both are awaiting a new date for the physical demarcation of their common border--a process originally scheduled for completion by November 2003, but yet to commence. Indeed, in October the Eritrean government banned UNMEE helicopters from using Eritrean air space, a development that significantly reduced the UN’s ability to monitor the situation in the temporary security zone, because this was largely dependent on aerial surveillance.
There are two possible interpretations of Asmara’s decision. Some observers suggest that the goal is to force the border issue higher up the international agenda. Eritrea suspects that the international community is both weary of the dispute and biased in favour of Ethiopia--a claim that is not totally unjustified since Ethiopia has sought to avoid the “final and binding” border ruling on a technicality, by agreeing to it only in principle. The alternative interpretation, fuelled by strong words about Eritrea defending its territorial integrity by “any means possible”, is that Eritrea is gearing up for a resumption of the military conflict. Asmara continues to rebuff appeals for dialogue and UN mediation until Ethiopia accepts the boundary ruling in full.
The Ethiopian government is highly unlikely to do so, however, particularly given its current domestic difficulties. The ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) may have won the May elections, but the two main opposition parties, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Front, increased their representation to 161 seats from just 12 in the 2000 poll. More to the point, the opposition remains convinced that the EPRDF “stole” the poll, and this has led to periodic outbursts of unrest and violence within--and, as of early November--outside the capital.
It is not yet clear whether the CUD will take its 109 seats in parliament, and it is still possible that there will be a steady increase in co-operation between the government and the opposition once the intensity of the election period begins to fade. However, given the lack of trust between the two sides a prolonged and tense stand-off seems more likely. What is certain is that the opposition’s strong showing does not bode well for a settlement of the border dispute. The opposition rejects the limited peace overtures previously made by the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi, to Eritrea, and does not recognise Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in the early 1990s. Although the opposition will not set Ethiopia’s agenda, its strong electoral performance will make Mr Meles's government even more reluctant than before to find a solution to the border crisis--and perhaps more willing to indulge in sabre-rattling. As it is, Ethiopia has been moving troops to the border--indeed, the country is thought to have nearly half of its armoured units in the area. There is a clear risk, therefore, that what Major-General Singh terms a “miscalculation” by one or other side could lead to renewed conflict.
Most observers consider Ethiopia to be militarily stronger than Eritrea, and think that it would win any renewed fighting. In the final push of the 1998-2000 border war, for example, Ethiopia pushed deep inside Eritrean territory and stopped voluntarily before taking the capital. Additionally, since 2000 Ethiopia has benefited from consistent international support (military, economic and political), whereas Eritrea has suffered the effects of closed borders, the destruction of war, economic decline and drought.
Hopefully the Eritrean government is also aware of these realities, and is indeed trying to raise the international profile of the border dispute, rather than preparing for war. The problem is that while the international community is determined to prevent any fresh conflict, some form of intervention by one or more countries with influence over both governments is not yet forthcoming.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Africa
posted by Marko at 11/05/2005 07:45:00 AM
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