Russian-Israeli Relations and Russian Arms Trade in the Middle East
Moscow Defense Brief:
Middle Eastern nations are constantly at the center of attention for Russian arms exporters. With the Chinese and Indian arms markets approaching saturation, the capacious markets of the countries of the Middle East are drawing attention as potential variants for the diversification of Russian arms exports. In this context it is important to note Russia’s rather poor showing against other major contenders on the arms export market, namely American, British and French exporters. The disparity especially concerns the markets of the rich oil-producing monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The same situation, however, can be observed in relation to the traditional buyers of Soviet and Russian arms – the radical anti-Western and anti-Israeli regimes of Syria, Iran and Libya.
All major confirmed Russian arms deliveries to Iran took place in the first half of the 1990s. Among these deliveries were three Kilo class submarines, several dozens MiG-29 fighters of the basic ‘9-12’ version and also a significant number of T-72 main battle tanks. The second half of the 1990’s was marked by the appearance of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Memorandum, in which Russia gave up the option of concluding new arms contracts with Iran. Following Russia’s withdrawal in 2000 from contract fulfillment contingencies contained in the Memorandum, Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation over the past five years has only resulted in the presumed deliveries of 30 Mi-17 transport helicopters, a certain number of which are likely to have been the combat version. This resumption of arms trading is also likely to include deliveries of spare parts. On the whole, however, it is clear that Iran remains only a marginal buyer for Russian defense and dual-use production.
Regarding Syria, the only confirmed and completed arms deal was the delivery in 1998-2000 of a consignment of Cornet-E (AT-14) and Metis-M (AT-13) ATGMs, having a total value of just over USD 70 ml. Information concerning significant arms sales to Libya during the post-Soviet period is lacking.
The reasons for the low level of arms trade activity to Damascus, Teheran and Tripoli vary. The main obstacle to importing foreign arms to Syria is the limited means of the state. For Iran, it is the nation’s orientation towards the development of its own defense industry; and for Libya, the obstacle remains the desire to normalize relations with the West and dissatisfaction with Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990’s.
Despite the current low level of activity in this area, future developments of political and military conditions in the region may indeed compel Iran and Syria to become more active in arms purchases, including purchases from Russia. Because even the most insignificant arms deliveries infringe on the security interests of Israel, it would appear expedient to attempt to formulate some general principles for military-technical cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, adhering to which would support Russia’s national interests. Generally these interests consist of:
*
Commercial interests, these being the generation of resources from potential arms sales to clients in the region; and
*
Maintaining access to advanced technologies, and in some cases, the direct purchases of arms and equipment from Israel with the purpose of ensuring increased competitiveness of the Russian defense industry, and in some cases – for the support of the so-called Russian ‘power’ ministries, the various military and strategic internal ministries reporting directly to the president.
It is easy to see how these two principles are potentially mutually exclusive. One of the major Russian military-technical policy tasks for the region is the harmonization of this conflict of interest. In the analysis of the situation, several prospective avenues emerge.
First, a reduction in the overall level of military security for the State of Israel is not among Russian interests. Moreover, Russia should pay increased attention to the possibility of real military threats as a consequence of Russian arms deliveries to Syria or other nations unfriendly to Israel. Special attention is necessary concerning the potential consequences of deliveries of weapons systems that could be used against civilians or civilian targets, and offensive arms against which it would be difficult to mount a defense.
Russian sensitivity to Israeli interests is desirable not in terms of altruism, but as a consequence of the fact that Israel, unusual as it may sound, could potentially become one of the Russian Federation’s major partners in the area of military-technical cooperation. The character of military technical cooperation with Israel consists of the fact that Israel is neither a buyer of Russian arms and military equipment nor a potential partner for the realization of large joint military-industrial projects. In the process of the degradation of the Russian defense industry and the growing gap between Russian and other military-technical leaders, Israel to an increasing degree could, however, become one of the major sources of cheap, easily imported technologies for Russia as an alternative to independent development. In addition, Israeli arms dealer networks in some cases could be used for the promotion of Russian aviation platforms equipped with Israeli avionics on the world market. Cooperation of this kind would be distinguished by a fully complimentary character and mutual commercial interest. Concerning Russia’s relationships with other countries’ manufacturing avionics, achievement of such a complimentary character in a manufacturing relationship would be more difficult, as France for example, is already a serious player in the market of aviation and helicopter platforms.
Finally, Russia has an interest in Israel with regards to that nation’s experience in antiterrorist and counter-insurgent combat; including experience in densely populated urban conditions.
Though the idea of Russia’s importing military equipment seems improbable at present, the fact that its own army is incapable of burdening the Russian arms industry with orders leads us to believe that such cooperation is a distinct possibility in the near future. Actually, the first imports of dual-use equipment in the interests of the Russian ‘power’ ministries have already taken place. For example, Irkut Corporation purchases from Israel equipment and technology for unmanned aviation systems and systems for observing and identifying objects. These transactions have been realized in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, which, from the perspective of the interests of the Russian aircraft manufacturing industry, follows a much more effective policy than the Ministry of Defense.
It should be noted that Israel has many advantages as a source of arms and defense technologies for Russia. The basic advantages include the readiness to share technology and, as already noted, the complimentary nature of Russian and Israeli product lines on the market.
It is clear that relations with a potential strategic partner in the military-technical sphere can only be built on conditions of increased attention to the security interests of said partner, even more so in the case of Israel. On the other hand, taking the security interests of Israel into closer account, Russia can and should assert its commercial interests. This would include the sale of weapons systems that would not pose any threat to Israel from Syria, other Arab countries or Iran.
As presented here, these principles for Russian interests in the region are compatible with each other and could be easily combined in a real policy of military-technical cooperation. Proceeding from the given approaches, it is possible to count certain transfers of arms to Syria as undesirable. Systems such as the Iskander-E missile systems (SS-X-26), the family of S-300 SAM systems (SA-10) and portable MANPADs of any kind are clearly not in the interests of Israel. The Iskander, with its highly accurate targeting, three hundred km range and the impossibility of being intercepted by antimissile defense systems, is for the Middle East a strategic weapon of tremendous potential which could devastate vital military, economic and administrative targets almost anywhere within the territory of Israel. Likewise, the S-300 SAM systems also offer too much advantage in range in the context of the congested Middle Eastern region, and their transfer to Syria would certainly pose a threat to flights above the territory of Israel, including civilian aircraft. MANPADs can fall into the hands of irregular paramilitary groups, which could use them against civilian targets.
At the same time, the transfer of arms systems such as medium and short range Air Defense Systems Buk-M1 (SA-17), Tor-M1 (SA-15), Tunguska-M1 or the Pantsir-C1 (SA-19), while strengthening the military security of Syria, would not pose any threat to Israeli civilian targets. These defense systems can be used only against military targets and only in the event of Israeli military activity above Syrian or Lebanese territory. Similarly, the military balance of the region would not be essentially changed in the event of any large scale modernization of Syrian military air capabilities or Syrian ground forces, which will always be inferior to Israeli air and ground forces in fighting capacity.
Middle Eastern nations are constantly at the center of attention for Russian arms exporters. With the Chinese and Indian arms markets approaching saturation, the capacious markets of the countries of the Middle East are drawing attention as potential variants for the diversification of Russian arms exports. In this context it is important to note Russia’s rather poor showing against other major contenders on the arms export market, namely American, British and French exporters. The disparity especially concerns the markets of the rich oil-producing monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The same situation, however, can be observed in relation to the traditional buyers of Soviet and Russian arms – the radical anti-Western and anti-Israeli regimes of Syria, Iran and Libya.
All major confirmed Russian arms deliveries to Iran took place in the first half of the 1990s. Among these deliveries were three Kilo class submarines, several dozens MiG-29 fighters of the basic ‘9-12’ version and also a significant number of T-72 main battle tanks. The second half of the 1990’s was marked by the appearance of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Memorandum, in which Russia gave up the option of concluding new arms contracts with Iran. Following Russia’s withdrawal in 2000 from contract fulfillment contingencies contained in the Memorandum, Russian-Iranian military-technical cooperation over the past five years has only resulted in the presumed deliveries of 30 Mi-17 transport helicopters, a certain number of which are likely to have been the combat version. This resumption of arms trading is also likely to include deliveries of spare parts. On the whole, however, it is clear that Iran remains only a marginal buyer for Russian defense and dual-use production.
Regarding Syria, the only confirmed and completed arms deal was the delivery in 1998-2000 of a consignment of Cornet-E (AT-14) and Metis-M (AT-13) ATGMs, having a total value of just over USD 70 ml. Information concerning significant arms sales to Libya during the post-Soviet period is lacking.
The reasons for the low level of arms trade activity to Damascus, Teheran and Tripoli vary. The main obstacle to importing foreign arms to Syria is the limited means of the state. For Iran, it is the nation’s orientation towards the development of its own defense industry; and for Libya, the obstacle remains the desire to normalize relations with the West and dissatisfaction with Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990’s.
Despite the current low level of activity in this area, future developments of political and military conditions in the region may indeed compel Iran and Syria to become more active in arms purchases, including purchases from Russia. Because even the most insignificant arms deliveries infringe on the security interests of Israel, it would appear expedient to attempt to formulate some general principles for military-technical cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, adhering to which would support Russia’s national interests. Generally these interests consist of:
*
Commercial interests, these being the generation of resources from potential arms sales to clients in the region; and
*
Maintaining access to advanced technologies, and in some cases, the direct purchases of arms and equipment from Israel with the purpose of ensuring increased competitiveness of the Russian defense industry, and in some cases – for the support of the so-called Russian ‘power’ ministries, the various military and strategic internal ministries reporting directly to the president.
It is easy to see how these two principles are potentially mutually exclusive. One of the major Russian military-technical policy tasks for the region is the harmonization of this conflict of interest. In the analysis of the situation, several prospective avenues emerge.
First, a reduction in the overall level of military security for the State of Israel is not among Russian interests. Moreover, Russia should pay increased attention to the possibility of real military threats as a consequence of Russian arms deliveries to Syria or other nations unfriendly to Israel. Special attention is necessary concerning the potential consequences of deliveries of weapons systems that could be used against civilians or civilian targets, and offensive arms against which it would be difficult to mount a defense.
Russian sensitivity to Israeli interests is desirable not in terms of altruism, but as a consequence of the fact that Israel, unusual as it may sound, could potentially become one of the Russian Federation’s major partners in the area of military-technical cooperation. The character of military technical cooperation with Israel consists of the fact that Israel is neither a buyer of Russian arms and military equipment nor a potential partner for the realization of large joint military-industrial projects. In the process of the degradation of the Russian defense industry and the growing gap between Russian and other military-technical leaders, Israel to an increasing degree could, however, become one of the major sources of cheap, easily imported technologies for Russia as an alternative to independent development. In addition, Israeli arms dealer networks in some cases could be used for the promotion of Russian aviation platforms equipped with Israeli avionics on the world market. Cooperation of this kind would be distinguished by a fully complimentary character and mutual commercial interest. Concerning Russia’s relationships with other countries’ manufacturing avionics, achievement of such a complimentary character in a manufacturing relationship would be more difficult, as France for example, is already a serious player in the market of aviation and helicopter platforms.
Finally, Russia has an interest in Israel with regards to that nation’s experience in antiterrorist and counter-insurgent combat; including experience in densely populated urban conditions.
Though the idea of Russia’s importing military equipment seems improbable at present, the fact that its own army is incapable of burdening the Russian arms industry with orders leads us to believe that such cooperation is a distinct possibility in the near future. Actually, the first imports of dual-use equipment in the interests of the Russian ‘power’ ministries have already taken place. For example, Irkut Corporation purchases from Israel equipment and technology for unmanned aviation systems and systems for observing and identifying objects. These transactions have been realized in the interests of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, which, from the perspective of the interests of the Russian aircraft manufacturing industry, follows a much more effective policy than the Ministry of Defense.
It should be noted that Israel has many advantages as a source of arms and defense technologies for Russia. The basic advantages include the readiness to share technology and, as already noted, the complimentary nature of Russian and Israeli product lines on the market.
It is clear that relations with a potential strategic partner in the military-technical sphere can only be built on conditions of increased attention to the security interests of said partner, even more so in the case of Israel. On the other hand, taking the security interests of Israel into closer account, Russia can and should assert its commercial interests. This would include the sale of weapons systems that would not pose any threat to Israel from Syria, other Arab countries or Iran.
As presented here, these principles for Russian interests in the region are compatible with each other and could be easily combined in a real policy of military-technical cooperation. Proceeding from the given approaches, it is possible to count certain transfers of arms to Syria as undesirable. Systems such as the Iskander-E missile systems (SS-X-26), the family of S-300 SAM systems (SA-10) and portable MANPADs of any kind are clearly not in the interests of Israel. The Iskander, with its highly accurate targeting, three hundred km range and the impossibility of being intercepted by antimissile defense systems, is for the Middle East a strategic weapon of tremendous potential which could devastate vital military, economic and administrative targets almost anywhere within the territory of Israel. Likewise, the S-300 SAM systems also offer too much advantage in range in the context of the congested Middle Eastern region, and their transfer to Syria would certainly pose a threat to flights above the territory of Israel, including civilian aircraft. MANPADs can fall into the hands of irregular paramilitary groups, which could use them against civilian targets.
At the same time, the transfer of arms systems such as medium and short range Air Defense Systems Buk-M1 (SA-17), Tor-M1 (SA-15), Tunguska-M1 or the Pantsir-C1 (SA-19), while strengthening the military security of Syria, would not pose any threat to Israeli civilian targets. These defense systems can be used only against military targets and only in the event of Israeli military activity above Syrian or Lebanese territory. Similarly, the military balance of the region would not be essentially changed in the event of any large scale modernization of Syrian military air capabilities or Syrian ground forces, which will always be inferior to Israeli air and ground forces in fighting capacity.
posted by Marko at 12/22/2005 10:13:00 AM
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