Syria Noose closing
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The Syrian regime has done just enough to ward off the immediate threat of sanctions being imposed on account of its alleged role in the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister. However, the second report issued by the UN investigation team reaffirms the salient conclusions of the fist one--notably that Syrian intelligence officials were implicated--and describes as "suspects" five Syrians recently interviewed by the team in Vienna.
Fresh victim
Just before the report was published on December 12th Lebanon witnessed another car bomb assassination. The victim this time was Gebran Tueni, managing editor of the Al Nahar newspaper group and a recently elected MP. Mr Tueni, an outspoken critic of the Syrian regime, had declared himself to be at the top of a Damascus hitlist of assassination targets. He had only been back in Lebanon for a matter of hours from self-imposed exile in France when the armoured car in which he was travelling in east Beirut was blown off the road by a powerful explosion, apparently a bomb placed in a parked vehicle and set off by remote control. The operation was widely assumed within Lebanon to have been carried out by agents of the Syrian regime. The presumed intention was to show that Lebanese (and, indeed, Syrian) critics of the Damascus regime cannot count on the protection of international powers, and to demonstrate that the regime will stop at nothing in its efforts to ensure its survival.
Mehlis moves on
The head of the UN commission, Detlev Mehlis, has said that he intends to return to his job as a public prosecutor in Germany when his current mandate expires on December 15th, but he has also made clear in his second report that the investigation will continue under new leadership. Mr Mehlis states that investigations conducted since the first report was issued in October have reinforced the original conclusions, and that there are now 19 suspects in the case, including the four senior Lebanese security officials who have been in custody since the end of August. He details how the Syrian government has sought to obstruct the investigation and, in respect of one key witness, to undermine it. However, he also acknowledges that Syria did finally agree to submit five suspects for questioning in Vienna and that his team was allowed to interview a Syrian witness inside Syria. He refers to "the slow pace with which the Syrian authorities are beginning to discharge their duties", as laid out in UN Security Council resolution 1636 of October 31st 2005. He refrains from stating that Syria's behaviour amounts to lack of co-operation, but emphasises that in future Syria must display "timely and unambiguous" co-operation with the commission.
The UN Security Council is likely to endorse the report's recommendation that the commission's mandate be extended for at least six months. It is also likely to support the request of the Lebanese government for an international tribunal to be set up to hear the case once the investigation has been concluded. The Security Council reacted promptly to the assassination of Mr Tueni, warning that "sponsors of today's and previous terrorist attacks" against Lebanese political and civil society leaders "will not be permitted to succeed and will finally be held accountable for their crimes".
Building a case
The second Mehlis report is considerably shorter than the first one, and does not include any startling new revelations. However, it does add some important elements:
* Two of the suspects interviewed in Vienna "indicated that all Syrian intelligence documents concerning Lebanon had been burned".
* DNA tests on Zuheir Saddik, a witness later determined to be a suspect (and now in custody in France), cast doubt on his claims to have been present at planning meetings held in an apartment in Beirut's southern suburbs.
* The original testimony of Hussam Taher Hussam, a Syrian agent quoted as an anonymous witness in the first Mehlis report, has been corroborated by other witnesses, despite his public recantation of his testimony at a press conference held in Syria--the report states that the commission received "credible information" that Syrian officials had arrested and threatened close relatives of Mr Hussam prior to this recantation.
* Further forensic examination had enabled the commission to identify the type of explosives used in the assassination (despite efforts by Lebanese security officials to confuse matters immediately after the blast)--further measures will be taken to track down the origins of the explosives.
* The Mitsubishi Canter truck believed to have been used for the bomb entered the Middle East via the UAE, having being identified by its engine block as reported stolen in Japan in October 2004. The UAE authorities are now helping with further enquiries to trace its movements.
* Witnesses have attested to Lebanese security forces having been present during excavation work in the area of the explosion in the days immediately preceding the assassination--the report notes that this line of enquiry is "significant".
* The commission presents a recording of a taped conversation between the late Mr Hariri and Rustom Ghazali, then head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, in August 2004 indicating that the late Lebanese prime minister was subject to a "Damascus protocol" dictating what he was allowed to do and say in respect of Syria.
* The commission has discovered evidence that Mr Hariri had declared his intention to take robust measures with respect to a Lebanese banking scandal thought to have implicated senior Syrian officials, should he return to office following the elections scheduled for the spring of 2005 (he was killed in February).
* The commission has received evidence from the former director of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale (one of the four suspects in custody in Beirut) of the existence of an illegal fund operated out of his office to finance secret operations "and which had possibly been used to finance the assassination of Mr Hariri".
The five Syrian suspects interviewed in Vienna at the end of November are thought to include Mr Ghazali and his former deputy Jameh Jameh. The report states that the interview of a sixth Syrian official, whose name was submitted to the Syrian authorities with the other five, has been postponed. This official is widely assumed to be Assef Shawkat, the head of Syrian military intelligence, who was mentioned in a witness statement in the first Mehlis report as having been implicated in the assassination.
Long grass
The Syrian strategy for dealing with the Hariri probe is to provide the bare minimum of co-operation, with the presumed objective of ensuring that the exercise loses momentum, as the investigators search in vain for the vital pieces of evidence needed to bring the case to court. Events such as the assassination of Mr Tueni serve as reminders that opposition to the will of Damascus is by no means a cheap and easy option
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
The Syrian regime has done just enough to ward off the immediate threat of sanctions being imposed on account of its alleged role in the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister. However, the second report issued by the UN investigation team reaffirms the salient conclusions of the fist one--notably that Syrian intelligence officials were implicated--and describes as "suspects" five Syrians recently interviewed by the team in Vienna.
Fresh victim
Just before the report was published on December 12th Lebanon witnessed another car bomb assassination. The victim this time was Gebran Tueni, managing editor of the Al Nahar newspaper group and a recently elected MP. Mr Tueni, an outspoken critic of the Syrian regime, had declared himself to be at the top of a Damascus hitlist of assassination targets. He had only been back in Lebanon for a matter of hours from self-imposed exile in France when the armoured car in which he was travelling in east Beirut was blown off the road by a powerful explosion, apparently a bomb placed in a parked vehicle and set off by remote control. The operation was widely assumed within Lebanon to have been carried out by agents of the Syrian regime. The presumed intention was to show that Lebanese (and, indeed, Syrian) critics of the Damascus regime cannot count on the protection of international powers, and to demonstrate that the regime will stop at nothing in its efforts to ensure its survival.
Mehlis moves on
The head of the UN commission, Detlev Mehlis, has said that he intends to return to his job as a public prosecutor in Germany when his current mandate expires on December 15th, but he has also made clear in his second report that the investigation will continue under new leadership. Mr Mehlis states that investigations conducted since the first report was issued in October have reinforced the original conclusions, and that there are now 19 suspects in the case, including the four senior Lebanese security officials who have been in custody since the end of August. He details how the Syrian government has sought to obstruct the investigation and, in respect of one key witness, to undermine it. However, he also acknowledges that Syria did finally agree to submit five suspects for questioning in Vienna and that his team was allowed to interview a Syrian witness inside Syria. He refers to "the slow pace with which the Syrian authorities are beginning to discharge their duties", as laid out in UN Security Council resolution 1636 of October 31st 2005. He refrains from stating that Syria's behaviour amounts to lack of co-operation, but emphasises that in future Syria must display "timely and unambiguous" co-operation with the commission.
The UN Security Council is likely to endorse the report's recommendation that the commission's mandate be extended for at least six months. It is also likely to support the request of the Lebanese government for an international tribunal to be set up to hear the case once the investigation has been concluded. The Security Council reacted promptly to the assassination of Mr Tueni, warning that "sponsors of today's and previous terrorist attacks" against Lebanese political and civil society leaders "will not be permitted to succeed and will finally be held accountable for their crimes".
Building a case
The second Mehlis report is considerably shorter than the first one, and does not include any startling new revelations. However, it does add some important elements:
* Two of the suspects interviewed in Vienna "indicated that all Syrian intelligence documents concerning Lebanon had been burned".
* DNA tests on Zuheir Saddik, a witness later determined to be a suspect (and now in custody in France), cast doubt on his claims to have been present at planning meetings held in an apartment in Beirut's southern suburbs.
* The original testimony of Hussam Taher Hussam, a Syrian agent quoted as an anonymous witness in the first Mehlis report, has been corroborated by other witnesses, despite his public recantation of his testimony at a press conference held in Syria--the report states that the commission received "credible information" that Syrian officials had arrested and threatened close relatives of Mr Hussam prior to this recantation.
* Further forensic examination had enabled the commission to identify the type of explosives used in the assassination (despite efforts by Lebanese security officials to confuse matters immediately after the blast)--further measures will be taken to track down the origins of the explosives.
* The Mitsubishi Canter truck believed to have been used for the bomb entered the Middle East via the UAE, having being identified by its engine block as reported stolen in Japan in October 2004. The UAE authorities are now helping with further enquiries to trace its movements.
* Witnesses have attested to Lebanese security forces having been present during excavation work in the area of the explosion in the days immediately preceding the assassination--the report notes that this line of enquiry is "significant".
* The commission presents a recording of a taped conversation between the late Mr Hariri and Rustom Ghazali, then head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, in August 2004 indicating that the late Lebanese prime minister was subject to a "Damascus protocol" dictating what he was allowed to do and say in respect of Syria.
* The commission has discovered evidence that Mr Hariri had declared his intention to take robust measures with respect to a Lebanese banking scandal thought to have implicated senior Syrian officials, should he return to office following the elections scheduled for the spring of 2005 (he was killed in February).
* The commission has received evidence from the former director of the Lebanese Sûreté Générale (one of the four suspects in custody in Beirut) of the existence of an illegal fund operated out of his office to finance secret operations "and which had possibly been used to finance the assassination of Mr Hariri".
The five Syrian suspects interviewed in Vienna at the end of November are thought to include Mr Ghazali and his former deputy Jameh Jameh. The report states that the interview of a sixth Syrian official, whose name was submitted to the Syrian authorities with the other five, has been postponed. This official is widely assumed to be Assef Shawkat, the head of Syrian military intelligence, who was mentioned in a witness statement in the first Mehlis report as having been implicated in the assassination.
Long grass
The Syrian strategy for dealing with the Hariri probe is to provide the bare minimum of co-operation, with the presumed objective of ensuring that the exercise loses momentum, as the investigators search in vain for the vital pieces of evidence needed to bring the case to court. Events such as the assassination of Mr Tueni serve as reminders that opposition to the will of Damascus is by no means a cheap and easy option
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
posted by Marko at 12/13/2005 11:56:00 AM
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