Iran Not to be deterred
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Iran's latest gambit in its effort to develop a nuclear industry on its own terms has followed a familiar pattern. As it has done several times before, the Iranian government has professed itself to be frustrated at the lack of progress towards a diplomatic settlement over how to guarantee that the nuclear programme has no military dimension, and has proceeded to take another step towards mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. The international response, as on previous occasions, has involved expressions of alarm from the main interested parties, while Iran professes that its aims are peaceful and its demands quite reasonable.
However, each new step that Iran takes brings closer the moment of decision for the Western powers as to whether to risk taking punitive action--through comprehensive sanctions or military strikes--or whether to accept that Iran is determined to persist with the development of the nuclear fuel cycle, providing it with the implicit capability of making and deploying nuclear weapons, and there is little prospect of deterring it.
Too rich
The latest Iranian move has entailed restarting research into the enrichment of uranium. This has included the highly symbolic step of removing seals that had been placed on equipment at the Natanz enrichment facility as part of an earlier standstill agreement with three EU states--France, Germany and the UK. It follows the submission of a proposal by Russia to carry out elements of the enrichment process on its territory on behalf of Iran, as a means to guarantee no military diversion. Iran has given the proposal some consideration, but has insisted on its right to conduct the entire fuel cycle on its own territory, with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections proving the necessary guarantees.
The alarm this time round among Western states has been more pronounced because it appears that Iran is planning to produce enriched uranium, albeit in very small quantities. The indications from some Western leaders, notably the UK's prime minister, Tony Blair, is that this is a step too far, and that the time for negotiations has run out.
The IAEA board is likely to convene in February to address the matter. At is meeting last September the board deemed that Iran’s behaviour and activities “give rise to questions that are in the competence of the [UN] Security Council”. At that time China and Russia, which have developing economic interests in Iran, resisted immediate referral the Security Council. If they agree to a referral at the upcoming meeting, as statements by Russian and Chinese officials suggest that they will, it remains questionable whether they would support punitive sanctions. In general, there will be little appetite for any measure that may push up already exceptionally high oil prices. There is little to suggest that this will force Iran into a change of policy. Indeed, there is some risk that Iran may follow through on threats to withdraw from the NPT.
In American hands
Ultimately the decision on how to proceed will fall on the US. It has three broad choices. First, it could take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is a highly unattractive option: it would probably only delay rather than destroy the programme. Iran’s facilities are well protected and widely dispersed, and it is not clear that the US knows the full extent of its activities. Moreover, Iran could respond directly against US interests or indirectly through pro-Iranian groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is highly influential, as well as via the Lebanese Shia group, Hizbullah, against Israel. The US’s second option is to launch a concerted diplomatic effort through direct talks to resolve the issue. (Thus far diplomatic efforts have been conducted solely by the EU—the US has no diplomatic channels open with Iran.) However, domestic political considerations and deep mistrust have prevented the US from taking this route before, and the election as president of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has shown no interest in fostering dialogue, makes it more difficult for the administration to make overtures. The third option--and marginally the most likely outcome--is that the US will accept that it is unable to prevent Iran developing the nuclear fuel cycle, but will at least be able to slow that process down in the hope that a more amenable Iranian government comes to power.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
Iran's latest gambit in its effort to develop a nuclear industry on its own terms has followed a familiar pattern. As it has done several times before, the Iranian government has professed itself to be frustrated at the lack of progress towards a diplomatic settlement over how to guarantee that the nuclear programme has no military dimension, and has proceeded to take another step towards mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. The international response, as on previous occasions, has involved expressions of alarm from the main interested parties, while Iran professes that its aims are peaceful and its demands quite reasonable.
However, each new step that Iran takes brings closer the moment of decision for the Western powers as to whether to risk taking punitive action--through comprehensive sanctions or military strikes--or whether to accept that Iran is determined to persist with the development of the nuclear fuel cycle, providing it with the implicit capability of making and deploying nuclear weapons, and there is little prospect of deterring it.
Too rich
The latest Iranian move has entailed restarting research into the enrichment of uranium. This has included the highly symbolic step of removing seals that had been placed on equipment at the Natanz enrichment facility as part of an earlier standstill agreement with three EU states--France, Germany and the UK. It follows the submission of a proposal by Russia to carry out elements of the enrichment process on its territory on behalf of Iran, as a means to guarantee no military diversion. Iran has given the proposal some consideration, but has insisted on its right to conduct the entire fuel cycle on its own territory, with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections proving the necessary guarantees.
The alarm this time round among Western states has been more pronounced because it appears that Iran is planning to produce enriched uranium, albeit in very small quantities. The indications from some Western leaders, notably the UK's prime minister, Tony Blair, is that this is a step too far, and that the time for negotiations has run out.
The IAEA board is likely to convene in February to address the matter. At is meeting last September the board deemed that Iran’s behaviour and activities “give rise to questions that are in the competence of the [UN] Security Council”. At that time China and Russia, which have developing economic interests in Iran, resisted immediate referral the Security Council. If they agree to a referral at the upcoming meeting, as statements by Russian and Chinese officials suggest that they will, it remains questionable whether they would support punitive sanctions. In general, there will be little appetite for any measure that may push up already exceptionally high oil prices. There is little to suggest that this will force Iran into a change of policy. Indeed, there is some risk that Iran may follow through on threats to withdraw from the NPT.
In American hands
Ultimately the decision on how to proceed will fall on the US. It has three broad choices. First, it could take military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is a highly unattractive option: it would probably only delay rather than destroy the programme. Iran’s facilities are well protected and widely dispersed, and it is not clear that the US knows the full extent of its activities. Moreover, Iran could respond directly against US interests or indirectly through pro-Iranian groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it is highly influential, as well as via the Lebanese Shia group, Hizbullah, against Israel. The US’s second option is to launch a concerted diplomatic effort through direct talks to resolve the issue. (Thus far diplomatic efforts have been conducted solely by the EU—the US has no diplomatic channels open with Iran.) However, domestic political considerations and deep mistrust have prevented the US from taking this route before, and the election as president of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has shown no interest in fostering dialogue, makes it more difficult for the administration to make overtures. The third option--and marginally the most likely outcome--is that the US will accept that it is unable to prevent Iran developing the nuclear fuel cycle, but will at least be able to slow that process down in the hope that a more amenable Iranian government comes to power.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
posted by Marko at 1/12/2006 12:40:00 AM
<< Home