Palestinian Territories politics: Hamas in charge
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
The victory of Hamas, the main Palestinian Islamist group, in the parliamentary election in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on January 25th marks a seismic shift in the balance of power in the Palestinian nationalist movement, with major implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the political scene across the Middle East.
Much will depend on whether Hamas chooses to take over the machinery of Palestinian government and seek to operate it more effectively than the largely discredited Fatah movement, created by Yasser Arafat, or whether it attempts to create a wholly different model for Palestinian politics, economy and society. Calls from Hamas leaders for negotiations with Fatah on forming a government of national unity, suggest that the Islamist group would prefer to work within existing institutional structures. However, for this to work, Hamas will have to provide assurances of its willingness to extend its current ceasefire and to address the concerns of international donors about its attitudes to Israel.
Discipline
From the moment that Hamas declared its intention to participate in the parliamentary election (originally scheduled for July 2005, but put back because of the Israeli pull-out from Gaza) it was evident that it would make a strong impact. The disarray in the ranks of Fatah as the election approached, contrasting with the tight discipline of Hamas, was an additional boost to the Islamist group, whose ratings rose steadily . The election itself went ahead without serious incident, with a strong turnout of more than 75%. Exit polls initially pointed to a narrow Fatah lead, but by the time the first unofficial returns came in it was clear that Hamas had secured a majority of the 132 seats in the new Palestinian Legislative Council.
The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, a veteran of the Fatah movement, said that he accepted the result. This suggests that he must soon invite the head of the Hamas list, Ismail Haniyeh, to form a new government. There is also the option of selecting a non-partisan prime minister, but this could only happen with Hamas approval, as the majority party in parliament has the right to overrule the president's choice. Mr Haniyeh said that Hamas wanted to form a broad-based government, presumably including Fatah figures, other politicians and technocrats. "Hamas is not going to work alone, but with the other groups who represent the Palestinian people," he said. The initial response from Fatah officials was not encouraging, but once the reality of the movement's defeat sinks in it is likely that Fatah will consent to open discussions with Hamas about cabinet positions.
Purse strings
The critical positions in the new government will be the interior minister, foreign affairs (and head of peace negotiations) and finance. Mr Abbas will face a severe test in seeking to forge agreement with Hamas on the structure of control over the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces and, crucially, on the status of the military wing of Hamas itself. This issue is central to the discussions with international donors about ongoing financial support for the PA. Already the PA faces a freeze on disbursements from the EU and other major donors unless it addresses concerns about its inflated pay roll, which has resulted in a big increase in the fiscal deficit. The acting finance minister, Jihad al-Wazir, has been discussing a three-year fiscal stabilisation plan with the IMF, based on cuts in civil service and security jobs, combined with efforts to persuade Gulf Arab states to deliver previously pledged grants--amounting to some US$1bn, according to the PA. Mr Wazir took charge of PA finances towards the end of last year when Salam Fayyad, a former IMF staff member, resigned as finance minister to contest the election as part of a new independent grouping.
The EU has already indicated that it is prepared to continue to provide support to any Palestinian government, as long as it seeks "peace by peaceful means". That does not preclude dealing with Hamas, as long as the movement continues to abide by its current effective ceasefire, and declares its willingness to negotiate with Israel about a peace settlement based on two states. US agencies and Israel are unlikely to shift from their demand that the armed wing of Hamas be disbanded. EU aid and tax transfers from Israel make up a large portion of the Palestinian budget; the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is one of the most active aid agencies--one of its ongoing projects is the provision of scanning equipment to enable quicker security clearance for goods moving across the border between Gaza and Israel. Hamas has a vital interest in making sure that these relationships are not jeopardised by its election victory, as the further impoverishment of the Palestinian people would be likely to provoke a swift political backlash. Hamas owed its election victory as much to genuine support for its principles as to disenchantment with the Fatah administration.
Slim hopes of peace
The price of maintaining financial flows may indeed be a softening of the Hamas position on Israel, something that was hinted at in its election material. The Hamas programme differed significantly from previous policy documents issued by the movement in that it could be interpreted as accepting Palestinian statehood being confined to the West Bank and Gaza, rather than demanding the liberation of the entire territory of historic Palestine--and the removal of the state of Israel. The programme stated that participation in the election is "part of the overall plan for the liberation of Palestine, return of the Palestinian people to its land and homeland and founding its independent state with Jerusalem as its capital". It does not specifically advocate continuation of the "armed struggle" against Israel, although it does uphold the right to armed resistance to occupation. The programme is similar in its essentials to the position of Fatah, which is based on establishing a West Bank and Gaza state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and safeguarding the rights of Palestinian refugees.
However, there are many ambiguities in the Hamas programme, and tougher interpretations of what it might mean in practice have been provided by members of the movement's military wing and by party officers based outside the Palestinian Territories. As far as Israel is concerned, a subtle shift in the Hamas position provides little comfort. The election victory of a party that was responsible for a large proportion of the Israeli civilian deaths during the two intifadas can only be greeted with foreboding. The Hamas factor is sure to figure strongly in the Israeli election at the end of March. The chief beneficiary seems to be Binyamin Netanyahu, whose Likud party has the toughest position on security and on conditions for negotiating with the Palestinians.
More broadly in the Middle East, the performance of Hamas will encourage like-minded Islamist movements seeking to supplant secular nationalist regimes that, like Fatah, are widely perceived to have monopolised power for far too long.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
The victory of Hamas, the main Palestinian Islamist group, in the parliamentary election in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on January 25th marks a seismic shift in the balance of power in the Palestinian nationalist movement, with major implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the political scene across the Middle East.
Much will depend on whether Hamas chooses to take over the machinery of Palestinian government and seek to operate it more effectively than the largely discredited Fatah movement, created by Yasser Arafat, or whether it attempts to create a wholly different model for Palestinian politics, economy and society. Calls from Hamas leaders for negotiations with Fatah on forming a government of national unity, suggest that the Islamist group would prefer to work within existing institutional structures. However, for this to work, Hamas will have to provide assurances of its willingness to extend its current ceasefire and to address the concerns of international donors about its attitudes to Israel.
Discipline
From the moment that Hamas declared its intention to participate in the parliamentary election (originally scheduled for July 2005, but put back because of the Israeli pull-out from Gaza) it was evident that it would make a strong impact. The disarray in the ranks of Fatah as the election approached, contrasting with the tight discipline of Hamas, was an additional boost to the Islamist group, whose ratings rose steadily . The election itself went ahead without serious incident, with a strong turnout of more than 75%. Exit polls initially pointed to a narrow Fatah lead, but by the time the first unofficial returns came in it was clear that Hamas had secured a majority of the 132 seats in the new Palestinian Legislative Council.
The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, a veteran of the Fatah movement, said that he accepted the result. This suggests that he must soon invite the head of the Hamas list, Ismail Haniyeh, to form a new government. There is also the option of selecting a non-partisan prime minister, but this could only happen with Hamas approval, as the majority party in parliament has the right to overrule the president's choice. Mr Haniyeh said that Hamas wanted to form a broad-based government, presumably including Fatah figures, other politicians and technocrats. "Hamas is not going to work alone, but with the other groups who represent the Palestinian people," he said. The initial response from Fatah officials was not encouraging, but once the reality of the movement's defeat sinks in it is likely that Fatah will consent to open discussions with Hamas about cabinet positions.
Purse strings
The critical positions in the new government will be the interior minister, foreign affairs (and head of peace negotiations) and finance. Mr Abbas will face a severe test in seeking to forge agreement with Hamas on the structure of control over the Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces and, crucially, on the status of the military wing of Hamas itself. This issue is central to the discussions with international donors about ongoing financial support for the PA. Already the PA faces a freeze on disbursements from the EU and other major donors unless it addresses concerns about its inflated pay roll, which has resulted in a big increase in the fiscal deficit. The acting finance minister, Jihad al-Wazir, has been discussing a three-year fiscal stabilisation plan with the IMF, based on cuts in civil service and security jobs, combined with efforts to persuade Gulf Arab states to deliver previously pledged grants--amounting to some US$1bn, according to the PA. Mr Wazir took charge of PA finances towards the end of last year when Salam Fayyad, a former IMF staff member, resigned as finance minister to contest the election as part of a new independent grouping.
The EU has already indicated that it is prepared to continue to provide support to any Palestinian government, as long as it seeks "peace by peaceful means". That does not preclude dealing with Hamas, as long as the movement continues to abide by its current effective ceasefire, and declares its willingness to negotiate with Israel about a peace settlement based on two states. US agencies and Israel are unlikely to shift from their demand that the armed wing of Hamas be disbanded. EU aid and tax transfers from Israel make up a large portion of the Palestinian budget; the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is one of the most active aid agencies--one of its ongoing projects is the provision of scanning equipment to enable quicker security clearance for goods moving across the border between Gaza and Israel. Hamas has a vital interest in making sure that these relationships are not jeopardised by its election victory, as the further impoverishment of the Palestinian people would be likely to provoke a swift political backlash. Hamas owed its election victory as much to genuine support for its principles as to disenchantment with the Fatah administration.
Slim hopes of peace
The price of maintaining financial flows may indeed be a softening of the Hamas position on Israel, something that was hinted at in its election material. The Hamas programme differed significantly from previous policy documents issued by the movement in that it could be interpreted as accepting Palestinian statehood being confined to the West Bank and Gaza, rather than demanding the liberation of the entire territory of historic Palestine--and the removal of the state of Israel. The programme stated that participation in the election is "part of the overall plan for the liberation of Palestine, return of the Palestinian people to its land and homeland and founding its independent state with Jerusalem as its capital". It does not specifically advocate continuation of the "armed struggle" against Israel, although it does uphold the right to armed resistance to occupation. The programme is similar in its essentials to the position of Fatah, which is based on establishing a West Bank and Gaza state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and safeguarding the rights of Palestinian refugees.
However, there are many ambiguities in the Hamas programme, and tougher interpretations of what it might mean in practice have been provided by members of the movement's military wing and by party officers based outside the Palestinian Territories. As far as Israel is concerned, a subtle shift in the Hamas position provides little comfort. The election victory of a party that was responsible for a large proportion of the Israeli civilian deaths during the two intifadas can only be greeted with foreboding. The Hamas factor is sure to figure strongly in the Israeli election at the end of March. The chief beneficiary seems to be Binyamin Netanyahu, whose Likud party has the toughest position on security and on conditions for negotiating with the Palestinians.
More broadly in the Middle East, the performance of Hamas will encourage like-minded Islamist movements seeking to supplant secular nationalist regimes that, like Fatah, are widely perceived to have monopolised power for far too long.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
posted by Marko at 1/30/2006 02:07:00 AM
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