Armenia/Azerbaijan conflict
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Apparently well-founded hopes for a breakthrough in the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict have faltered, following the failure of the Rambouillet summit to produce an outline agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as expected. Although in theory there is still time this year to make progress, the prospects appear remote. Crucially, there is still no sign that both sides are willing to prepare their publics for a compromise deal. Moreover, time is not on the side of peace, as within Azerbaijan there is a steadily growing constituency in favour of a military solution.
On February 10th-11th the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliyev, met in Rambouillet on the outskirts of the Paris for talks under the auspices of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In the months leading up to the meeting, the prospects for a resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict had appeared brighter than at any time since late 2001, when an apparent peace deal reached earlier in the year collapsed owing to lack of political support. Expectations were high that talks would result in an outline agreement on the basic principles of a peace settlement for Nagorny Karabakh, which would be fleshed out in subsequent talks. Instead, the two main parties left France without concluding a deal.
The failure to the Rambouillet talks to produce such a deal is likely to be a major setback to the Nagorny Karabakh peace process. This is one of the largest frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union: Nagorny Karabakh, a territory of 4,400 square kilometres, is formally part of Azerbaijan but is under the control of Karabakh Armenians; virtually all of the province’s ethnic Azeri residents have been displaced. In addition, seven Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagorny Karabakh are under Armenian control, including an area of the Lachin valley that links Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia. As a result, nearly 11,900 square kilometres of Azerbaijani territory is under occupation; the entire area is ringed by trenches and troops; and there are several thousand internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan.
Disappointed hopes
The latest negotiations were the product of more than 18 months of painstaking work to draw up a peace framework. No concrete details of the peace proposal under consideration were released, but it was believed to include the return to Azerbaijan of at least five of the seven territories under Armenian control, followed 10-15 years' later (after the return of residents displaced by the civil war) by a referendum in Nagorny Karabakh to determine its status.
The presidential talks appear to have foundered owing to a failure to reconcile the mutually exclusive principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. Azerbaijan remains fundamentally opposed to any solution to the conflict that would entail giving up formal control over Nagorny Karabakh, while Armenia rejects outright the notion that the region would return to Azerbaijani rule. The situation is complicated by years of hostile rhetoric on both sides, which have hardened the respective populations' attitude to compromise. Furthermore, the fact that the authorities in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have acquired power through fundamentally flawed elections has weakened their legitimacy, which has in turn affected their ability to argue the case for concessions.
The role of Russia in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict—as one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group of mediators, alongside Russia and the US—has also complicated the search for peace. The conflict differs from that of the other frozen conflicts in the CIS, in that it is between two sovereign states, one of which—Armenia—has historically been closely associated with Russia. For this reason, Azerbaijan has always regarded Russia's participation in the Minsk Group with suspicion, a wariness reinforced by the belief that Russia both covertly and overtly backed Armenia and the Nagorny Karabakh Armenians during the war with political and military support. Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have undergone something of a rapprochement in recent years, in part owing to the desire by both governments to counter the spread of Islamic militancy in the region. Nevertheless, issues such as Russia's growing military presence in Armenia (following the forthcoming closure of Russian bases in Georgia) and Armenia's status as Russia's "strategic partner" in the South Caucasus remain points of contention.
How many more chances?
2006 had been seen as a crucial window of opportunity for a peace settlement in Nagorny Karabakh, given the absence of elections. Azerbaijan held a parliamentary election in October 2005 and one month later Armenia held a referendum to enact constitutional changes. Although both were flawed processes, international criticism was muted specifically to avoid weakening either side ahead of the talks. Armenia’s next election, for parliament, is due in 2007 while both countries are scheduled to have presidential elections in 2008. Although talks between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan are likely to continue (under the so-called Prague process), once election campaigning begins in earnest, serious progress will not be possible.
Neither side has done much to prepare its population for an eventual compromise deal. The signals which the two leaders have sent to international negotiators—that they are willing to find a solution—are entirely different from those directed to their respective publics. There is not a serious political movement in favour of compromise in either state, and the prevailing political culture in both is opposed to such a solution. There are differences, nevertheless: the Armenian side, being in possession of a swathe of Azerbaijani territory in addition to Nagorny-Karabakh, can afford to countenance the notion of some concessions. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is unwilling to compromise on its principal demand for the return of all of its sovereign territory. Until the national governments are willing to prepare their electorates for a compromise over Nagorny-Karabakh, the chances that the two presidents will agree a deal are slim to non-existent. For Messrs Kocharian and Aliyev, to go against public opinion over such a fundamental issue would be to invite political ruin.
It thus appears that there is little prospect that the two sides will take advantage of the 2006 window of opportunity—already, it appears to have been slammed shut. As things stand, the next chance may not appear until 2009. And if that opportunity is not seized, the risk is that the Nagorny Karabakh conflict may become “unfrozen” in a much less desirable manner. In Azerbaijan, the constituency in favour of a military solution to the conflict has grown steadily in recent years. In a February poll conducted by the Baku-based Opinion Monitoring Centre, 38% of respondents saw force as the best option. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s military—which was soundly defeated in the 1991-93 conflict—is now being built up rapidly. With Azerbaijan’s budget buoyed by oil revenue and double-digit economic growth, defence spending is set to rise to US$600m this year from around US$350m in 2005. The better-equipped and trained Armenian military, by contrast, has a budget of US$165m for 2006.
The fact that time and the oil boom are likely to shift the military balance in Azerbaijan’s favour perhaps helps to explain Mr Aliyev’s refusal to cut a deal. It is quite possible that he calculates that in five years’ time he will be in a position to drive a much harder bargain with Armenia. Yet the growing public frustration in Azerbaijan with the status quo, allied with increased defence spending and the bellicose rhetoric of many politicians, underlines the risk for peace of continued delay. The window of opportunity for 2006 appears to be closed; it is not clear how many more there will be.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
Apparently well-founded hopes for a breakthrough in the Nagorny-Karabakh conflict have faltered, following the failure of the Rambouillet summit to produce an outline agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as expected. Although in theory there is still time this year to make progress, the prospects appear remote. Crucially, there is still no sign that both sides are willing to prepare their publics for a compromise deal. Moreover, time is not on the side of peace, as within Azerbaijan there is a steadily growing constituency in favour of a military solution.
On February 10th-11th the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Robert Kocharian and Ilham Aliyev, met in Rambouillet on the outskirts of the Paris for talks under the auspices of the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In the months leading up to the meeting, the prospects for a resolution of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict had appeared brighter than at any time since late 2001, when an apparent peace deal reached earlier in the year collapsed owing to lack of political support. Expectations were high that talks would result in an outline agreement on the basic principles of a peace settlement for Nagorny Karabakh, which would be fleshed out in subsequent talks. Instead, the two main parties left France without concluding a deal.
The failure to the Rambouillet talks to produce such a deal is likely to be a major setback to the Nagorny Karabakh peace process. This is one of the largest frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union: Nagorny Karabakh, a territory of 4,400 square kilometres, is formally part of Azerbaijan but is under the control of Karabakh Armenians; virtually all of the province’s ethnic Azeri residents have been displaced. In addition, seven Azerbaijani territories surrounding Nagorny Karabakh are under Armenian control, including an area of the Lachin valley that links Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia. As a result, nearly 11,900 square kilometres of Azerbaijani territory is under occupation; the entire area is ringed by trenches and troops; and there are several thousand internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan.
Disappointed hopes
The latest negotiations were the product of more than 18 months of painstaking work to draw up a peace framework. No concrete details of the peace proposal under consideration were released, but it was believed to include the return to Azerbaijan of at least five of the seven territories under Armenian control, followed 10-15 years' later (after the return of residents displaced by the civil war) by a referendum in Nagorny Karabakh to determine its status.
The presidential talks appear to have foundered owing to a failure to reconcile the mutually exclusive principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. Azerbaijan remains fundamentally opposed to any solution to the conflict that would entail giving up formal control over Nagorny Karabakh, while Armenia rejects outright the notion that the region would return to Azerbaijani rule. The situation is complicated by years of hostile rhetoric on both sides, which have hardened the respective populations' attitude to compromise. Furthermore, the fact that the authorities in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have acquired power through fundamentally flawed elections has weakened their legitimacy, which has in turn affected their ability to argue the case for concessions.
The role of Russia in the Nagorny Karabakh conflict—as one of the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group of mediators, alongside Russia and the US—has also complicated the search for peace. The conflict differs from that of the other frozen conflicts in the CIS, in that it is between two sovereign states, one of which—Armenia—has historically been closely associated with Russia. For this reason, Azerbaijan has always regarded Russia's participation in the Minsk Group with suspicion, a wariness reinforced by the belief that Russia both covertly and overtly backed Armenia and the Nagorny Karabakh Armenians during the war with political and military support. Relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have undergone something of a rapprochement in recent years, in part owing to the desire by both governments to counter the spread of Islamic militancy in the region. Nevertheless, issues such as Russia's growing military presence in Armenia (following the forthcoming closure of Russian bases in Georgia) and Armenia's status as Russia's "strategic partner" in the South Caucasus remain points of contention.
How many more chances?
2006 had been seen as a crucial window of opportunity for a peace settlement in Nagorny Karabakh, given the absence of elections. Azerbaijan held a parliamentary election in October 2005 and one month later Armenia held a referendum to enact constitutional changes. Although both were flawed processes, international criticism was muted specifically to avoid weakening either side ahead of the talks. Armenia’s next election, for parliament, is due in 2007 while both countries are scheduled to have presidential elections in 2008. Although talks between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan are likely to continue (under the so-called Prague process), once election campaigning begins in earnest, serious progress will not be possible.
Neither side has done much to prepare its population for an eventual compromise deal. The signals which the two leaders have sent to international negotiators—that they are willing to find a solution—are entirely different from those directed to their respective publics. There is not a serious political movement in favour of compromise in either state, and the prevailing political culture in both is opposed to such a solution. There are differences, nevertheless: the Armenian side, being in possession of a swathe of Azerbaijani territory in addition to Nagorny-Karabakh, can afford to countenance the notion of some concessions. Azerbaijan, by contrast, is unwilling to compromise on its principal demand for the return of all of its sovereign territory. Until the national governments are willing to prepare their electorates for a compromise over Nagorny-Karabakh, the chances that the two presidents will agree a deal are slim to non-existent. For Messrs Kocharian and Aliyev, to go against public opinion over such a fundamental issue would be to invite political ruin.
It thus appears that there is little prospect that the two sides will take advantage of the 2006 window of opportunity—already, it appears to have been slammed shut. As things stand, the next chance may not appear until 2009. And if that opportunity is not seized, the risk is that the Nagorny Karabakh conflict may become “unfrozen” in a much less desirable manner. In Azerbaijan, the constituency in favour of a military solution to the conflict has grown steadily in recent years. In a February poll conducted by the Baku-based Opinion Monitoring Centre, 38% of respondents saw force as the best option. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s military—which was soundly defeated in the 1991-93 conflict—is now being built up rapidly. With Azerbaijan’s budget buoyed by oil revenue and double-digit economic growth, defence spending is set to rise to US$600m this year from around US$350m in 2005. The better-equipped and trained Armenian military, by contrast, has a budget of US$165m for 2006.
The fact that time and the oil boom are likely to shift the military balance in Azerbaijan’s favour perhaps helps to explain Mr Aliyev’s refusal to cut a deal. It is quite possible that he calculates that in five years’ time he will be in a position to drive a much harder bargain with Armenia. Yet the growing public frustration in Azerbaijan with the status quo, allied with increased defence spending and the bellicose rhetoric of many politicians, underlines the risk for peace of continued delay. The window of opportunity for 2006 appears to be closed; it is not clear how many more there will be.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
posted by Marko at 2/15/2006 08:06:00 PM
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