Iran: Nuclear fuel or bust
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, responded to the resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on February 4th by issuing instructions for preparations to start for full-scale uranium enrichment at the Natanz complex, south of Tehran. The Iranian leader made clear that Iran was determined to proceed with its quest to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle whether the outside world liked it or not. He ridiculed the IAEA resolution, and discounted any suggestion that Iran could be prevented by force or other means from achieving this goal.
The Economist Intelligence Unit broadly concurs with the supposition that Iran is likely to prevail in this objective, although we attach a significant probability to military action being taken by the US and/or other powers to try to stop this happening, and thereby to guarantee that Iran does not gain a nuclear weapons capability. The least likely outcome, in our view, would entail Iran being thwarted either because of crippling sanctions or as a result of voluntarily agreeing to outsource key stages in the cycle.
The IAEA resolution calls on Iran to take a number of confidence-building steps that would allow the question of whether its programme is exclusively peaceful to be resolved. It also requests the head of the IAEA to report to the UN Security Council on Iran's progress in carrying out these steps. They are: suspension of all enrichment-related activity; reconsidering the construction of a heavy-water reactor, which could produce plutonium; ratifying the additional protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and, pending that, continuing to allow IAEA inspections to go ahead as required by that protocol; and allowing free access for IAEA inspectors over and above the protocol's requirements.
The 35-member board passed the resolution by a vote of 27 in favour, three against and five abstentions. Those voting for the resolution included Russia, China, India, Argentina and Brazil. The "no" votes came from Cuba, Syria and Venezuela, and Algeria, Libya, South Africa, Indonesia and Belarus abstained.
Iran's initial reaction to the resolution renders it likely that the first progress report to the UN Security Council after the IAEA board reconvenes in early March will be negative. This would pave the way for a formal referral of Iran's case to the Security Council. In the meantime there is still some limited scope for negotiations, as Iran is scheduled to hold talks in mid-February about a proposal from Russia to conduct the most sensitive stages of the Iranian fuel cycle in Russian facilities. However, the prospect of a breakthrough appears to be slim, given the uncompromising nature of Mr Ahmadinejad's response to the IAEA resolution.
Probable outcomes
With the dispute fast developing into one the principal concerns for international security, we have drawn up a set of scenarios for the medium term (up to 2010). Our central scenario, to which we attach a 45% probability, is that Iran completes full nuclear fuel cycle capability, either by agreement (20%) or through its own devices (25%). This could entail a diplomatic agreement whereby the international community would accept the inevitability of Iran pursuing its nuclear ambitions, backing away from comprehensive sanctions, including an oil embargo, and from military action, but demanding that Iran submit to stringent IAEA inspections. A marginally more likely outcome would be for Iran to persist with its nuclear programme without international agreement, shrugging off the stigma of being treated as a pariah state, but not being subjected to harsh sanctions or military assault.
A more dramatic outcome, to which we attach a 35% probability, is that the US, or possibly Israel, undertakes air strikes primarily against Iranian civil nuclear targets and succeeds in setting back the Islamic Republic's pursuit of the full fuel cycle. Under this outcome is also subsumed other military options by the US, including targeting Iranian air defences, and by the Iranians in reprisal, or in pre-emption. A further armed escalation beyond these steps cannot be ruled out, including ground fighting and a wider regional conflagration.
Our final scenario, which has a 20% probability, would entail Iran either accepting a formula akin to the Russian proposal or being forced by effectively directed sanctions to abandon its nuclear fuel-cycle ambitions.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, responded to the resolution passed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on February 4th by issuing instructions for preparations to start for full-scale uranium enrichment at the Natanz complex, south of Tehran. The Iranian leader made clear that Iran was determined to proceed with its quest to develop the full nuclear fuel cycle whether the outside world liked it or not. He ridiculed the IAEA resolution, and discounted any suggestion that Iran could be prevented by force or other means from achieving this goal.
The Economist Intelligence Unit broadly concurs with the supposition that Iran is likely to prevail in this objective, although we attach a significant probability to military action being taken by the US and/or other powers to try to stop this happening, and thereby to guarantee that Iran does not gain a nuclear weapons capability. The least likely outcome, in our view, would entail Iran being thwarted either because of crippling sanctions or as a result of voluntarily agreeing to outsource key stages in the cycle.
The IAEA resolution calls on Iran to take a number of confidence-building steps that would allow the question of whether its programme is exclusively peaceful to be resolved. It also requests the head of the IAEA to report to the UN Security Council on Iran's progress in carrying out these steps. They are: suspension of all enrichment-related activity; reconsidering the construction of a heavy-water reactor, which could produce plutonium; ratifying the additional protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and, pending that, continuing to allow IAEA inspections to go ahead as required by that protocol; and allowing free access for IAEA inspectors over and above the protocol's requirements.
The 35-member board passed the resolution by a vote of 27 in favour, three against and five abstentions. Those voting for the resolution included Russia, China, India, Argentina and Brazil. The "no" votes came from Cuba, Syria and Venezuela, and Algeria, Libya, South Africa, Indonesia and Belarus abstained.
Iran's initial reaction to the resolution renders it likely that the first progress report to the UN Security Council after the IAEA board reconvenes in early March will be negative. This would pave the way for a formal referral of Iran's case to the Security Council. In the meantime there is still some limited scope for negotiations, as Iran is scheduled to hold talks in mid-February about a proposal from Russia to conduct the most sensitive stages of the Iranian fuel cycle in Russian facilities. However, the prospect of a breakthrough appears to be slim, given the uncompromising nature of Mr Ahmadinejad's response to the IAEA resolution.
Probable outcomes
With the dispute fast developing into one the principal concerns for international security, we have drawn up a set of scenarios for the medium term (up to 2010). Our central scenario, to which we attach a 45% probability, is that Iran completes full nuclear fuel cycle capability, either by agreement (20%) or through its own devices (25%). This could entail a diplomatic agreement whereby the international community would accept the inevitability of Iran pursuing its nuclear ambitions, backing away from comprehensive sanctions, including an oil embargo, and from military action, but demanding that Iran submit to stringent IAEA inspections. A marginally more likely outcome would be for Iran to persist with its nuclear programme without international agreement, shrugging off the stigma of being treated as a pariah state, but not being subjected to harsh sanctions or military assault.
A more dramatic outcome, to which we attach a 35% probability, is that the US, or possibly Israel, undertakes air strikes primarily against Iranian civil nuclear targets and succeeds in setting back the Islamic Republic's pursuit of the full fuel cycle. Under this outcome is also subsumed other military options by the US, including targeting Iranian air defences, and by the Iranians in reprisal, or in pre-emption. A further armed escalation beyond these steps cannot be ruled out, including ground fighting and a wider regional conflagration.
Our final scenario, which has a 20% probability, would entail Iran either accepting a formula akin to the Russian proposal or being forced by effectively directed sanctions to abandon its nuclear fuel-cycle ambitions.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Middle East
posted by Marko at 2/06/2006 02:34:00 PM
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