Uzbekistan: A second Afghanistan?
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has backed the Uzbek authorities’ tough approach to its domestic opponents and warned of the risk of the country becoming a “second Afghanistan” without firm leadership. In practice, Uzbekistan does not seem a likely candidate for an Afghan scenario: although it does have problems with Islamic militancy, these are not widespread and the principal threats are socio-economic. While Mr Putin hinted that Russia might nudge President Islam Karimov towards less restrictive policies, in general Moscow will continue to support the Uzbek leadership—in order to secure Russia’s economic interests and for as long as Mr Karimov is perceived as the best bet for maintaining regional stability.
During a major press conference in Moscow on January 31st, Mr Putin went out of his way to reaffirm support for the Uzbek authorities’ May 2005 crackdown on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andizhan. In Western countries the episode is mostly regarded as a brutal overreaction to a largely peaceful demonstration, resulting in the deaths of several hundred civilians. Mr Putin responded that the Russian and Uzbek authorities were privy to far more information about Andizhan than the rest of the world, emphasising that "you don't know what we know".
The Uzbek authorities placed the Andizhan events in the context of a wider threat to the country's stability, namely that posed by religious extremists intent on executing a coup d’etat. Mr Putin endorsed this position and now claims that without the decisive response of the Uzbek authorities in Andizhan, the country would have been engulfed in unrest. Such a scenario would have had serious repercussions throughout Central Asia: Uzbekistan not only has the largest population in Central Asia, with 25m people, but also shares borders with all the other former Soviet Central Asian republics. Mr Putin added that the key for stability in Uzbekistan and the other states of Central Asia now was to secure “evolution not revolution”—and thus to avoid a “second Afghanistan” emerging in the region.
Return of the Taliban?
To what extent does Islamic militancy pose a risk to Uzbekistan's stability? The threat of religious extremism undoubtedly exists, as shown by the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which staged a series of guerrilla incursions into Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 in an attempt to overthrow the government. The authorities have also waged a campaign against Hizb ut-Tahrir, a banned extremist organisation that seeks to establish a caliphate in the region, ostensibly by peaceful means, although the language that it uses is often inflammatory and its revolutionary goal sits uneasily with its promise of a peaceful transition from the current government.
Government rhetoric about the threat posed by Hizb ut-Tahrir implies that the organisation is capable of mobilising widespread support. Where organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir do pose a risk to the authorities is in their ability to recruit young, disaffected Uzbeks, particularly in the densely-populated and multi-ethnic Ferghana Valley, which has a history of discontent and is an area of high unemployment. Even if Hizb ut-Tahrir's religious message has little appeal, the group's anti-government stance and promise of a better life is a powerful one. However, the attractiveness to ordinary Uzbeks of groups such as this is questionable, given the country's long-standing history of religious tolerance and moderation. There is little likelihood that it would be able to organise a critical mass powerful enough to cause countrywide instability.
Economic and social grievances are more likely to be the catalyst for unrest in Uzbekistan. In the two years before Andizhan there were several small-scale demonstrations in Uzbekistan, mainly held in protest at the government's stringent restrictions on trade, which have affected the many small businessmen working in the country's bazaars or as shuttle-traders. Economic motives are believed to have played an important role behind the protest in Andizhan; according to the eye-witness accounts of the demonstration, many people took to the streets in the belief that Mr Karimov was going to attend to listen to their economic concerns.
The government has shown little inclination to address these grievances, concentrating instead on rounding up all those whom it suspects of harbouring subversive tendencies. More than 150 people have been imprisoned for their role in the Andizhan events, in a series of trials criticised as flawed by human rights groups. Furthermore, the crackdown has encompassed what remains of Uzbekistan's secular opposition movements, international media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), most of which have been forced either to leave the country or suspend their activities. The fear of repression appears to have averted further unrest for the time being.
Putin’s pay-off
Mr Putin's reaffirmation of support for Mr Karimov's handling of the Andizhan events reflects the strengthening of the bilateral relationship over the past two years. The risk of instability—be it low-level social unrest or discontent within the regime's elite—evidently concerns Russia, which has a growing economic presence not just in Uzbekistan, but throughout the region. Bilateral military ties are expanding. In late 2005 the two sides concluded a mutual security pact, which envisages mutual promises of assistance in the event of an attack. The growing military relationship has even led to speculation that Russia might establish a military base in Uzbekistan, in the place of the US troops that were forced to leave the country in late 2005.
Russia's growing involvement in, and dependence on, Central Asia's gas industry is an important factor in its relations with Uzbekistan. Not only is Uzbekistan potentially an important provider of gas for Russia, but it is also the transit route for Russia's gas imports from Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan benefits from this relationship too, in that Russian companies are proving increasingly willing to commit investment to its stagnating hydrocarbons sector. Potential investment by Gazprom could amount to US$1.5bn in the coming years, provided that the two sides can reach a deal on the terms of a much-delayed production-sharing agreement.
The expanding bilateral economic links give Russia an important stake in maintaining stability in Uzbekistan, and help to explain the country's unambiguous support for the Uzbek authorities. Mr Putin acknowledged in his press conference that Uzbekistan had "very many problems", and concern must undoubtedly be rising at the potential for far more widespread unrest. Moreover, his reference to evolution rather than revolution suggests that Russia might be trying to persuade the Uzbek authorities to ease some of the more illiberal trade and other economic restrictions, with a view to defusing potential tension.
From Russia's perspective, the need to preserve stability in Uzbekistan, with a view to safeguarding its economic interests, will remain paramount. The unequivocal support offered by Mr Putin suggests that Russia will step up its co-operation in security matters, if only to protect its own interests in the region. However, this support is unlikely to extend to Mr Karimov personally: if Russia deems that its interests would be better served by another president, it would change course accordingly. Mr Karimov can rely on Russian backing only for as long as Russia judges him its best guarantor of stability.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has backed the Uzbek authorities’ tough approach to its domestic opponents and warned of the risk of the country becoming a “second Afghanistan” without firm leadership. In practice, Uzbekistan does not seem a likely candidate for an Afghan scenario: although it does have problems with Islamic militancy, these are not widespread and the principal threats are socio-economic. While Mr Putin hinted that Russia might nudge President Islam Karimov towards less restrictive policies, in general Moscow will continue to support the Uzbek leadership—in order to secure Russia’s economic interests and for as long as Mr Karimov is perceived as the best bet for maintaining regional stability.
During a major press conference in Moscow on January 31st, Mr Putin went out of his way to reaffirm support for the Uzbek authorities’ May 2005 crackdown on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andizhan. In Western countries the episode is mostly regarded as a brutal overreaction to a largely peaceful demonstration, resulting in the deaths of several hundred civilians. Mr Putin responded that the Russian and Uzbek authorities were privy to far more information about Andizhan than the rest of the world, emphasising that "you don't know what we know".
The Uzbek authorities placed the Andizhan events in the context of a wider threat to the country's stability, namely that posed by religious extremists intent on executing a coup d’etat. Mr Putin endorsed this position and now claims that without the decisive response of the Uzbek authorities in Andizhan, the country would have been engulfed in unrest. Such a scenario would have had serious repercussions throughout Central Asia: Uzbekistan not only has the largest population in Central Asia, with 25m people, but also shares borders with all the other former Soviet Central Asian republics. Mr Putin added that the key for stability in Uzbekistan and the other states of Central Asia now was to secure “evolution not revolution”—and thus to avoid a “second Afghanistan” emerging in the region.
Return of the Taliban?
To what extent does Islamic militancy pose a risk to Uzbekistan's stability? The threat of religious extremism undoubtedly exists, as shown by the activities of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which staged a series of guerrilla incursions into Uzbekistan in 1999 and 2000 in an attempt to overthrow the government. The authorities have also waged a campaign against Hizb ut-Tahrir, a banned extremist organisation that seeks to establish a caliphate in the region, ostensibly by peaceful means, although the language that it uses is often inflammatory and its revolutionary goal sits uneasily with its promise of a peaceful transition from the current government.
Government rhetoric about the threat posed by Hizb ut-Tahrir implies that the organisation is capable of mobilising widespread support. Where organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir do pose a risk to the authorities is in their ability to recruit young, disaffected Uzbeks, particularly in the densely-populated and multi-ethnic Ferghana Valley, which has a history of discontent and is an area of high unemployment. Even if Hizb ut-Tahrir's religious message has little appeal, the group's anti-government stance and promise of a better life is a powerful one. However, the attractiveness to ordinary Uzbeks of groups such as this is questionable, given the country's long-standing history of religious tolerance and moderation. There is little likelihood that it would be able to organise a critical mass powerful enough to cause countrywide instability.
Economic and social grievances are more likely to be the catalyst for unrest in Uzbekistan. In the two years before Andizhan there were several small-scale demonstrations in Uzbekistan, mainly held in protest at the government's stringent restrictions on trade, which have affected the many small businessmen working in the country's bazaars or as shuttle-traders. Economic motives are believed to have played an important role behind the protest in Andizhan; according to the eye-witness accounts of the demonstration, many people took to the streets in the belief that Mr Karimov was going to attend to listen to their economic concerns.
The government has shown little inclination to address these grievances, concentrating instead on rounding up all those whom it suspects of harbouring subversive tendencies. More than 150 people have been imprisoned for their role in the Andizhan events, in a series of trials criticised as flawed by human rights groups. Furthermore, the crackdown has encompassed what remains of Uzbekistan's secular opposition movements, international media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), most of which have been forced either to leave the country or suspend their activities. The fear of repression appears to have averted further unrest for the time being.
Putin’s pay-off
Mr Putin's reaffirmation of support for Mr Karimov's handling of the Andizhan events reflects the strengthening of the bilateral relationship over the past two years. The risk of instability—be it low-level social unrest or discontent within the regime's elite—evidently concerns Russia, which has a growing economic presence not just in Uzbekistan, but throughout the region. Bilateral military ties are expanding. In late 2005 the two sides concluded a mutual security pact, which envisages mutual promises of assistance in the event of an attack. The growing military relationship has even led to speculation that Russia might establish a military base in Uzbekistan, in the place of the US troops that were forced to leave the country in late 2005.
Russia's growing involvement in, and dependence on, Central Asia's gas industry is an important factor in its relations with Uzbekistan. Not only is Uzbekistan potentially an important provider of gas for Russia, but it is also the transit route for Russia's gas imports from Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan benefits from this relationship too, in that Russian companies are proving increasingly willing to commit investment to its stagnating hydrocarbons sector. Potential investment by Gazprom could amount to US$1.5bn in the coming years, provided that the two sides can reach a deal on the terms of a much-delayed production-sharing agreement.
The expanding bilateral economic links give Russia an important stake in maintaining stability in Uzbekistan, and help to explain the country's unambiguous support for the Uzbek authorities. Mr Putin acknowledged in his press conference that Uzbekistan had "very many problems", and concern must undoubtedly be rising at the potential for far more widespread unrest. Moreover, his reference to evolution rather than revolution suggests that Russia might be trying to persuade the Uzbek authorities to ease some of the more illiberal trade and other economic restrictions, with a view to defusing potential tension.
From Russia's perspective, the need to preserve stability in Uzbekistan, with a view to safeguarding its economic interests, will remain paramount. The unequivocal support offered by Mr Putin suggests that Russia will step up its co-operation in security matters, if only to protect its own interests in the region. However, this support is unlikely to extend to Mr Karimov personally: if Russia deems that its interests would be better served by another president, it would change course accordingly. Mr Karimov can rely on Russian backing only for as long as Russia judges him its best guarantor of stability.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
posted by Marko at 2/07/2006 09:41:00 AM
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