U.S. Intelligence Saw Hussein’s Orders to Destroy Iraqi WMD Stockpiles as Ruse, Analysts Say
U.S. intelligence agencies incorrectly believed that former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s orders to his military in 2002 to destroy WMD stockpiles were a ruse, according to three U.S. defense analysts who helped draft a Defense Department report on the issue (see GSN, March 13).
he report says that U.S. intelligence intercepted an internal message between two Iraqi military commanders in 2002. The men discussed removing the words “nerve agents” from “wireless instructions,” but the report says analysts “had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime’s attempt to ensure it was in compliance with U.N. resolutions,” the Washington Post reported today.
U.S. intelligence also learned of orders to the Iraqi military to search “for any chemical agents” in order to “make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it,” the analysts wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine. The United States “viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit” and discounted it, the analysts wrote.
Ali Hassan al-Majeed, a former Iraqi military commander on trial for allegedly using chemical weapons against Kurds, told U.S. interrogators that prior to the U.S.-led invasion of the country Hussein told his top commanders that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. However, Hussein “flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary, going on to explain that such a declaration might encourage the Israelis to attack,” according to the report.
By late 2002, Hussein finally decided to publicly acknowledge that he had given up his WMD programs, the Post reported.
Hussein “was insistent that Iraq would give full access to U.N. inspectors ‘in order not to give President [George W.] Bush any excuses to start a war,’” says the Pentagon report. “But after years of purposeful obfuscation, it was difficult to convince anyone that Iraq was not once again being economical with the truth” (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, March 14).
he report says that U.S. intelligence intercepted an internal message between two Iraqi military commanders in 2002. The men discussed removing the words “nerve agents” from “wireless instructions,” but the report says analysts “had no way of knowing that this time the information reflected the regime’s attempt to ensure it was in compliance with U.N. resolutions,” the Washington Post reported today.
U.S. intelligence also learned of orders to the Iraqi military to search “for any chemical agents” in order to “make sure the area is free of chemical containers, and write a report on it,” the analysts wrote in Foreign Affairs magazine. The United States “viewed this information through the prism of a decade of prior deceit” and discounted it, the analysts wrote.
Ali Hassan al-Majeed, a former Iraqi military commander on trial for allegedly using chemical weapons against Kurds, told U.S. interrogators that prior to the U.S.-led invasion of the country Hussein told his top commanders that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction. However, Hussein “flatly rejected a suggestion that the regime remove all doubts to the contrary, going on to explain that such a declaration might encourage the Israelis to attack,” according to the report.
By late 2002, Hussein finally decided to publicly acknowledge that he had given up his WMD programs, the Post reported.
Hussein “was insistent that Iraq would give full access to U.N. inspectors ‘in order not to give President [George W.] Bush any excuses to start a war,’” says the Pentagon report. “But after years of purposeful obfuscation, it was difficult to convince anyone that Iraq was not once again being economical with the truth” (Walter Pincus, Washington Post, March 14).
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