Ken Pollack on Iran

By Marc Schulman, American Future

Ken Pollack, author of the highly influential 2002 book “The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq” and, more recently, “The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America“, was recently interviewed by Spiegel Online. This post summarizes his views on Iran, as expressed in that interview.

ON THE EVIDENCE THAT IRAN HAS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

. . . the evidence is circumstantial, but it is quite strong. The Iranians have admitted to trying to acquire the entire fuel cycle (control over manufacturing reactor fuel). The only debate remaining is whether there is some non-military justification for Iran having the entire fuel cycle. You don’t need to be able to enrich uranium for energy production.

ON THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR BOMB
Pollack downplays the threats that concern other analysts:

One of the claims you often hear is that the Iranians would give a bomb to a terrorist group like the Hezbollah. I see nothing in the evidence to suggest that that’s the case . . . They use terrorism to advance very specific elements of their foreign policy. They very wisely recognize that giving weapons of mass destruction to terrorists can only hurt those interests.

Another risk that people cite is this idea that Iranians will get a nuclear weapon and, because they’re crazy, they’ll use it. They’ll blow up Tel Aviv, they’ll blow up the Saudi oil fields, they’ll blow up Berlin, Istanbul, pick your place. Again, I see no evidence of this. The Iranians have been murderous in the past, and they oppose Western interests wherever they can across the board. But that doesn’t mean they’re crazy.

ON THE REALISM OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAN

A military strike right now is not a very good option . . . We’ve had a great deal of tacit cooperation in Iraq [not everyone believes this!] . . . Iran could make a tremendous amount of trouble. Currently, there is a network of 6,000 agents operating on Iran’s behalf in Iraq — they could be activated at any time to defend Tehran’s interests.

ON SCHROEDER’S PLEA FOR THE MILITARY OPTION TO BE SET ASIDE

It was a mistake to have said something like that . . . It’s important for Iranians to understand that if they don’t go down the negotiation track, the US and other governments might be driven to the military option.

ON THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE

It’s not great: There are a number of sites that we know about, but we have a very bad track record.

WITH THE EU3-IRAN NEGOTIATIONS AT AN IMPASSE, WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
Europe has to be willing to wield sticks and US has to be willing to give out the carrots. The carrots and sticks need to be very big. Iranians recognize that their nuclear program, their support of terrorism, their economic prospects and their relationship to the West are all bound together.

. . . the West, and particularly the US, has got to be willing to lay out a path for Iran that will basically solve all of their economic problems, or at least promise the possibility of solving their economic problems. The US also has to be willing to provide security structures and to guarantee security in the Persian Gulf in a way that would address the Iranians’ concerns. Beyond that, the US could provide Iran with loan guarantees, incentives for investors and we could offer them their own light water nuclear reactor.

We need Europe to be ready to go along with a whole panoply of sanctions . . . Start with a censure, then a travel ban. Then move into targeted sanctions. But push as hard as you can so that they know that eventually the really heavy stick is coming. But we should go slowly rather than moving into a full-fledged economic war with Iran right away.

A DIFFERENT POINT OF VIEW
Henry Kissinger strongly disagrees with Pollack; he has very harsh words for policies that provide incentives in return for denuclearization:

Invariably, proliferating countries claim that they are seeking merely to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to enhance electricity production or both. Countries determined to prevent proliferation are therefore tempted to provide incentives in the form of guaranteed alternative sources of energy or of nuclear fuel for power plants. Yet this approach generally fails, because the ultimate objectives of the proliferating country are political and strategic, not economic.

A policy of offering material incentives in return for denuclearization is likely to fail, however appealing it may be in the abstract. For the incentives in one way or another increase the dependence of the proliferating country on the states against which the proliferation is really directed.

Count me on Kissinger’s side.