"The New Republic" gets it wrong on Syria (again)
Harold's List
Response to TNR article 'Roadblock to Damascus'
by: Oubai Shahbandar
More common misconceptions pandered by the Ba'athist apologist noise machine:
1."Putting pressure on Syria is not likely to make a difference with regard to the Iraqi insurgency"
The Syrian front is a crucial flank for the advancement of democracy in the middle east. It is not a mere portal for the transfer of terrorists into Iraq but a crucial logistical and command and control base for terror operations against the Iraqi populace and Coalition forces. Saddam Hussein held an exclusive meeting with five of his closest advisors in April 2003 where he gave the order to activate the terror network that he along with his intelligent services had prepared to destabilize Iraq in preparation for his regime's fall. Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmed who was present at the meeting is a ranking member of the Military Bureau, a top secret Ba'ath meta-spy organization entrusted with this task. He also currently resides in Damascus. Not only that, U.S intelligence services know where in Damascus he lives. From there he makes frequent trips to Mosul (his hometown) where he distributes hundreds of thousands of dollars to terrorists in Anbar province-- a mere drop in the bucket in the millions of dollars of smuggled funds entrusted to Syrian banks by Saddam's henchmen. This isn't a case of another angry youth from the periphery of Yemen on his way to become cannon fodder in Iraq. It is obvious that the node of the terror web in Iraq finds its nexus under the aegis of Assad II's regime.
2. "Syria does not have the technical acumen to stop terrorists from entering Iraq"
Ever since the late 1940's-early 50's Syria has maintained hostile state of relations with Iraq. The various Syrian leaders that came to power would occasionally encourage the border tribes ( tribal loyalty has never been confined by borders) to work in concert with their fellow tribesman in Iraq to sabotage Iraqi installations, conduct raids, and carry out various other actions of harassment and subversion. This was done intermittently and the leash was constricted and release according to the ebb and flow of relations between the two countries. The point is that the center of government in Damascus has always had the ability to control the flow of armed terrorists into Iraq because it was never an issue of technology but of intelligence. That is, it has always been tacitly accepted by the various governments in Damascus that physically guarding the border itself was superfluous if tabs were not kept on the activities of the tribes in the region. Syria has been a closed police state for over thirty five years under Ba'ath rule; the Ba'ath have done their best to saturate the nation with their agents and perhaps in no greater degree of concentration than in the areas on the peripheries of Syria bordering Iraq. The loyalty of the tribes with shared kin in Iraq had always been in question by the previous dictator Hafez Assad, that is why the Ba'ath have always taken exceptional concern in securing a reliable information network in the region. As such, satellite imagery and motion detectors let alone legions of military personnel posted along the border have never been needed for the detection of the movement of personnel and material in the area; the greatest source of intelligence web has always been the Bedouins and the tribes people and Damascus has always made it a point to make sure to know what they know. So in the end the claims put forth by regime apologists that the regime is doing all it can to stem the tide of terrorists from entering Iraq have always depended on a red herring. Successive Syrian governments have never depended on material and technological superiority to control the flow of people and weapons into Iraq, but on a well established network of informants and friendly tribal leaders. In the desert the fastest and most reliable lines of communication and surveillance has always been the bedu and tribal centers of populations on the border. The spigot of terror can just as easily be sealed by the Ba’ath regime had they the political will and inclination to do so. The logistical and personnel flow into Iraq has never operated in an independent vacuum, but very much under the watchful eyes of the reliable informational network that the Ba’ath have in place in the region.
3. “The insurgency will intensify, Assad or no Assad.”
The backbone of the most organized, well armed, and best funded factions of terrorists in Iraq is firmly ensconed in Assad II’s Syria. There, they have access to a secure and ostensibly untouchable base of supply. Simply put, the terrorists in Anbar cannot function with the same level of lethality if their main source of support vanishes. The knowledge that a reliable and ready source of weapons, sanctuary, and money is there is a major boost to the moral of the most dogmatic and lethal terrorists operating in Iraq. Take that away, and their operational momentum will surely wither. The Syrian line of supply is the Islamist terror network’s Achilles’ heel; they do not expect it to go away any time soon and have in fact worked assiduously to expand it and as a result have become increasingly dependent upon it. A surprise flanking of the Sunni terror network in Iraq would strike a crippling blow to their command and control clearing the way for avenues of reconciliation with various Anbar tribal leaders whose loyalties to the terrorist leadership will ebb away as the massive financial incentives come to an end and as the operational viability of the terror network comes into severe question.
4. “Even if Syria is closed off to terrorists, they can just as easily enter Iraq through the Saudi and Jordanian borders.”
The major centers of population that straddle Iraqi borders with surrounding states are mainly situated along the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian border. The old smuggling routes used by the terrorists depend upon reliably supportive population which hardly exists on the Saudi and Jordanian side. The respective populations in those areas are extremely sparse offering very little to no life support for those attempting to cross into Iraq. Additionally, the flat and desert like terrain makes evading aerial and ground surveillance almost impossible.
5. “Engaging Syria now would be counterproductive to our efforts in Iraq.”
A battle for democracy is currently being waged in Iraq, but the war for democratic viability in the region can only be won with a Democratic government in the second historic capitol of the Arab and Islamic world: Damascus. The success in Iraq will prove to be tragically fleeting if democracy does not take hold amongst its immediate surrounding neighbors. You may win Baghdad today by ignoring Damascus, but you will surely see such success slip away if the other head of the Ba’athist Hydra is not eventually dealt with.
Response to TNR article 'Roadblock to Damascus'
by: Oubai Shahbandar
More common misconceptions pandered by the Ba'athist apologist noise machine:
1."Putting pressure on Syria is not likely to make a difference with regard to the Iraqi insurgency"
The Syrian front is a crucial flank for the advancement of democracy in the middle east. It is not a mere portal for the transfer of terrorists into Iraq but a crucial logistical and command and control base for terror operations against the Iraqi populace and Coalition forces. Saddam Hussein held an exclusive meeting with five of his closest advisors in April 2003 where he gave the order to activate the terror network that he along with his intelligent services had prepared to destabilize Iraq in preparation for his regime's fall. Muhammad Yunis al-Ahmed who was present at the meeting is a ranking member of the Military Bureau, a top secret Ba'ath meta-spy organization entrusted with this task. He also currently resides in Damascus. Not only that, U.S intelligence services know where in Damascus he lives. From there he makes frequent trips to Mosul (his hometown) where he distributes hundreds of thousands of dollars to terrorists in Anbar province-- a mere drop in the bucket in the millions of dollars of smuggled funds entrusted to Syrian banks by Saddam's henchmen. This isn't a case of another angry youth from the periphery of Yemen on his way to become cannon fodder in Iraq. It is obvious that the node of the terror web in Iraq finds its nexus under the aegis of Assad II's regime.
2. "Syria does not have the technical acumen to stop terrorists from entering Iraq"
Ever since the late 1940's-early 50's Syria has maintained hostile state of relations with Iraq. The various Syrian leaders that came to power would occasionally encourage the border tribes ( tribal loyalty has never been confined by borders) to work in concert with their fellow tribesman in Iraq to sabotage Iraqi installations, conduct raids, and carry out various other actions of harassment and subversion. This was done intermittently and the leash was constricted and release according to the ebb and flow of relations between the two countries. The point is that the center of government in Damascus has always had the ability to control the flow of armed terrorists into Iraq because it was never an issue of technology but of intelligence. That is, it has always been tacitly accepted by the various governments in Damascus that physically guarding the border itself was superfluous if tabs were not kept on the activities of the tribes in the region. Syria has been a closed police state for over thirty five years under Ba'ath rule; the Ba'ath have done their best to saturate the nation with their agents and perhaps in no greater degree of concentration than in the areas on the peripheries of Syria bordering Iraq. The loyalty of the tribes with shared kin in Iraq had always been in question by the previous dictator Hafez Assad, that is why the Ba'ath have always taken exceptional concern in securing a reliable information network in the region. As such, satellite imagery and motion detectors let alone legions of military personnel posted along the border have never been needed for the detection of the movement of personnel and material in the area; the greatest source of intelligence web has always been the Bedouins and the tribes people and Damascus has always made it a point to make sure to know what they know. So in the end the claims put forth by regime apologists that the regime is doing all it can to stem the tide of terrorists from entering Iraq have always depended on a red herring. Successive Syrian governments have never depended on material and technological superiority to control the flow of people and weapons into Iraq, but on a well established network of informants and friendly tribal leaders. In the desert the fastest and most reliable lines of communication and surveillance has always been the bedu and tribal centers of populations on the border. The spigot of terror can just as easily be sealed by the Ba’ath regime had they the political will and inclination to do so. The logistical and personnel flow into Iraq has never operated in an independent vacuum, but very much under the watchful eyes of the reliable informational network that the Ba’ath have in place in the region.
3. “The insurgency will intensify, Assad or no Assad.”
The backbone of the most organized, well armed, and best funded factions of terrorists in Iraq is firmly ensconed in Assad II’s Syria. There, they have access to a secure and ostensibly untouchable base of supply. Simply put, the terrorists in Anbar cannot function with the same level of lethality if their main source of support vanishes. The knowledge that a reliable and ready source of weapons, sanctuary, and money is there is a major boost to the moral of the most dogmatic and lethal terrorists operating in Iraq. Take that away, and their operational momentum will surely wither. The Syrian line of supply is the Islamist terror network’s Achilles’ heel; they do not expect it to go away any time soon and have in fact worked assiduously to expand it and as a result have become increasingly dependent upon it. A surprise flanking of the Sunni terror network in Iraq would strike a crippling blow to their command and control clearing the way for avenues of reconciliation with various Anbar tribal leaders whose loyalties to the terrorist leadership will ebb away as the massive financial incentives come to an end and as the operational viability of the terror network comes into severe question.
4. “Even if Syria is closed off to terrorists, they can just as easily enter Iraq through the Saudi and Jordanian borders.”
The major centers of population that straddle Iraqi borders with surrounding states are mainly situated along the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian border. The old smuggling routes used by the terrorists depend upon reliably supportive population which hardly exists on the Saudi and Jordanian side. The respective populations in those areas are extremely sparse offering very little to no life support for those attempting to cross into Iraq. Additionally, the flat and desert like terrain makes evading aerial and ground surveillance almost impossible.
5. “Engaging Syria now would be counterproductive to our efforts in Iraq.”
A battle for democracy is currently being waged in Iraq, but the war for democratic viability in the region can only be won with a Democratic government in the second historic capitol of the Arab and Islamic world: Damascus. The success in Iraq will prove to be tragically fleeting if democracy does not take hold amongst its immediate surrounding neighbors. You may win Baghdad today by ignoring Damascus, but you will surely see such success slip away if the other head of the Ba’athist Hydra is not eventually dealt with.
posted by Marko at 10/02/2005 12:27:00 AM
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