Kazakhstan's election
The 91% vote for the incumbent, Nursultan Nazarbayev, in Kazakhstan’s presidential election marks a step backwards for the country politically. Although Mr Nazarbayev was aiming for a more open and fair process, in order to improve the country’s image, the urge to take no risks by massaging the vote has proven too strong for the pro-Nazarbayev state administration.
According to official preliminary results, Mr Nazarbayev won 91% of the vote in Kazakhstan’s presidential election on December 4th; the main opposition candidate, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, took just 6.6%. The preliminary assessment of monitors from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), delivered on December 5th, was broadly negative. It praised the country for holding an election that was open to opposition candidates and in which candidates received free airtime on state media. Yet it criticised the harassment and intimidation of opposition campaigns, a marked pro-Nazarbayev bias in media coverage and the use of laws protecting the dignity of the president to stifle debate. The report’s harshest criticisms focused on the conduct of the authorities during polling. It reported instances of multiple voting, ballot stuffing and pressure on voters. Counting procedures were violated and results protocols were tampered with.
There was never an expectation that Kazakhstan would hold an election that accorded fully with the most scrupulous of Western standards. Yet equally, the country is much more open than neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are police states that hold sham elections. So although the Kazakh authorities have since independence used many of the same tricks as their Central Asian counterparts to score overwhelming election victories—preventing opposition leaders from running for office, harassing opposition campaigns, slanting media coverage, pressuring voters and stuffing ballot boxes—the country is considered to have a greater potential than its southern neighbours to hold a fairly open and fairly honest election. A realistic mark of progress at this point would have been if Kazakhstan’s electoral process were to be bracketed with Russia’s, rather than with the rest of Central Asia’s.
Safety or respectability?
Ahead of the election, the authorities went out of their way to emphasise that any post-ballot opposition demonstrations—in the manner of opposition supporters during the so-called colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic—would be dealt with forcibly. Mr Nazarbayev is acutely aware of the risks that such a situation could spiral out of control, as it did in the neighbouring Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005. In the wake of the bloody anti-government violence in Uzbekistan in May, Mr Nazarbayev strengthened his control over the armed forces and has indicated that he will not tolerate violence under the pretext of demonstrations against alleged ballot-rigging.
The strong-arm threats employed by Mr Nazarbayev pointed to an election that would be carefully managed, to protect or extend the president’s authority. At the same time, however, a contrary impulse was informing the president’s behaviour. Mr Nazarbayev has always seen himself as a cut above the other Central Asian presidents with regard to political behaviour. He has never resorted to the kind of crude repression or outright violence seen routinely in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. Mr Nazarbayev, moreover, is eager for Kazakhstan to chair the OSCE in 2009—an aspiration that depends to a large extent on Kazakhstan holding an OSCE-approved election.
This helps to explain the less stringent restrictions on opposition activities during the election campaign. As the OSCE noted, there were advances with regard to candidate registration and access to the state media. Mr Nazarbayev’s conduct also altered. In previous elections he has harshly criticised the opposition; this time he dwelt more on his own achievements and tended to speak of opponents in respectful tones. The purpose of this seemed clear enough: to show that Kazakhstan’s political system and its leaders are maturing.
Old habits
At the key moment, however, Kazakhstan’s leadership—or its electoral officials—failed to live up to the promises for a more open election. The worst violations noted by the OSCE were during and after the vote itself. Mr Nazarbayev’s 91% share of the vote is significantly above the 75% he received in opinion polls shortly before the election and the 77.8% given him in an exit poll. Not surprisingly, the exit poll also showed a much higher level of support for Mr Tuyakbay—13.4%—than the official count of 6.6%. The fact that the official result for Mr Nazarbayev was more than ten percentage points above the level of support indicated by opinion polls and the exit poll supports OSCE assertions of voting and counting fraud.
Indeed, the 2005 presidential election result not only marks a failure for Kazakhstan to take a step towards fairer elections—in one sense it represents a step backwards. In two presidential contests and one referendum to extend his term, Mr Nazarbayev’s share of the vote fell gradually, from 98.8% in 1991 to 95.4% in 1995 (the referendum) and 81% in 1999. A showing close to, or slightly below the 1999 level could have been credibly presented as an accurate reflection of popular sentiment in Kazakhstan. The 90%-plus result cannot. It also seems to confirm a regressive trend seen in the last two years, following the 2004 parliamentary election where the opposition, in the form of Ak Zhol, got only one of the 77 available seats. Viewed from this perspective, Kazakh politics has not simply stagnated; the country’s democratic gains are being rolled back.
Who’s to blame?
The one element of uncertainty surrounding the result is whether it reflects Mr Nazarbayev’s express will, or the decision of local officials to not risk allowing a reasonably open contest. Mr Tuyakbay, for instance, says that Mr Nazarbayev wanted the 2004 parliamentary vote to be reasonably free, but his wish was frustrated by local officials unwilling to leave the outcome to chance. It could be that the same thing has happened this time, with pro-Nazarbayev officials determined to ensure that the president scores an overwhelming victory and that they, as individuals, are not responsible for the municipality that delivers the lowest pro-presidential share of the vote.
In either instance, the medium-term political outlook for the country is worrying—although Kazakhstan is not so fragile that it could go the same way as the Kyrgyz Republic. Mr Nazarbayev remains the choice of the majority of the population and living standards, on the whole, are reasonable and improving. Political stability is not under threat.
Yet political stability would not have been threatened by an election in which the result reflected the opinion and exit polls. This would, moreover, have given Kazakhstan’s opposition a platform from which to make a concerted challenge at the next parliamentary election, with the aim of becoming a parliamentary opposition. If more than 20% of the population supports opposition parties, but that segment of the electorate’s voice is muzzled by the authorities, it is not positive for the country’s stability in the medium term. The stakes will be much higher when Kazakhstan votes for Mr Nazarbayev’s successor.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
According to official preliminary results, Mr Nazarbayev won 91% of the vote in Kazakhstan’s presidential election on December 4th; the main opposition candidate, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, took just 6.6%. The preliminary assessment of monitors from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), delivered on December 5th, was broadly negative. It praised the country for holding an election that was open to opposition candidates and in which candidates received free airtime on state media. Yet it criticised the harassment and intimidation of opposition campaigns, a marked pro-Nazarbayev bias in media coverage and the use of laws protecting the dignity of the president to stifle debate. The report’s harshest criticisms focused on the conduct of the authorities during polling. It reported instances of multiple voting, ballot stuffing and pressure on voters. Counting procedures were violated and results protocols were tampered with.
There was never an expectation that Kazakhstan would hold an election that accorded fully with the most scrupulous of Western standards. Yet equally, the country is much more open than neighbouring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which are police states that hold sham elections. So although the Kazakh authorities have since independence used many of the same tricks as their Central Asian counterparts to score overwhelming election victories—preventing opposition leaders from running for office, harassing opposition campaigns, slanting media coverage, pressuring voters and stuffing ballot boxes—the country is considered to have a greater potential than its southern neighbours to hold a fairly open and fairly honest election. A realistic mark of progress at this point would have been if Kazakhstan’s electoral process were to be bracketed with Russia’s, rather than with the rest of Central Asia’s.
Safety or respectability?
Ahead of the election, the authorities went out of their way to emphasise that any post-ballot opposition demonstrations—in the manner of opposition supporters during the so-called colour revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and the Kyrgyz Republic—would be dealt with forcibly. Mr Nazarbayev is acutely aware of the risks that such a situation could spiral out of control, as it did in the neighbouring Kyrgyz Republic in March 2005. In the wake of the bloody anti-government violence in Uzbekistan in May, Mr Nazarbayev strengthened his control over the armed forces and has indicated that he will not tolerate violence under the pretext of demonstrations against alleged ballot-rigging.
The strong-arm threats employed by Mr Nazarbayev pointed to an election that would be carefully managed, to protect or extend the president’s authority. At the same time, however, a contrary impulse was informing the president’s behaviour. Mr Nazarbayev has always seen himself as a cut above the other Central Asian presidents with regard to political behaviour. He has never resorted to the kind of crude repression or outright violence seen routinely in Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan. Mr Nazarbayev, moreover, is eager for Kazakhstan to chair the OSCE in 2009—an aspiration that depends to a large extent on Kazakhstan holding an OSCE-approved election.
This helps to explain the less stringent restrictions on opposition activities during the election campaign. As the OSCE noted, there were advances with regard to candidate registration and access to the state media. Mr Nazarbayev’s conduct also altered. In previous elections he has harshly criticised the opposition; this time he dwelt more on his own achievements and tended to speak of opponents in respectful tones. The purpose of this seemed clear enough: to show that Kazakhstan’s political system and its leaders are maturing.
Old habits
At the key moment, however, Kazakhstan’s leadership—or its electoral officials—failed to live up to the promises for a more open election. The worst violations noted by the OSCE were during and after the vote itself. Mr Nazarbayev’s 91% share of the vote is significantly above the 75% he received in opinion polls shortly before the election and the 77.8% given him in an exit poll. Not surprisingly, the exit poll also showed a much higher level of support for Mr Tuyakbay—13.4%—than the official count of 6.6%. The fact that the official result for Mr Nazarbayev was more than ten percentage points above the level of support indicated by opinion polls and the exit poll supports OSCE assertions of voting and counting fraud.
Indeed, the 2005 presidential election result not only marks a failure for Kazakhstan to take a step towards fairer elections—in one sense it represents a step backwards. In two presidential contests and one referendum to extend his term, Mr Nazarbayev’s share of the vote fell gradually, from 98.8% in 1991 to 95.4% in 1995 (the referendum) and 81% in 1999. A showing close to, or slightly below the 1999 level could have been credibly presented as an accurate reflection of popular sentiment in Kazakhstan. The 90%-plus result cannot. It also seems to confirm a regressive trend seen in the last two years, following the 2004 parliamentary election where the opposition, in the form of Ak Zhol, got only one of the 77 available seats. Viewed from this perspective, Kazakh politics has not simply stagnated; the country’s democratic gains are being rolled back.
Who’s to blame?
The one element of uncertainty surrounding the result is whether it reflects Mr Nazarbayev’s express will, or the decision of local officials to not risk allowing a reasonably open contest. Mr Tuyakbay, for instance, says that Mr Nazarbayev wanted the 2004 parliamentary vote to be reasonably free, but his wish was frustrated by local officials unwilling to leave the outcome to chance. It could be that the same thing has happened this time, with pro-Nazarbayev officials determined to ensure that the president scores an overwhelming victory and that they, as individuals, are not responsible for the municipality that delivers the lowest pro-presidential share of the vote.
In either instance, the medium-term political outlook for the country is worrying—although Kazakhstan is not so fragile that it could go the same way as the Kyrgyz Republic. Mr Nazarbayev remains the choice of the majority of the population and living standards, on the whole, are reasonable and improving. Political stability is not under threat.
Yet political stability would not have been threatened by an election in which the result reflected the opinion and exit polls. This would, moreover, have given Kazakhstan’s opposition a platform from which to make a concerted challenge at the next parliamentary election, with the aim of becoming a parliamentary opposition. If more than 20% of the population supports opposition parties, but that segment of the electorate’s voice is muzzled by the authorities, it is not positive for the country’s stability in the medium term. The stakes will be much higher when Kazakhstan votes for Mr Nazarbayev’s successor.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
posted by Marko at 12/08/2005 11:46:00 AM
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