Russia: Arming Iran
Russia has reached a deal to supply Iran with US$1bn worth of arms, including tactical surface-to-air missiles. Although the deal is certain to strain Russia’s relations with Western states, Moscow has few alternatives to selling to “states of concern”, for it has lost many of its traditional markets and is effectively barred from the world’s most advanced markets. Aside from economic interests, the arms sale signals Russian diplomatic support for Iran and creates a further disincentive to Western military action against the Islamic Republic. Yet for Western states, there may perhaps be a silver lining—if the arms deal gives Iran’s leadership the political cover to accede to Russia’s proposals to solve the international stand-off over Tehran’s nuclear programme.
Two separate Russian news outlets ran reports on December 2nd of major arms sales to Iran. The business daily Vedomosti claimed that a deal had been signed by which Iran would buy 29 TOR-M1 surface-to-air missile systems, which are designed to shoot down aircraft or missiles at low altitude. Separately, the news agency Interfax reported that the deal, which was valued at over US$1bn, would include modernising Iran’s air force and supplying some patrol boats. According to Reuters, neither Russia’s defence ministry nor the state arms export agency Rosoboronexport was willing to comment.
Sellers can’t be choosers
The deal will add tension to Russian-Western relations, and particularly US-Russian ties, in the context of a heated stand-off between Iran and the US over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme. While Tehran insists this is purely for civilian purposes, Washington suspects that Iran harbours ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.
Although diplomatic calculations are an integral part of Russia’s arms sales policy, it would be a mistake to ignore domestic considerations. Russia has a large and relatively sophisticated arms industry that on most calculations is the second-largest exporter in the world. Yet this is more accurately a statement of volume rather than revenue, as the data are compiled on the basis of assumed value rather than contract prices, which are often not disclosed. To maintain jobs, high-tech skills and to help diversify the Russian economy away from a reliance on oil, gas and other primary products that dominate exports, it is therefore important that the arms sector has sufficient orders. The Russian defence budget has risen substantially in the last two years, but it is much smaller in relative terms than during the latter Soviet period. As a result, to a far greater extent than its US counterpart, Russia’s defence industry is dependent on export markets.
Here, however, Russia encounters a problem. Throughout the Soviet period, the countries of the Warsaw Pact were—literally—a captive market. Today, by contrast, most of those countries are now members of NATO and their arms markets are coming under Western sway. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have all opted for western fighter jets to replace their ageing MiG fleets. The best that Russian firms can hope for is some refitting work, to extend the life of existing Russian-made equipment until stretched east-central European defence budgets can afford to buy new, Western-made kit.
Despite the end of the Cold War, furthermore, Russia has had no joy in selling its military equipment to the US, Western European states, Japan, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. Although there are few formal barriers to those markets, domestic lobbies and perceptions of political risk in those states have shut the doors to Russian equipment—even including the heavy-lift aircraft that non-US NATO states rely on during UN peacekeeping and disaster-relief operations, because they neither own nor produce that type of airplane.
As a result, Russia has for several years depended on China and India as its two principal arms customers. Iran and other Middle Eastern states have periodically bought Russian arms too. The dramatic move to sell over US$1bn in arms to Iran—the biggest deal between the two states in over five years—is logical from the perspective of Russia’s arms industry. It broadens the customer base and opens up the possibility of additional sales in the Middle East. Although Russia’s arms customers, with the exception of India, make the US administration nervous, the fact is that Russia has few alternative customers for its most advanced military technology.
Making a point, as well as a buck
Although Russia can legitimately point to the fact that it has few viable alternative markets for its arms, it is undeniable that political factors played an important role in the decision to sell arms to Iran. By concluding this deal Russia is making clear its diplomatic support for Iran at a time when US-Iranian relations are tense, with Washington eager to refer Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA rules to the UN Security Council. There is, moreover, some speculation that the US might undertake unilateral military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, along the lines of Israel’s strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981.
In this context, the arms sale serves to underline—as well as to take advantage of—the differences in diplomatic status between Iran today and Iraq prior to the US-led invasion. Unlike Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, there are no international restrictions on the sale of weapons to Iran. Western states will oppose the arms sale, and will be particularly upset by its timing, but they cannot accuse Russia of flouting international rules.
This is the single most important political aspect of the arms deal. It signals Russia’s confidence that Iran will not go the way of Iraq—even though both states were part of US President George Bush’s “axis of evil”—for Iran’s international political situation is very different. And it acts as an additional deterrent to US military action against Iran: the surface-to-air missiles that reportedly form the cornerstone of the deal are defensive systems, so they offer no threat to Iran’s regional neighbours. They would, however, threaten US bombers or missiles sent to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme.
Nuclear link?
In terms of Western relations, the Iranian arms deal is nevertheless highly controversial for Russia. It will cause disquiet among the Europeans and will infuriate the US administration. Perhaps President Vladimir Putin thinks this is a price worth paying, if it ensures Russia a larger share of the international arms market while simultaneously helping to restrain US influence in the Middle East and world affairs more generally. Yet it is also possible that Mr Putin hopes this will lead to a diplomatic triumph that will raise his country’s prestige and assuage Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme.
Russia has recently proposed a compromise solution to the US-Iranian stand-off over Iran’s plans for uranium enrichment. The plan, which has won European and (grudging) US approval, provides for the enrichment to be done in Russia under the control of a joint venture. Iran has so far refused to sign up to the plan, and in general is unwilling to make concessions which would curb its sovereignty. However, it may be that Russia has sought to link the arms sale with the nuclear deal—and that the acquisition of a Russian-made defensive missile system gives Iran’s leadership the political cover to accept the nuclear compromise.
If Iran does sign on to Russia’s nuclear compromise plan, it would be arguably the biggest Russian diplomatic coup since the collapse of the Soviet Union and would fulfil a longing among the country’s policy elite to once again play a pivotal role in global affairs. If not, Russia will have to content itself with the knowledge that it has raised its profile in the Middle East and increased the opportunities for its arms exporters—and it will have to hope that these benefits will outweigh any retribution that Washington has in mind.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
Two separate Russian news outlets ran reports on December 2nd of major arms sales to Iran. The business daily Vedomosti claimed that a deal had been signed by which Iran would buy 29 TOR-M1 surface-to-air missile systems, which are designed to shoot down aircraft or missiles at low altitude. Separately, the news agency Interfax reported that the deal, which was valued at over US$1bn, would include modernising Iran’s air force and supplying some patrol boats. According to Reuters, neither Russia’s defence ministry nor the state arms export agency Rosoboronexport was willing to comment.
Sellers can’t be choosers
The deal will add tension to Russian-Western relations, and particularly US-Russian ties, in the context of a heated stand-off between Iran and the US over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear programme. While Tehran insists this is purely for civilian purposes, Washington suspects that Iran harbours ambitions to develop nuclear weapons.
Although diplomatic calculations are an integral part of Russia’s arms sales policy, it would be a mistake to ignore domestic considerations. Russia has a large and relatively sophisticated arms industry that on most calculations is the second-largest exporter in the world. Yet this is more accurately a statement of volume rather than revenue, as the data are compiled on the basis of assumed value rather than contract prices, which are often not disclosed. To maintain jobs, high-tech skills and to help diversify the Russian economy away from a reliance on oil, gas and other primary products that dominate exports, it is therefore important that the arms sector has sufficient orders. The Russian defence budget has risen substantially in the last two years, but it is much smaller in relative terms than during the latter Soviet period. As a result, to a far greater extent than its US counterpart, Russia’s defence industry is dependent on export markets.
Here, however, Russia encounters a problem. Throughout the Soviet period, the countries of the Warsaw Pact were—literally—a captive market. Today, by contrast, most of those countries are now members of NATO and their arms markets are coming under Western sway. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic have all opted for western fighter jets to replace their ageing MiG fleets. The best that Russian firms can hope for is some refitting work, to extend the life of existing Russian-made equipment until stretched east-central European defence budgets can afford to buy new, Western-made kit.
Despite the end of the Cold War, furthermore, Russia has had no joy in selling its military equipment to the US, Western European states, Japan, Canada, Australia or New Zealand. Although there are few formal barriers to those markets, domestic lobbies and perceptions of political risk in those states have shut the doors to Russian equipment—even including the heavy-lift aircraft that non-US NATO states rely on during UN peacekeeping and disaster-relief operations, because they neither own nor produce that type of airplane.
As a result, Russia has for several years depended on China and India as its two principal arms customers. Iran and other Middle Eastern states have periodically bought Russian arms too. The dramatic move to sell over US$1bn in arms to Iran—the biggest deal between the two states in over five years—is logical from the perspective of Russia’s arms industry. It broadens the customer base and opens up the possibility of additional sales in the Middle East. Although Russia’s arms customers, with the exception of India, make the US administration nervous, the fact is that Russia has few alternative customers for its most advanced military technology.
Making a point, as well as a buck
Although Russia can legitimately point to the fact that it has few viable alternative markets for its arms, it is undeniable that political factors played an important role in the decision to sell arms to Iran. By concluding this deal Russia is making clear its diplomatic support for Iran at a time when US-Iranian relations are tense, with Washington eager to refer Iran’s non-compliance with IAEA rules to the UN Security Council. There is, moreover, some speculation that the US might undertake unilateral military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, along the lines of Israel’s strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981.
In this context, the arms sale serves to underline—as well as to take advantage of—the differences in diplomatic status between Iran today and Iraq prior to the US-led invasion. Unlike Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, there are no international restrictions on the sale of weapons to Iran. Western states will oppose the arms sale, and will be particularly upset by its timing, but they cannot accuse Russia of flouting international rules.
This is the single most important political aspect of the arms deal. It signals Russia’s confidence that Iran will not go the way of Iraq—even though both states were part of US President George Bush’s “axis of evil”—for Iran’s international political situation is very different. And it acts as an additional deterrent to US military action against Iran: the surface-to-air missiles that reportedly form the cornerstone of the deal are defensive systems, so they offer no threat to Iran’s regional neighbours. They would, however, threaten US bombers or missiles sent to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme.
Nuclear link?
In terms of Western relations, the Iranian arms deal is nevertheless highly controversial for Russia. It will cause disquiet among the Europeans and will infuriate the US administration. Perhaps President Vladimir Putin thinks this is a price worth paying, if it ensures Russia a larger share of the international arms market while simultaneously helping to restrain US influence in the Middle East and world affairs more generally. Yet it is also possible that Mr Putin hopes this will lead to a diplomatic triumph that will raise his country’s prestige and assuage Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear programme.
Russia has recently proposed a compromise solution to the US-Iranian stand-off over Iran’s plans for uranium enrichment. The plan, which has won European and (grudging) US approval, provides for the enrichment to be done in Russia under the control of a joint venture. Iran has so far refused to sign up to the plan, and in general is unwilling to make concessions which would curb its sovereignty. However, it may be that Russia has sought to link the arms sale with the nuclear deal—and that the acquisition of a Russian-made defensive missile system gives Iran’s leadership the political cover to accept the nuclear compromise.
If Iran does sign on to Russia’s nuclear compromise plan, it would be arguably the biggest Russian diplomatic coup since the collapse of the Soviet Union and would fulfil a longing among the country’s policy elite to once again play a pivotal role in global affairs. If not, Russia will have to content itself with the knowledge that it has raised its profile in the Middle East and increased the opportunities for its arms exporters—and it will have to hope that these benefits will outweigh any retribution that Washington has in mind.
SOURCE: ViewsWire Eastern Europe
posted by Marko at 12/03/2005 08:33:00 AM
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